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Abstract
Parliamentary diplomacy is an emerging path in developing international relations. Although 
parliaments function mainly as legislative producers and scrutinisers, most national 
parliaments have foreign affairs committees and departments to conduct diplomatic missions. 
The Thai Senate is part of the bicameral parliament of Thailand, that is active in legislative 
scrutiny and in diplomatic activities. However, findings from data collection demonstrate that 
the Thai Senate is yet to become a prominent diplomatic actor, let alone a solid political 
institution. The duties of the Senate are limited primarily by the Constitutional framework. 
Therefore, they are required to perform their duties according to the constitutional framework 
as well as the institutional framework within the limited period of their term in office. The 
relations between the institution and its actors, the impact of the country’s governing system 
and political culture, as well as the organisational structure are all factors that influence the 
purposes and outcomes of parliamentary diplomatic practice. The supporting evidence 
reflects the bureaucracy and the semi-democratic political system in Thailand that underlie 
the values and performance of parliamentary actors, seen through the international diplomatic 
duties of senators and their facilitators. This research shows that parliamentary diplomacy is 
another dimension of building and maintaining international relations in the parliament level. 
Moreover, the research would act as a critical document in pointing out institutional flaws for 
future improvement, in terms of the institutional structure and the actors’ performance.
Introduction
Introduction
Parliamentary diplomacy is a term used to define the representation of parliamentarians from 
different countries in a foreign convention, as referring to international diplomatic 
conferences. In this case, the description of parliamentary diplomacy is identical as that of 
conventional diplomacy. The difference would be the actors involved and the depth of 
authority in decision-making and policy implementation. The various studies and research on 
world parliaments and legislatures are often aimed at the role of parliaments in 
démocratisation and legislative scrutiny. There is no necessary commitment to parliamentary 
forms among the middle class and business groups in the Thai case, as they have not been 
able to believe that abuse of the democratic process would be inherently self-correcting 
seeing from the experiences of Thai politicians in the past (Cook, 1997, p. 158). Shifting the 
focus to studies of diplomacy and international relations, this research will specifically 
examine the role of parliament as a diplomatic actor. The Thai Senate has been used in this 
study as part of a bicameral parliament which reflects a strong bureaucratic system and is 
considered, by the researcher, as a good example of a semi-democratic political institution in 
a developing country.
This research is a case study on theorising parliamentary diplomacy, focusing on the Thai 
Senate -  also known as the Upper House of the parliament of Thailand. Throughout the 
research, theoretical arguments on diplomacy, sociological institutionalism, and political 
culture in Thailand will be incorporated to the discussions, as needed. The main reason for 
selecting this research topic on parliamentary diplomacy is because it has not been widely 
researched. The focus on parliamentary diplomacy itself, moreover, has received very little 
attention in scholarly publications date. The limited existing research is mostly focused on
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European parliaments, rather than Asian parliaments. Possible reasons for the lack of research 
in Asian parliaments in the fields of parliamentary diplomacy would be the instability of the 
political regime, inevitably setting a framework for its governing system. Therefore, this 
research has been conducted on the Thai Senate, not only to examine the level of 
parliamentary diplomacy in international diplomatic duties but also to study the relations 
between the institution and its actors. Moreover, the benefits of looking at the case study on 
the Thai Senate as a case study of a young semi-democratic institution would also provide a 
foundation for future studies on Asian parliaments which are shaped by their political 
regimes and culture. A definition of parliamentary diplomacy will then gradually be 
developed from conceptualising existing scholarship on diplomacy and international 
relations, combined with the fieldwork gathered to support the initial hypotheses on the Thai 
Senate as being a certain sort of diplomatic actor. Positively, this will also enable a better 
understanding of the institutional political structure, as well as the impact of Thailand’s 
political culture and bureaucratic system as they shape the parliamentary system as well as 
the performance of parliamentary diplomatic actors. Findings presented in this research may 
hopefully be able to increase knowledge of parliamentary diplomatic prospects in the long 
run.
Reasons for conducting this research
The purpose of conducting this research is to investigate the role and effectiveness of 
parliamentary diplomacy through the international diplomatic duties of the Thai Senate. 
There are several reasons for considering the Thai Senate as a case study for theorising and 
answering questions on Thai parliamentary diplomacy. Firstly, most existing research on 
parliamentary diplomacy has been limited to studying Western parliaments, more specifically 
parliaments in Western Europe (Weisglas and de Boer, 2007, Stravidis, 2005). It is true that
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the parliamentary structure originated in Europe, however it would be useful to conduct a 
study on Asian parliaments. Most parliaments in the Eastern continents have adopted the US 
Congress or the UK Westminster parliament model. Again, it would be an interesting matter 
to study Asian parliaments as they have adopted the parliamentary structure and adapt the 
Westem-style parliament to their own political culture. The political regime including the 
selection of parliament members and the organisation of members within the Houses would 
be reflected through the parliamentary system. Thus, a case study on an Asian parliament 
would be helpful to provide a detailed research for future studies on developments of Asian 
parliamentary institutions, and to provide a generic picture of how most Asian parliaments 
have evolved over time combining the Western parliamentary model with their country’s 
political culture and system.
Secondly, the Parliament of Thailand -  as parliaments anywhere -  represents a country with a 
distinctive political culture. The political system in Thailand could be described as semi- 
democratic, military dominant. Diverse orientations on political culture represent specific 
attitudes or orientations as to the appropriate relationship of citizens to government (Albritton 
and Prabudhanitisam, 1997, p.63). Political institutions reflect an intense patron-client 
bureaucratic political system. This will be explained in detail along the course of the thesis in 
chapter 3 . Furthermore, studying the international diplomatic duties of the Senate would also 
lead to an understanding of the institutional structure, inevitably being influenced by the 
bureaucratic system of government. This research rests on an assumption that the relations 
between the actors and the institution would affect the performance and outcomes of foreign 
diplomatic missions. Evidence from data will be able to clarify this point later on in chapter 4 
where findings will be presented and discussed.
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Thirdly, viewing the Thai Senate as a case study for the purpose of considering parliamentary 
diplomacy would also point out the limitations of diplomatic practice through parliamentary 
actors. Members of parliament represent the legislative sector of government. In general, 
existing scholarly literature on diplomacy does not identify parliaments as major actors in the 
conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy. International duties of parliaments, consequently, 
are either perceived as secondary duties or in certain governments not even part of 
parliamentarians’ duties at all (interview with senator from Committee on Education, March 
2011). The researcher’s opinion on this matter is that the global course of advanced 
communication has stimulated new branches of interaction in every social unit. Globalisation 
is best understood as both an ideological construction and a material effect, being an 
empirically exogenous variable that provides support for policy change and to which 
domestic politics must react (Conley, 2001, p.224). This has then enabled people to become 
more interconnected, and as a result modes of communication and actors involved have 
gradually emerged in order to build and strengthen international relations. During the course 
of this research, arguments and discussions will be supported by evidence to demonstrate that 
diplomatic duties are in fact as important to the functioning of the institution as are domestic 
legislative duties. Findings will also provide weight to the initial hypothesis on parliamentary 
institutions as diplomatic actors.
The main purpose of conducting this research is to seek a formal conceptualisation of 
parliamentary diplomacy by providing the reader with a genuine example of a contemporary 
diplomatic actor; a national parliament. Moreover, the evidence gathered to support this 
research will be used to throw light on the initial hypotheses that parliamentary diplomacy 
can be considered as another channel in building a viable international relations. Other data 
found through interviews and archival consultation provide evidence on the structure of the
12
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Thai Senate and the Secretariat of the Senate, which in turn help form an institutional model 
for the research analysis later on. Further, obstacles and limitations that may occur during the 
conducting of this research may also stimulate improved methods for the institutional system. 
In addition, examples from other parliaments will be added to the discussion in order to give 
a general amount of on the institutional structures and policies both of domestic and 
international duties. This would also constitute a model in order to see whether there are 
practices of parliamentary diplomacy in other parliaments, in order to make it function more 
effectively both in diplomacy and in other legislative functions. The findings from fieldwork, 
are intended to fill in the gaps of the argument by pointing out issues and areas where the 
procedures of foreign missions can be improved.
The prospects for effective parliamentary diplomacy will be placed in the final part of the 
thesis. Expectations from findings would be to seek for evidence to explain the level of the 
Senate’s diplomatic duties and define its dimension as a diplomatic actor. The Senate, being a 
legislative institution, has limited decision-making authorities according to the Constitution. 
The composition of the Thai senators is also a factor that would determine their level of 
activeness and responsibility in parliament. Appointed senators have a 6-year term period in 
parliament, while the elected senators have a 3-year period. In addition, the elected senators 
are limited to restrictions on certain qualifications in the Senate, e.g. they are not able to stand 
for Senate Presidential elections. Apart from the constitutional framework and the senators’ 
entrance into parliament, the senators working style and preference in working with 
secretariat staff or with their personal aides would also reflect their attitudes towards the 
domestic and diplomatic duties, not to mention the prospective outcomes of these duties. 
Moreover, the Senate is part of a bicameral parliament which is heavily shaped by a semi- 
democratic -  authoritarian bureaucratic culture. Therefore, the research will start from the
i:
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assumption that the Thai Senate is a diplomatic actor within its institutional framework. 
These facts and assumptions, likewise, will be a basis for the discussions and arguments 
along the course of the research towards the conclusion. Any additional data risen during 
fieldwork, whether be positive aspects or institutional flaws, will not only provide a testing of 
the initial hypotheses but will also encourage parliamentary institutions as representatives of 
the people to be more conscious about their structure and maintain an efficient system to 
provide substantial procedures on both domestic and international duties.
The following parts will discuss the methodology of this research and an introduction to each 
chapter respectively, to provide an outline of the main issues that will be discussed through 
this research.
Methodology
A mixed-methods qualitative research design is used in conducting this research. Semi­
structured interviews were conducted; 17 senators from the 2008-2011 incumbency, 11 
Secretariat of the Senate staff in various positions, and 5 professional representatives who are 
not affiliated with the Thai parliament. The specific period of study (2008-2011) was chosen 
because of the convenience of data accessibility and spontaneity of research. Moreover, this 
particular period is a clear example of a transitional period in parliament, thus has direct 
impact on the functionality of Thai politics. Additional documents including official report 
summaries on foreign missions of the Senate, courtesy calls, official visits to foreign 
parliaments and receptions of foreign delegations. Although theoretical arguments on 
diplomacy, new institutionalism, and political culture specifically on Thai politics and 
democracy will be incorporated for this research, data analysis is based on grounded theory.
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Grounded theory is an organised system for discovering a theory that explains the core 
variable in a substantive area, thus a set of principles and methodology are developed. 
Relationships between concepts, incidents, properties, and categories are then explained 
(Stillman, 2006, p.499). For this reason, the interview transcriptions and the data collected 
from various official documents are triangulated to see whether there would be any emerging 
issues apart from the approaches initially adopted in the first chapters of the thesis. New data 
that emerge from data triangulation among the 3 groups of people interviewed, are then 
triangulated with the data obtained from official documents.
Apart from semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1) and document analysis, first-hand 
information has also been acquired from personal observation from the period of 2007 -  
2009, during the time the researcher was working as a secretariat staff in the Bureau of 
Foreign Affairs. This additional information is also helpful to support the data collected from 
the semi-structured interviews and the document details. On the one hand there is an 
advantage from being able to observe individuals and systems while being an insider. The 
access to people and data were more convenient, as most of the data collected was strictly 
confidential and would have been difficult for people who are not parliamentary staff to 
access. However, it is intended to analyse the data from an outsider’s perspective to provide 
readers with a critical, analysis on the Thai Senate as a political institution and diplomatic 
actor. As a result, evidence is presented to support the discussions from a researcher’s 
perspective rather than an insider from the. Secretariat of the Senate. As the research 
environment is also considered a political environment, there are clear sets of difficulties that 
can be recognised in conducting research in one’s workplace in terms of what the researcher 
represents in the written thesis and the consideration of the researcher’s status within the 
institution (Drake, 2010, p.86). Further, the similarities between the Thai parliament and
15
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other Asian parliaments, which will be signified later on in chapter 3, is that the Thai Senate 
has been raised as a case study to highlight its distinctive characteristics in terms of 
measuring the suitability of democracy and the preference for democracy in shaping the 
institutional function. The distinction from other Asian parliaments would be that the Thai 
Senate is still in the process of advancement, combined with other already advanced 
counterparts e.g. Korea, Japan. Examples and details will be explained further in chapter 4 on 
findings from data collection.
This research methodology is structured to test my initial hvpotheses that the Thai Senate is a 
important institution in domestic legislative scrutiny, but is yet to develop in becoming an 
effective diplomatic actor. However, I argue initially that prospects of the Thai Senate in 
becoming an effective diplomatic actor depend upon the actors’ values and perceptions on the 
importance of international diplomatic duties. A further argument is that senate staff are the 
steering wheel in parliamentary diplomatic procedures, as they have a better understanding of 
the process of parliamentary diplomacy than the senators. Senate staff are permanent civil 
servants while senators are temporary political actors. Therefore, their understandings and 
experiences on foreign diplomatic duties are different. A final background issue to be 
explored is that the diplomatic actors in this study, senators and senate staff, perform their 
duties according to their existing knowledge, professional background, norrns and regulations 
within the institution.
16
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Structure
The first chapter will begin with a general definition of conventional diplomatic practice by 
giving a discussion on the evolution of conventional diplomacy and how the nature of 
diplomatic practice has evolved during recent decades with the emergence of new diplomatic 
actors. Diplomacy, in . the first chapter, will be discussed in terms of representation, 
negotiation, and communication. The argument will be made that the emergence of new 
diplomatic players could be driven by an individual’s perceptions and values of international 
prospects and to fulfill institutional requirements.
In addition, the discussion will carry on as to how the fulfilment of parliamentary diplomatic 
duties are in a way perceived as an alternative path to increase foreign relations with 
equivalent counterparts, thus contributing to further studies of emerging diplomatic actors. 
My arguments will then consider the impact of diplomacy in decision-making and policy 
implementation, presenting discussions on how the constitutional framework has set limits to 
the authority of parliamentary actors.
In chapter 2, the discussion will move on to consider several influences that stimulate the 
functioning of parliamentary diplomacy. The factors that will be raised include political and 
geographical proximity, economic globalisation, and political culture in Thailand.
“As is often the case in political science, these [academic] contributions [on 
Europeanisation and démocratisation] can be grouped according .to whether they 
mainly emphasise structures or actors. The former models emphasise how 
geographical proximity, the degree of interdependency, and power asymmetries 
between the external actor and the target state more or less determine the success
17
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rate of the external influence attempt. The latter arguments, in contrast, 
accentuate how domestic political elites, on the basis of their main values and
calculations of both the internal and external costs and benefits of political
change, decide whether or not to give: into external demands.”
(Tolstrup, 2012, p.2)
The arguments on the functioning of the diplomatic actors from the Senate in this part will 
also be supported by the sociological institutionalist approach, focusing on March and 
Olsen’s theory “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 2009, p.l). Decisions are shaped 
by one’s identity, the application of rules, and situational recognition (Weber, Kopelman, 
Messick, 2004, p.282). The discussion on March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness will be 
introduced as an explanation of the bureaucratic system in Thailand, the relationship between 
actors and the institution. Throughout this thesis, the arguments and discussions will be based 
on the logic of appropriateness, adding relevant facts on the Thai parliamentary system
including the appointment of the senators and details on the political culture in Thailand as a
base for the research analysis. This sub-theory on sociological institutionalism will give a 
reflection on the parliamentary actors’ purposes on international diplomatic duties and 
examine whether it leads on to affect any outcomes of foreign missions. Institutional logics 
are constitutive of political orders where the logic affects the formation of political order are 
adopted to explain principles that regulate interactions, levels of appropriate integration, what 
mechanisms to apply, and who should be legitimate participants (Batora, 2009, p. 1075). 
Therefore, the adopting of March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness approach in this 
chapter will also be used to explain the relationship between the actor and the institution, and 
also the actors’ performance during the period of their term in office. This would then help to
18
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clarify the initial research questions and hypotheses on the functionality of the Thai Senate in 
p^liamentary diplomacy.
Chapter 3 will discuss the political culture of Thailand as a historical background of this 
research. My argument will be that the performance of senators -  considered to be temporary 
political actors -  is shaped by the patron-client bureaucratic model that underlies the Thai 
political system. During the administrative reforms in states where bureaucracy was clearly 
subservient in the late twentieth century, the relatively more autonomous Asian bureaucracies 
have tended either to pursue minor internal improvements in the face of crisis or reluctantly 
negotiated a reform program within limited parameters where external demands were strong 
(Painter, 2006, p.27). Parliamentary reforms, similarly, would reflect the administrative status 
of the country.
“Politics [in Thailand] is actually moving faster than the traffic these days-—and 
turning a critical comer. People's movements in the city and countryside are 
significantly expanding their claims on a political sphere long dominated by the 
civil bureaucracy and the military. Change is coming from the top, in the 
drafting of a new democratic constitution, and from the bottom, in the shifting of 
public attitudes and the growth of civil society. There is, however, strong 
resistance from the establishment, and some intellectuals say true democracy 
will be impossible as long as the monarchy retains its demigod status.”
(Eng, 1997, p. 170)
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As Eng notes, Thai politics reflects the patron-client style bureaucracy. As a result, this 
historical background chapter will give a detailed explanation not only on the Thai 
parliamentary culture, but also a generalisation on other Asian parliaments in the region eg. 
Japan, South Korea. Examples of other Asian parliaments are given in this chapter to show 
the development of new Asian democracies. The selected countries are often showcased as 
successful countries that have recovered from the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and have 
stabilised their parliamentary system. When discussing parliamentary politics, there are 
problems surrounding the transformation of relationship between parliament and government. 
The institutional aspects at the level of parliamentary composition and representation which 
redefine the institutional capabilities and political identity of the legislature also add to the 
structuring of parliament (Verzichelle, 2008, p.35). The adopting of March and Olsen’s logic 
of appropriateness approach in the previous chapter can also be used to explain the 
relationship between the actor and the institution, and also the actors’ performance during the 
period of their term in office. This will then help to clarify the initial research questions and 
hypotheses on the functioning of the Thai Senate in parliamentary diplomacy.
In chapter 4, the discussion will be more focused on analysing the Thai Senate as an example 
of a parliamentary diplomatic actor. In this part, the debate will be more critical and 
analytically based on the findings from semi-structured interviews with senators, secretariat 
staff, and professional representatives who are not affiliated with parliament. The analysis of 
the main theme of the research - the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor - will be examined 
according to supporting information from interviews and additional data from official 
documents from the Secretariat of the Senate, Bangkok. Data triangulation was used to 
expand and validate embodied meanings of divergent viewpoints, in order to gain fuller
20
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understanding of certain events'. However, the epistemological nature of the data collection 
and analysis is not aimed to prove whether my research questions are right or wrong, as they 
do not have a correct or incorrect answer, but to gather evidence to support my assumptions. 
The nature of the qualitative research is based on the context of discovery rather than 
verification as new practices or behaviours, new forms of social organisation or social 
structure and new ways of thinking or interpreting processes of socialisation or change new 
information may be reflected (Ambert, Adler, Adler and Detzner, 1995, p.880).
Chapter 5 will include specific discussion on case studies which have risen during data 
collection. Case studies on territorial disputes; Thai-Myanmese Thai-Cambodian border 
conflict, and domestic conflict in the three Southernmost provinces in Thailand as well as the 
ASEAN 2015 community development plan were examples that were repeatedly mentioned 
during the interview conversations. Therefore, in this part these cases will be critically 
discussed to demonstrate examples of the Thai Senate as a representative in foreign 
diplomatic duties. In the case of the Southernmost provinces insurgency, members of the 
Senate are seen as more active in internal diplomacy coordinating with the government and 
other private sectors in solving the conflict. Theoretical points on border disputes, territory 
and conflict studies will be adopted as a structure for the discussion in this chapter. The 
discussion made will also be related to part of the influences on the development of 
parliamentary diplomacy which are raised earlier on in chapter 2 on influences and factors for 
the development of parliamentary diplomacy.
See Ma and Norwich, 2007, p .212. For triangulation in qualitative research, see Denzin, 1989.
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Also, these cases will seek to elaborate the ambitions, objectives, and initiatives of the Senate 
-  as part of the Thai parliament -in  strengthening and stabilising its position within the 
region. These case studies also seek to demonstrate the role of the Senate as part of the 
international negotiating team where the decision-making authority is limited by the 
Constitution^ Modem political representation may be conceived as the main frame for 
parliament as an institution, with parliamentary parties as cmcial collective actors driving the 
political games within the parliament (Russo and Verzechelli, 2012, p.351). The role of the 
constitution and the separation of powers can always be interpreted in purely functionalist 
terms in the emergence of new institutions as the likely consequences of delegating review 
powers and conditions how the legitimacy of new institutions will be examined, debated, and 
understood (Sweet, 2002, p.77-78).
In the conclusion chapter, a summary on the research findings based on the initial research 
questions and hypotheses will be presented. The interpretation of parliamentary diplomacy 
will also be concluded through the evidence obtained from the Thai Senate, proving whether 
it is a good example of a parliamentary diplomatic actor and whether legislative institutions 
are capable of proceeding to foreign diplomatic duties. The concluding discussions will 
consolidate the theoretical discussions and arguments from each of the previous chapters. As 
a preliminary definition of parliamentary diplomacy from various scholarly definitions would 
be stated in the first chapter, in the concluding part a summary the practice of parliamentary 
diplomacy which can lead on to further in-depth research in similar or relevant fields in the 
studies of diplomacy and international relations. Limitations from this research will also be 
pointed out in the conclusion, as to measure if the research outcomes may have been 
presented differently had these limits have not occurred.
" See Ram-Prasad, 2012, p.2. The individual and collective impact a constitution normatively offers a vision o f  a 
political life founded on individual liberty that nevertheless invites a plurality o f belonging, then it might 
encourage loyalty from citizens for whom such belonging is existentially significant.
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Chapter 1: Evolution of Traditional Diplomacy
Chapter 1 
Evolution of Traditional Diplomacy
“Distant proximities encompass the tensions between core and periphery, between 
national and transnational systems, between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, 
between cultures and subcultures, between states and markets, between urban and rural, 
between coherence and incoherence, between integration and disintegration, between 
decentralisation and centralisation, between universalism and particularism, between pace 
and space, between global and local”
(Rosenau, 2003, p.4)
Diplomatic practice has existed since the formation of communities, and has advanced 
through time. Conventional diplomats, or international envoys, would usually be responsible 
for almost everything ranging from formal procedures to informal chores. Stories from the 
senior professionals^ have inspired younger generations to ponder about seeking careers in 
the foreign service. The universal perception of a diplomat appears as one of the most 
prestigious professions, holding the representative position of the state and having all -the 
opportunities to grace formal banquets and encounter important figures from monarchs to 
Presidents to head of states. In a way, that should be the formal part of their career. On the 
less formal part, diplomats actually have to do everything; representing the country, heading 
a delegation, making decisions and public statements, answering phone calls, hosting dinner 
parties, and fixing a blocked pipe. It would be possible to define a diplomat, from these few 
examples of their duties, as being the country’s handyman.
 ^The introductory part o f this chapter has been composed o f  various informal conversations with senior 
ambassadors, diplomats, and parliamentarians during the years 2007 -  2009 while the author was working at the 
Secretariat o f  the Senate, Bangkok, Thailand, and during March-May 2011 when fieldwork for this research was 
conducted.
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Chapter 1: Evolution of Traditional Diplomacy
Diplomacy is the art of communication, representation, negotiation, and international 
relations practice between representatives of states. In the contemporary world society, the 
impact of soft power is analysed according to conceptual, institutional, and political 
challenges (Wilson, 2008, p.l 11). When we think about diplomacy at the first instance, we 
usually get the images of high ranking executives dressed up smartly meeting in a grand hall, 
shaking hands, and indulging in banquets. On the conventional image of diplomacy, this is 
how diplomacy was and is still practiced nowadays, but there is more to the small chats and 
wine toasting among foreign office diplomats. The message from involved parties that are 
being conveyed is what matters the most in diplomatic relations. Through history, diplomatic 
affairs in the 18"^  and 19^  ^ century belonged to an aristocratic elite relationships between 
monarchs and rulers. Twentieth-century diplomats are envoys of the people. Broadly 
speaking, the former were professionals while the latter are amateurs in statecraft (Thompson, 
1984, p.373-374). The area of international affairs is the preserve of the executive and has 
traditionally been seen as a domain in which the government rather than the Parliament 
provides the leadership"'. My discussion in the following sectors would be to examine whether 
parliament does hold the authority and competency to have leadership in diplomacy and 
international relations building among foreign peers.
There are diplomats everywhere these days, in every establishment. When the time comes for 
an institutional member to be representative of some sort with Other international 
counterparts, they would need to show the radical side of their diplomatic competencies.
All countries have conventional diplomats, but they also have other diplomatic actors from 
other political institutions who are unique in their duties. In a way, it is undeniable that the 
modem world system has urged representatives from other social and political establishments
Since they represent the people, parliaments are entitled to debate government policies and actions, be 
informed o f developments in the international fields, and initiate their own investigations o f  international issues 
should they so choose. See Laundy, 1989, p.45.
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to come forth as diplomatic actors in their own rights. Changes of the model of global politics 
in the past millennium are employed for making a projection of institution a development of 
the twenty-first century. These changes, moreover, are expected to co-evolve with 
developments in démocratisation, the world economy, and public opinion (Modelski and 
Thompson, 1999, p. 109). Governments everywhere increasingly have to adjust and react to 
the global spread of democracy and the rise of assertive citizens with the potential to organise 
across borders, as in politics state sovereignty is currently being challenged by people power 
(Leonard and Avakeson, 2000, p.2). To put it in simple words, the constant shifting and 
advancement of global activities have encouraged new actors to become more assertive, at 
the same time competitive in order to adapt their professional skills in building international 
relations.
As this research is focused on a political institution, adopting empirical theory into the 
research has helped to clarify the arguments within the theoretical framework. Therefore, 
empirical theory is adopted for research such as this study in an attempt to understand the 
nature of international relations as it tries to explain processes, develop propositions, and 
discover correlations in the world of interaction among states^ Moreover, the implementation 
of research procedures in organisations has to deal with complicated organisational reactions, 
thus data from organisation research are often arranged on different aggregate levels 
(Grunow, 1995, p.93).
The representation of new diplomatic players could be from the institutional requirements in 
fulfilling international duties or to solidify an individual’s perceptions and values on 
international prospects. States have been forced to increase attention in their quest to improve
 ^ See Lauren, 1979, p .8. Qualitative research usually involves a combination o f cross-case comparisons and 
within-case analysis using the methods o f congruence testing and process tracing. For theory-orientated research 
and case studies, see George and Smoke, 2004.
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legitimacy, therefore public diplomacy has been stimulated by new types of actors including 
supranational polities, multilateral organisations, civil society actors, as well as new 
communication technologies (Proedru and Frangonikelopoulos, 2012, p.728). This is to say 
that the roles of formerly dominant traditional diplomats, in this sense foreign ministry 
officials and representatives, are being overtaken by alternative diplomatic actors. In some 
societies today we even see that new diplomatic actors are becoming as. active as the 
conventional foreign office representatives. “New public diplomacy” representatives would 
act to signify a combination of public and traditional diplomacy, international and domestic 
information activities, as well as news management and marketing (Gilboa, 2008, p.58). 
Before I begin to discuss about parliamentary diplomacy and its significance to international 
relations, it is worth justifying the meaning and the nature of the traditional diplomatic 
practice as well as discussing the factors that influence its evolution into several types of 
diplomacy in the contemporary world. This will help clarify my arguments on parliamentary 
diplomacy and the Thai Senate for the purpose of constructing a diplomatic model later on.
a. Defining diplomacy
I. Traditional Diplomacy 
The word ‘diplomacy’ carries various interpretations and is part of our daily human 
interactions as we speak. Diplomacy itself is an ancient method of communication, yet 
throughout the periods, various titles for diplomacy are applied for the level and purpose of 
diplomacy. For example, public diplomacy is used by states, associations of states, and non­
state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; 
and influence opinions and actions to advance values and interests (Gregory, 2008, p.274). 
As part of the regular function of conventional diplomacy and intelligence work, information 
on foreign public opinion has also been gathered. Although not widely practiced, this covers
an event whereby an international actor seeks out a foreign audience and engages them by
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listening rather than by speaking (Cull, 2008, p;32). In this context, diplomacy is used as a 
soft method of building and maintaining international relations. International outcomes 
through influence upon and constitution of actors reflect discourses of transnational 
discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2006, p. 102).
To put it simply, diplomacy is the interaction between two or more actors in building 
relations, each side or both sides getting the information they want through customary or 
legal proceedings or proceedings they want without tainting the formal relationship between 
the parties (Barston, 2006, p. 1-5). Diplomats have long recognised one-way communication 
forms and outlets that are inherently self-contained, which would later on develop into a 
dialogical form of communication in public pronouncements (Cowan and Arsenault, 2008, 
p. 12). The relations would then develop into a more formal correspondence where official 
practices are involved and the individual actors would have to maintain a pleasurable and 
reliable relationship with their equivalents^. The information or proceedings in this context 
refers to any prospect that would be of benefit to the countries they represent. The 
relationship between the definition of diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice, however, 
has long been a starting point for scholarly discussions (Constantinou, 1996, p. 48), as the 
practice may not always follow along with the definition. Diplomatic actors could be 
representatives varying from a small to a vast social unit, from a social group to a country. 
Diplomatic relations could begin from individuals from neighbouring countries, countries 
within the same region, then expand out to countries outside of the region that share similar 
interests or benefit. Table 1 gives a comparison of the shifting nature of traditional diplomacy 
to the more contemporaiy practice of public diplomacy as follows;
 ^The peaceful relationship between two countries or more, otherwise bilateral or multilateral relationship, 
would remain stable unless a severe situation forces one part or all to cut o ff the mutual relations.
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Table 1: Traditional and public diplomacy
Traditional diplomacy Public diplomacy
Key actors States People
Source of power Coercion Attraction
Diplomatic strategy Powerplay / realpolitik Good international 
citizenship/ mutual benefit
Objectives Imposing ideas Shaping preferences
Communications Propaganda/self-promotion Partnership/networks
Role of government Directing Facilitating
Attitude to information Confidentiality/trading
secrets
Openness/building
trust/credibility
International structures Bilateral Multilateral
Mindset Win/lose Win/win
War For land or economic gain For values or international 
stability
Source: Leonard and Avakeson, 2000.
The chart above has been presented to point out a distinctive comparison and the 
development of diplomatic procedures throughout the phases of modem international affairs. 
In the following section, moreover, the interpretation of diplomacy as a method of 
representation, negotiation and communication respectively.
II Contemporary diplomacy: public diplomacy 
Diplomacy as representation
Several explanations of diplomacy have been stated and noticeably most say that diplomacy 
is in fact a system of representation. What do they represent? This depends on who they are 
and where they come from in the society. Diplomatic actors universally are expected to be 
ambassadors and civil servants from the Foreign Ministry, representing their country and the 
institution they have membership with. Kurbalija (1999) explained that diplomacy is a 
human-intensive activity, being conducted largely through personal communication and 
individual actors, evaluations and decisions. Jonsson (2002) stated that in addition to being a 
system of representation, diplomacy is also a system of communication. However, he 
elaborated more that diplomacy is ‘a bone of contention’ as the study of diplomacy displays a
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variety of conceptualisations rather than scholarly consensus, given the undeveloped and 
fragmented nature of the field. Sharp (1999) argued that diplomacy is a discrete human 
practice constituted by the explicit construction, representation, negotiation, and manipulation 
of necessarily ambiguous identities. In some situations, however, it is also possible that 
diplomacy can be viewed as a discursive facilitator of communication. This is in the sense 
that as diplomacy is needed more urgently in a situation where the social context in which 
actors operate is mostly developed, and where the identities of the agents appear as less 
obvious. New institutions begin to create new dynamics of interaction only when institutional 
changes are accompanied by changing self-perceptions that new institutions begin to create 
new dynamics of interaction (Todd, 2005, p, 429).
Bringing the subject back to diplomacy, along the line of Jonsson’s argument, it is clear to 
say that the definition of diplomacy itself varies according to the context and the position of 
the person who defines it. As this working topic is on a particular dimension of diplomacy, it 
accords as much with Jonsson’s statement about diplomacy being a system of communication 
and representation as it does to represent the country and its outlook (Hemery, 2002, p. 139). 
The diplomatic actor would inevitably reflect the prospects of his government and his 
country, sometimes just by looking at the name of the country he represents without starting a 
formal conversation.
While in the process of discussing and negotiation, the practitioner must keep in mind that it
is the message conveyed to deliver the country’s policy message - what others hear - that
ultimately matters most, not what one says (Ross, 2002, p.76). It should be asserted further
that the communication abilities of the individual is one of the most important factors in the
diplomatic procedure. Also, the purpose and intention that lies underneath the
communication, otherwise the discursive purpose, is more important than the person’s image
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or the country’s name. The discussion will carry on to talk about negotiation as one of the 
most important parts of diplomacy. In general, negotiations usually expect results in turn, and 
the results would be either positive or negative, one way or another. At the same time it is 
possible for certain negotiations to go nowhere, but resulting in an open-ended discussion or 
a typical debate where the participating parties cannot come up with a resolution. In certain 
situations prior to the start of a negotiating session, orders can be made to determine the 
outcome of the negotiation which either has to result in an agreement or disagreement. Unless 
there are severe political situations that force the diplomatic relations to end, the 
representative country would prefer to maintain pleasurable relations. Cutting off diplomatic 
relations is likely to cause negative image and reputation to a country or all countries 
involved (Henrikson, 2000, pp. 122-123).
The argument on communication and its impact on states draw us towards the thought of
balancing power in international relations. As diplomacy is about the effectiveness of
communication and representation, the nature of diplomacy in fact engages the ambition for
power and managing social governance. As the current discussion is based on an Asian
government model, the political system in Singapore can be used as an example of a
neighbouring country in the same region where the shifting of power and governance has had
impact on bureaucracy. The role of the public sector and the changing nature of the state are
reflected in the government's policy orientation. As a result, the focuses on the current trends
of change in governance in terms of the nature of state formation, policy orientation, role
definition, administrative structure, and welfare provision (Haque, 2004, pp. 228-231).
Relating this case to the discussion on the Thai parliament, parliamentary procedures not only
reflect their professional orientation but also the shaping of the bureaucratic system on the
institutional structure. I shall be arguing about competitiveness and power in the next part of
this chapter, but for now I will include a brief discussion on governance as part of the
30
Chapter 1: Evolution of Traditional Diplomacy
intention of diplomatic nature. We could see that part of diplomacy and its contribution to the 
world always has a purpose, that is to gain social power beginning from a micro level. 
Multilateral cooperation has created a new type of diplomat, the international civil servant 
leading to the definition for the practice as parliamentary diplomacy. In democratic countries, 
foreign policy decisions are steered by the objectives of that country’s foreign policy given 
the responsibility by the constitution (Kleiner, 2008, p. 321-322).
This is to say that when country representatives meet, their discussions would assert to an 
extent a willingness to demonstrate their power and to show their abilities of being in control 
of that power. Latham (1999) has explained that decision makers, steering committees, or 
administrators generate governance as they manage or administer the activities of their 
organisations or those of the people and things for which they assume responsibility. Even if 
diplomatic actors do not often reveal straightforwardly that they need to be accepted for their 
power, they tend to show through their talks and speeches that the country they represent has 
the power and competency to perform in the international level.
Diplomacy as negotiation
Apart from the interpretation of diplomacy as being manners of communication and 
representation, it can be argued that the most important part of the diplomatic procedure 
would be the negotiating process^ When things go wrong or when a counterpart is in need of
 ^Brett (2000) presents three main situations that are created at the end o f a process o f  negotiations:
1. Successful conclusion for both parties— win-win situation. Every side in the negotiations has benefitted. 
This outcome is possible when each side is interested in something different and when this focus o f interest 
isfound on a different scale.
2. Successful conclusion for only one party. This situation occurs when both parties are found on the same 
scale o f measurement. The success and failure o f  the parties are measured by the same standards (zero sum 
game).
3. Cessation o f negotiations without results, when neither o f the parties has been satisfied and neither has 
succeeded in convincing the other side. The result o f this situation is that each party loses. When the sides 
are motivated to search for information about the opposite party so as to contribute to the construction o f  the 
agreement and they are flexible in the process that will lead to agreement, it is possible to bridge the cultural 
gaps and reach an agreement optimal for both sides.
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a favour or assistance in an international level, the well-known characteristic of diplomacy is 
that the words yes and no do not exist. Even if they do exist, diplomatic representatives are 
not supposed to use them unless the situation needs an ultimatum. Meerts (1999) has given an 
explanation to support this by stating that the art of negotiation plays an important role in 
diplomacy when states wish to cooperate on the basis of common interests, or even if there 
are opposing interests, as long as they wish to reach a non-violent solution to a conflict. 
Diplomats, or diplomatic actors, as will be referred to throughout in this argument, need to be 
able to speak out from a professional perspective, tackle the situation by giving convincing 
and accurate reasons for agreement or disagreement, but at the same time avoid saying yes or 
no at the same time as maintaining the harmony between relations. If one compared the 
negotiating process in spoken words it would be like saying “I will do this for you if you do 
that for me, and we will all be happy”. In most social structures and institutions, a burden 
placed on society is to improve the efficiency of a top-heavy bureaucracy and expanding its 
military power leading to an increase in benefits (Shiner, 2000, p.330). Therefore, from this 
point of argument the negotiation process is seen as a formal communication medium in 
maintaining the balance of power not only among the involved parts internationally, but also 
to keep the power balanced within the local government of each country.
Negotiation is viewed as the most crucial part of diplomatic procedures as it can determine
the outcome of the whole diplomatic mission (Kersten, Michalowski, Szpakowicz, and
Koperczak, 1991, p. 1269-1270). We all know that national ambassadors appointed to foreign
posts abroad already possess the skills and advantages of a potential communicator and
negotiator from their intensive training and experience. I argue here that every diplomatic
actor, whether conventional or new alternative actors, should understand and improve their
negotiating skills to an extent. Diplomacy is not only about shaking hands and attending
dinner receptions. If a country or institution provides communicating representatives as a
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group, at least one group member should be able to negotiate professionally and by position 
this is most likely to be the group leader (Neumayer, 2008, p.230-231). The group leader 
refers to head of state, president, chairperson of institution, ambassador, or person with 
highest rank in the representative groups From this point of view, it could be justified that the 
diplomatic actor regardless of his background and profession should have some experience in 
speaking and negotiating abilities. The person might not need such skills in all circumstances 
but it is always best to maintain these skills in case they might be needed on an urgent matter. 
The case that will be raised later on the Thai Senate will demonstrate that negotiations have 
not yet been used, despite its importance in diplomacy as the members and the institution are 
still in the developing stage of seeking an international identity to become a successful 
diplomatic actor. Further arguments and assumptions will be put forth for the discussing the 
Thai Senate.
Diplomacy as communication
Moving on from the interpretations of traditional diplomacy, we will now think about how 
diplomacy has given advantage to other actors in developing and maintaining international 
relations. The working nature of diplomacy consists of building relations, through official 
channels including talks, meetings, seminars, conferences. In some instances, ‘personal 
diplomacy’ as the name says could also happen during informal periods and in unexpected 
places, for instance during a tea break along the corridors. My argument is that conventional 
practices in diplomacy provide a foundation of ideas for other actors, so that they know the 
Standard procedures and customs to begin with. The procedures, however, would differ 
depending on the institution and the actors involved in the diplomatic process and this would
 ^ Futher discussions on the knowledge and understanding on parliamentary diplomacy and seniority in the 
workplace will be explained in the second part o f this chapter (shapings o f  parliament).
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also lead to different outcomes. The most important point to stress here is that the existing 
knowledge of the other actors as well as the understanding, how they value the prospects of 
diplomacy would definitely affect their performance and the level of successful outcomes of 
their procedures. Again, the person who acts as the diplomat should need to understand and 
separate his self perceptions as an individual and as a government representative, for the 
duties he presides in both roles are different. Smith (1968) pointed out that the diplomatic 
process acquires some formalities in international relationships and it also requires some 
limitations, demanding learning and ingenuity to surmount. For what a diplomat can say or 
do as an individual in his own society, he cannot always say or do in another -  what, as an 
individual, not always as a government representative -  and what he does decide is feasible is 
so subject to misunderstanding.
However, it is clear to see that nowadays traditional diplomacy is becoming blurred as
Barston (2006) explained that nowadays foreign ministries and diplomatic service personnel
should not be viewed in a restrictive or formal sense as being the only preserved
representatives of diplomacy. Societies have expanded to be more advanced and
interconnected. Traditional diplomatic routes may become time consuming -  considering the
matter of space and the number of connections the information needs to pass through.
Therefore, there are other political actors in various levels that have emerged and are
becoming more active in diplomatic relations. The questioning of international relations
theory has been stimulated by an increased awareness of the international dimension in other
social sciences disciplines including sociology and geography (Devraun, 1998, p. 147). From
the point of view of this thesis, this adds up to the stimulation of various actors in diplomacy
and international relations, where new actors emerge accordingly to the demands and
purposes of the international activity. The following discussion will move on to a more
specific examination on diplomacy at the parliamentary level. Parliamentary diplomacy, as
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phrased, can be considered as an emerging dimension in the practice of traditional diplomacy. 
The nature of parliamentary diplomacy involves the representation of a national legislative 
institution, the professional skills and negotiating ability and persuasion among foreign 
counterparts. Factors including the level of conflict in a bilateral and multilateral situation 
would also determine whether the parliamentary diplomats (e.g. Members of parliament) 
would be able to demonstrate their negotiating skills in conflict resolution, decision-making, 
or policy implementation. Intervention has now been used in a rather different form in a 
multilateral level to establish security, end conflict^ rebuilding political and economic 
transformation, and relieve humanitarian crisis with goals on liberalisation and state-building 
(Lounsbery, Pearson, & Talentino, 2011, p.228).
I ll  Interpretation o f  parliamentary diplomacy 
1.2 Parliamentary diplomacy
“Diplomatic historians have attempted to explain the behavior of governmental 
units involved in diplomacy, strategic planning, alliance politics, or 
intergovernmental competition. They would help to remind the practitioner that 
process, routine, the choice of modes of approach, or even the policy maker’s 
expectation that an individual acting as a quasi-institution must be confronted as 
it will influence decisions and outcomes.”
(Williamson Jr., 1979, p .141).
Before we start talking about the evolution of traditional diplomacy to various dimensions
including that in the parliamentary level, it is fundamental to understand the parliamentary
system and the capabilities the institution holds to enable itself to operate as an institutional
actor. In this context, I am referring to both unicameral and bicameral parliaments in general.
Further in the research, my argument will be more specific on the Thai Senate, otherwise the
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Upper House which is part of the bicameral Thai parliament. Therefore, this research will be 
based on a bicameral parliamentary model. Further research and document analysis from the 
House of Representative’s international bureau will be used to measure the levels of 
international diplomatic duties of the Thai Senate. This, also, would be able to analyse its 
significance and might also be able to predict the direction and prospects of the institution as 
a diplomatic actor.
Parliaments are national institutions known for their domestic duties rather than international 
duties. Tsebilis and Money (1997) explain that parliaments are institutions which are 
dedicated to talk; members of parliament debate legislative proposals and scrutinise the work 
of governments through questioning; they may also be the sites where governments explain 
and justify their policies. The main responsibilities include drafting and scrutinising 
legislation. The system of parliament suggests how each country divides the power and 
responsibility. Significant differences in the influence of individual members on policy 
choices are characterised by a variety of organisational structures (Diermeier and Myerson, 
1999, p. 1182). Unicameral parliaments have separate committees handling both drafting bills 
and inspecting them, while bicameral parliaments are distinctively separated into two houses. 
Members of each house have separate duties, those of the lower house drafts legislative 
documents and those of the upper house scrutinises the drafted documents and the 
performance of the lower house.
However, there have been some suggestion that the check and balance system of
bicameralism delays the process of legislation. The existence of two chambers, it is said,
apart from showing the difference of the members’ backgrounds, adversely affects the ability
of parliamentarians to handle their domestic duties in office. Rogers (2003, p.510) has based
his argument on the history of American legislature, a bicameral parliament, and argued that
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a two hundred year-old belief described bicameralism as a constraint to legislative 
production. The reason, as Rogers claimed, was that parliaments that adopt the bicameral 
system produced less legislative activity than did unicameral parliaments due to the division 
of their duties. When this happens, it alters the anticipated relationship of legislation and the 
anticipated relationship between bicameralism. The argument deepened here will not specify, 
specify precisely or go into depth on the legislative responsibilities of both chambers, in 
particular on the case study of the Thai Senate, as this research is aimed to explore the 
international part of the parliamentarians’ duties. However, I am raising the issue of 
unicameralism and bicameralism to help clarify the understanding of parliamentary systems 
and the nature of the domestic legislative responsibilities that would be useful in examining 
the motivation or stimulation for senators in the performance of their international duties in 
the following parts further on.
Considering the impact of bicameralism and parliamentary diplomacy, international
diplomatic activities constitute an important aspect in the functioning of parliaments. The
reason for this can be explained because adopting diplomatic approaches to parliamentary
affairs will provide an advantageous opportunity for members of parliament to build
networks among foreign peers, exchange legislative policies and procedures, and be able to
improvise the structure of their performance. An example from the former speaker of the
National Assembly of South Africa suggests that ‘parliament is there to watch over the
interests of the people; it is there to act as the voice of the people and in the interests of the
people both inside the country but also at an international level’ (Mbete in Ahmed, 2009).
Parliamentary diplomacy is referred to collective practice throughout every national
parliament, as parliaments are active in foreign policy engagement specifically through the
traditional committee system. The South African parliament’s Parliamentary Group on
International Relations (PGIR), for instance, was set up to encourage members’ participation
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in bilateral and multilateral fora and manages parliament’s international relations agenda. 
However, parliament’s uncertainty about its role in the foreign policy process and the 
executive’s domination of foreign affairs are factors which lead to the lack of engagement on 
international issues (Ahmed, 2009, p.291).
After discussing the changing nature of traditional diplomacy and the positive points of 
bicameral parliament, the discussion will now move on to talk about the interpretation of 
parliamentary diplomacy and the reason it is an important addition to international relations 
studies. As mentioned before, the exact definition of parliamentary diplomacy needs to be 
drawn from other theoretical explanations than the definition of traditional diplomacy. 
Scholars in diplomatic studies and political representatives who are acquainted to 
parliamentary works and relations refer to parliamentary diplomacy as a development of 
traditional diplomacy, being a series of international diplomatic activities carried out by 
members of parliaments through its committees in order to create or strengthen existing 
relations with other foreign parliaments (Rana, 2011, p. 159-160). There are many versions of 
the definition of parliamentary diplomacy. However, this brief summary is what most 
definitions tend to present. It captures the basic details and procedures of the term. At this 
stage it would be difficult, however, to give a more fully developed definition of 
parliamentary diplomacy, as the study of parliamentary diplomacy is relatively new and there 
is limited existing research on this diplomatic dimension. It would be possible to say that 
parliamentary diplomacy, in fact, shares exactly the same nature as traditional diplomacy. 
The only distinctive difference is the change of the actors who perform the diplomatic 
procedures. As a result, interpretations of the term were drawn together from relevant sources 
and from the nature of the procedures of parliamentary diplomacy, based on international 
diplomatic duties of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff.
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In the previous parts, it has been attempted to give an accurate interpretation on the nature of 
diplomacy in general. We will now examine the changing nature of diplomacy and how it has 
opened up to other actors. It is important to understand the reasons why we get the emergence 
of various types of diplomacy, in particular parliamentary diplomacy. Hocking (1999) 
explained that the conduct of diplomacy has long been identified with ‘diffusion’, that is to 
say the development of a multiplicity of actors and channels in the conduct of external 
relations. The perspectives and values of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff on 
international duties will be discussed later on in the thesis. At the time being, the argument 
that diplomacy is no longer limited for professional diplomats from a national foreign office 
will be made clear, as alternative actors are emerging to pursue the diplomatic missions from 
the institutions they represent. The modernisation of communication and technology in our 
world today has made formerly reserved professions including diplomacy open up to allow 
alternative actors to become part of the system. Hamilton and Langhome (1995, p.3) have 
given a description on the changing nature of diplomacy as follows;
“dialogues between states and other types of international actors are today ‘blurring 
the distinction between what is diplomatic activity and what is not, and who, 
therefore, are diplomats and who are not’.
In addition, Hamilton and Langhome has also described 4 factors that shape the development
of diplomacy: the international order; the threat, prevalence and changing nature of war; the
evolution of the state; and advances in science and technology. This quote takes us back to
the previous part on the speculation of traditional diplomacy. From these factors, I argue that
the most influential one on modem diplomacy would be the advances on science and
technology, in particular the intemet. The intemet has paved way for a faster track of
communication, and has covered every level of correspondence (Hamilton and Langhome,
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1995, p.258). I would say that the intemet has become part of the diplomatic procedures in all 
establishments from local, national, to intemational. Yet, the traditional custom of meeting in 
person and arranging courtesy calls is still practiced along Avith cyber correspondence. 
Another focal point is that each institution or diplomatic actor can adopt different levels of 
traditional diplomatic customs as they intend to establish their own unique institutional 
identity according to the members and regulations within the institution. It is inevitable that 
nowadays the intemet has a vast impact on our daily lives, including the politicians where the 
intemet facilitates the personal characteristics of the candidates, the strategic and structural 
circumstances of their incumbency, and the demonstration of constituency characteristics of 
the elections (Hermson, Stokes-Brown, and Hindman, 2007, p.33).
Moreover, parliamentary diplomacy has been likely to develop from the debating nature of 
parliamentarians on domestic issues. During sittings members of parliament would have the 
opportunity to discuss on specific issues and see whether any adjustment or reform needs to 
be done. From this point, my assumption carries on that when parliamentarians are required 
to pursue the intemational part of their duties they would also have the opportunity to share 
opinions and engage in a discussion. They might bring up certain domestic issues and at the 
same time leam about other national issues from foreign counterparts^ Bayley (2004) stated 
that the concrete action in the outside world are results from the discourse of parliament as 
parliament establishes regulations as to what must, may, or may not be done in a given 
society. Parliament is the site of debate, discussion, and linguistic activity. Other main duties 
of parliament would include the enforcement and maintaining the autonomy of state 
institutions referring to political parties, the functioning of political parties, electoral and 
parliamentary practices relating to political parties (Tardi, 2007, p.432). This assumption.
 ^ International duties referring to intemational conferences and meetings that are proceeded in the country and 
abroad. This assumption can also be related to competitiveness among parliamentarians as a motivation for 
developing parliamentary diplomacy.
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however, would depend on the interpersonal knowledge and skills of the individual 
parliamentarian, and will be discussed later on in the research.
As referred to earlier on in the discussion, there should be a reason that makes parliamentary 
diplomacy a distinctive topic of study. An observation would be that there are new emerging 
diplomatic actors, governmental and non-governmental, in today’s globalised world. This 
emergence of new diplomatic actors is seen as breaking the barrier of the traditional Foreign 
Office diplomatic route (Rana, 2011, p. 159-161). Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff 
are part of the emerging new diplomatic actors. Reasons for their engagement in intemational 
diplomatic missions would be that parliamentarians and the working staff would have to keep 
up with recent worldly issues, engage themselves in foreign affairs, in order to improve their 
competency as diplomatic actors. Shifting back to the thought that diplomacy is another form 
of communication, I argue here that an accurate way to describe parliamentary diplomacy 
would be that it is a level of power communication between parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff to build and strengthen intemational relations with other parliaments. 
Other consequences would be to gain benefit from that relation, to prove that the 
representative parliament is a strong diplomatic actor and therefore be able to exercise their 
power through the institutional processes of communication and representation (Offe, 2006, 
p.9-10).
So far, I have raised discussions and have attempted to clarify the nature and definition of
traditional diplomacy leading on through to the emergence of parliamentary diplomacy. Also,
brief details on different systems of parliament including unicameral and bicameral have been
pointed out as part of the explanation to help clarify the working natures of parliamentarians
and how the parliament system may enable them to develop as potential diplomatic actors.
Relating this discussion to the theory of intemationalisation, the concept of state security has
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dominated intemational relations discourse and. practice as a sovereign means to protect its 
citizens (Masunungure and Badza, 2010, p. 208-209). Coordinately, the development of the 
parliamentary institution as a diplomatic actor will help to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of parliamentary institutions in intemational diplomatic affairs and 
maintaining the autonomy of its citizens. My argument for now will remain that 
parliamentary diplomacy is by no doubt another dimension of traditional diplomacy. As it has 
evolved from the conventional diplomatic practice, the nature of parliamentary diplomacy has 
no dramatic differences from that of traditional diplomacy. However, in the following parts I 
shall need to explore further on various impacts that are thought to be involved in the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy.
An example of decision-making and policy implementation from local politics in Ghana is 
raised here as an example of opportunities provided for local assembly members in policy 
implementation and decision-making (Fiankor and Akussah, 2012, p.32-33). The assembly 
system of Ghana had little access to relevant and reliable information when making decisions 
about programmes, policies, and their implementation. Recommendations from this study on 
the Ghanaian Assembly included enhancing the capability of assembly members through 
training, the presentation of information sources in appropriate formats for assembly 
members, the provision of adequate funding by assemblies to support subscription to relevant 
information sources, the establishment of district assembly libraries and information centres, 
and the effective dissemination of information by ministries, departments and agencies to the 
district assemblies.
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The analysis of the operation of modem diplomacy is to consider the present trends of the 
global order, analyse the paths and contexts which governments chose in pursuing their 
policies and objectives in the greatly changed intemational arena. It is also to study how a 
government reaches a diplomatic objective that it sets itself. A state or government needs to 
define its objectives, assess the practicabiliiy of those objectives by taking the constraints it 
faces in achieving the objectives into account, and then decide on the means, resources, or the 
pathways for pursuing its objectives in ternis of understanding what it wants to achieve 
(Woolcott, 1997, p.l03).
In the next chapter, factors that influence the pattems of parliamentary diplomacy will be 
discussed. These aforementioned factors would lead on to a thorough explanation about the 
nature of parliamentary diplomatic practice. The significance between the institutions and its 
actors will also be discussed, basing the arguments on the raised factors and elements on the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy which will be raised co-ordinately.
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Chapter 2 
Influences on parliamentary diplomacy
“Despite the most dramatic political and economic crises, an abiding 
belief in the power of public diplomacy to bridge the cultural, political, 
economic, and religious gaps worldwide is public diplomacy. The focus is not 
on governments or sponsors but on people communicating with people and the 
productive relationships that hopefully ensue, further develop, mature, and 
continue to manifest additional creative projects, exchanges, and events that 
further understanding and mutual respect”.
(Payne, 2009, p.580)
Continuing from the first chapter, now that the attempt to clarify the interpretation of 
traditional diplomacy and its evolution into parliamentary diplomacy has been discussed, this 
part of the discussion will be focusing on the various influences on parliamentary diplomacy. 
The factors that are related to the formation of parliamentary diplomacy and how it is 
interpreted and implemented today will be elaborated. As the discussion goes, a theoretical 
shaping of parliamentary diplomacy as a form of social institution will also be emphasised. 
A statement has been put forth to emphasise the importance of the institutionalising of 
diplomacy that it was needed to stabilise the relationship between nations and make it more 
predictable at some point where the interdependence went beyond a certain threshold 
(Galtung and Holmboe, 1965, p. 102). Moving on from traditional diplomacy, the discussion 
will now focus on the diplomatic dimension in the parliamentary level. As previously argued, 
parliamentary diplomacy has evolved from the traditional diplomatic practice. During the 
stages of evolution, there has been several influences that stimulated and shaped the nature of
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parliamentary diplomacy, that is procedures, actors involved, and purposes of the missions. 
This part, therefore, will bring up the potential agents that have influence on the evolution of 
the diplomatic practice in political institutions. The discussion about the factors, shapings, 
and motivations that have had an extent of impact on how parliamentary diplomacy has 
developed will be stressed in this chapter. The first part of the discussion will begin with the 
political, economic, and cultural factors that are having general impact on the shifting and 
development of intemational relations, in particular diplomacy. At this point, it is argued that 
contemporary parliamentary diplomacy is still in the developing stage, and may take some 
time until we are able to confirm that parliamentary diplomacy is indeed a strong and reliable 
path to develop intemational relations from the conventional diplomatic practice. While this 
is so far, all countries, including the Westem democracies, it is also very tme to countries like 
Thailand. Impacts of the proliferation of non-state actors, the inexorable march of global 
capital forces, and the communications revolution have risen questions on the future direction 
of diplomacy whether there would be a place or a future for the profession at all (Hemery, 
2003, p. 140). These issues will be discussed later on in chapter 3.
Considering these issues, theories of ‘New Institutionalism’ will be utilised, focusing 
especially on sociological institutionalism as a base for the discussion on the relationship 
between the institution and its actors. In this section particularly, distinctively different 
definitions have been raised about institutions and organisations, that they are different in 
terms of the functioning structure, the communication pattern, and the behaviour of its actors. 
A reason to support this assumption is that the processes of institutional and organisational 
fields emphasising the power, structure, and scale of institutions, demonstrates that 
institutions are different from and independent of organisations (Lammers & Barbour, 2006, 
p.358-360). Again, analytical analysis will be carried out in the case study when the relevant
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arguments relating to this research are specified. The institution and the actors would refer to 
the parliament and the Thai senators and senate staff respectively.
There are several factors, shapings, and motivations that stimulate the practice of diplomacy 
in the parliamentary level. The difference between factors, shapings, and motivations that 
will be presented in this chapter are all categorised as influences on the development of 
parliamentary diplomacy. However, the differentiation between these 3 terms is based on the 
scope they cover. Factors will refer to the global-level influences that stimulate the building 
of intemational relations in general, and therefore apply to the development of parliamentary 
diplomacy. Shapings will then focus on a specific impact beneath the structure of the 
institution and the performance of the institutional actors respectively -  in this case the 
discussion will be based upon a theoretical approach on sociological institutionalism. 
Motivations, further, will refer to influences within the parliamentary institution. In summary, 
factors, shapings, and motivations are influences that stimulates parliamentary diplomacy 
from the macro level to the micro level respectively. The discussion will begin with the 
factors, following with the shapings and motivations to expand the research questions and. 
hypotheses given in the introduction on parliamentary diplomacy.
a.Factors
Several factors explain the development of parliamentary diplomacy in Thailand. As has been 
pointed out earlier on, parliamentary diplomacy is not the kind of diplomacy that developed 
on its own, yet has evolved from the traditional diplomatic practice of building relations with 
foreign governments, especially under such pressures as expanding global trade and resolving 
intemational conflicts. The activeness of institutional actors also supports this fact in 
stimulating the competency of institutions in playing a role in the intemational relations
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arena. Other external factors, moreover, contribute to the structuring of diplomatic practice at 
the parliamentary level. Beginning from a historical reference, there is some evidence that the 
term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ originated from the post World War II period during the 
formation of the League of Nations'®. The initial plan to establish the League of Nations was 
on the attempt to maintain state sovereignty where diplomats, lawyers, and governmental 
representatives from national governments established intemational regulations and 
facilitated intemational consultation and cooperation (Dubin, 1983, p. 469-470). The term 
‘parliamentary diplomacy’, however, originally referred to the parliamentary-type 
proceedings of the League Assembly and the UN General Assembly, not to parliaments 
acting extemally.
From that period until now, many factors have been considered in the process of the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy. As the term “parliamentary diplomacy” reflects the 
relations between national parliaments, therefore it is important to think about factors that 
encourage parliamentarians from different countries to pursue intemational diplomatic duties. 
Such factors could be derived from political, economic, and cultural dimensions in the studies 
of intemational relations. Certain possible factors which will be raised throughout this 
chapter would include political proximity, the geographical location of the country, economic 
relations, globalisation, and culture. These themes have been raised as general factors to 
cover my arguments on the evolution of parliamentary diplomacy, and they can also be 
applied to theoretical explanations about the development of intemational relations in a 
territorial sense, from regional levels to the global level.
During the post-WWII period, parliamentary diplomacy developed along with intemational law procedures. 
See Rusk, 1955.
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This can also lead us to think about motivation of parliamentary diplomatic actors to become 
part of politics, as members of a political institution, in the first place and whether they look 
forward to the advantages they may receive from their membership and the duties they 
perform. The study of political participation has emphasised attributes of the individual actor 
to account for participation, to the relative exclusion of characteristics of the context within 
which that actor is behaving (Uhlaner, 1986, p.552). In this context, the focus is on the 
arguments and discussion on political participation in terms of individuals’ motivation in 
entering politics and exercising their political professions rather than to study the citizen’s 
interest and engagement in politics, as this shall be explained later along the course of the 
thesis. For the meantime, the following factors that will be raised here are global factors that 
influence traditional diplomacy. As a result, they can possibly be applied not only to issues 
on parliamentary relations but also to other institutions, representatives, or actors in 
intemational relations.
i. Power
Power is a major factor raised here to support the discussion on factors that influence the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy. One main purpose lies in all aspects of building 
intemational relations; to demonstrate the pow er and ability of the governments. My 
argument will base on the factor that has strong impact on the changing nature of diplomacy 
is simply power. Power has been an inevitably linked subject to the study of politics and 
intemational relations and is dominantly related to ‘influence’ and ‘control’ (Baldwin, 2003, 
p. 177). What we leamed and know about power in the intemational context traditionally 
would refer to the use of military force when there are national states with conflicting 
policies. A way of understanding what is happening in the world on the balancing of power 
is that individual states, developed or developing, all strive for political power, and
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diplomacy is one of the ‘soft’ methods they use. It is said that power may be achieved 
through moral force including diplomacy, guile or fraud, and does not need to depend wholly 
upon the use of physical force (Wells, 1970, p.3).
This argument can be support further that forming and maintaining diplomatic relations is, in 
a way, an exercise of power though representatives of a particular country, to create political 
counterparts and allies for national benefits. On the part of parliamentary diplomacy, creating 
diplomatic relations would differ slightly in terms of the extent of impact it has compared to 
traditional diplomatic procedures extended through the Foreign Office. In other words, the 
diplomatic relations among parliamentary counterparts would be more to build and maintain 
a network of contacts and colleagues rather than to engage in a complete diplomatic mission 
that would have direct impact towards the state. Political proximity, in this case, refers to 
engagements that globalisation entails as it draws us all closer together, both 
‘phenomenologically’ via the sort of experienced proximity that is provided in time-space 
bridging technologies through media technologies and communication; and ‘structurally’ via 
the complex institutional interconnections of globalisation (Tomlinson, 2000, p.402). What is 
understood and seen nowadays is that nations are not entirely striving for political power, but 
they exercise the use of diplomacy so as to maintain the balance of power among each 
representative country. Power, in this sense, can relate to diplomatic concepts of authority, 
influence, coercion, and can be used to analyse social relationships in the real world, 
depending on how we identify cases of power and how power is interpreted". Knoke’s 
distinction on the multiple-elite power model suggests that the state is neither a captive of 
other institutional elites nor a neutral political broker. The interests of the elite organisations
" A redefinition o f  power has been brought up as ‘power to’ against ‘power over’. Therefore, power indicates a 
capacity, a facility, an ability, not a relationship, indicating that the meaning o f  power has started to shift and be 
reinterpreted during the author’s writing (1975). See Lukes, 1974.
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are more often served than the interests of the larger collectivity, therefore a few elites 
dominate decisions and noiidecisions in each of their own arenas of power (Dobratz and 
Kourvatis, 1982, p.293). In what follows, below, economic globalisation will be discussed as 
another important factor on influencing parliamentary diplomacy. The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be discussed as an example of a regional 
establishment that has a major impact not only on the stable maintenance of power in the 
region, but also a reflection on the competency of Thai parliamentarians as governmental 
representatives in the international arena. Ever since the formation of ASEAN, the evolution 
in Southeast Asia’s multilateral defense diplomacy were explained by the pre-existing 
ASEAN-related cooperative activities dealing with transnational security. The continual 
power maintenance are all due to the creeping démocratisation among key Southeast Asian 
states and the changing nature of Southeast Asia’s strategic environment (Laksmana, 2012, 
p.253). A detailed explanation on the significance of ASEAN to Thai senators will be 
included in the aforementioned part oh economic globalisation and in the chapter on the Thai- 
Cambodian border conflict and the ASEAN 2015 development plan respectively.
ii. Geographical settings
International borders not only provide resources and physical security but also provide order 
to national and transnational social and economic life. When they are uncontested, they 
clarify and stabilise transnational actors’ property rights (Simmons, 2005, p. 827). However, 
defense of one’s national territory is no longer defined simply by security alone. In times of 
conflict threat or risk to the state or its people can challenge the capacity of the state to 
regulate entry and exit, penetrate society, and cross boundaries (Dewitt and Hernandez, 2003, 
p. 4). The nonviolent resolution in most territorial disputes are bilateral negotiations between
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the two parties or a more formal process of legal dispute resolution by a third party such as an 
international court or arbitration panel (Iluth & Allee, 2002a).
Geography influences not only the possibility for conflict, but also the likelihood it will be 
chosen as an option by a decision-maker. A great distance may be outweighed by a 
preference for military force by the state or by the risk-taking propensity of its leadership. 
However, several other facilitating conditions for conflict may enhance or supercede effects 
of those from geography (Goertz and Diehl, p.5). Institutions have become entwined with 
concerns about the agents for development. The question of agents as instruments responsible 
for the security of people has been discussed. The relationship between habit, agency, 
rationality, and uncertainty in world politics, or even the appreciated habit’s role as a 
structural obstacle to social change has yet been explored in recent practices of international 
relations. Where the logic of habit predominates, international relations has less rationality, 
less agency, and less uncertainty than other logics would lead us to expect (Hopf, 2010, 
p.540). Consequently, international humanitarian law and international human rights law 
remain highly contingent on different perceptions of interests between states and security 
(Cox and O’Niell, 2008, p.201).
Geographical proximity also has an impact on the maintenance of peace between border 
countries. Recent patterns in international peacemaking have stressed the need for 
practitioners’ coordination and discussion as one of the implications of peacemaking. 
Peacemakers and negotiators, accordingly, should let their actions be tempered or inspired by 
findings from rigorous retrospective research (Heldt, 2012, p.2). Evidence from interviews 
conducted are raised here as an example in order to explain the relations between the Thai
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Senate and other parliaments through membership and participation of parliamentary 
friendship groups. Bilateral relations through forms of friendship groups are established in 
order to maintain goodwill among fellow parliamentarians and also to exchange opinions on 
any problematic situation that may occur.
Parliamentary diplomacy has been previously argued as an evolvement from traditional 
diplomacy, therefore, factors, shapings, motivations may be drawn or assumed from those that 
has been seen to have influenced traditional diplomacy. This can be related to one universal 
factor on the development of traditional diplomacy in general; the geographical location o f  
the country. The location of the country can also lead to political proximity where national 
governments within the same region choose to build relations between each other and 
establish a stable and trustworthy foundation. Most importantly, political activity and 
political power are extended across the boundaries of the modem nation-state (Held, 
McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999, p.49). For example, parliaments from countries that 
share the same border, or are in the same specific region, may start building connections with 
one anotherTransfrontier diplomacy, as it describes actions to build international relations 
between countries sharing the same border, can ameliorate relations not only between border 
communities but also between central governments and even entire societies (Henrikson, 
2000, p. 121)., As it is easier to build relations because of their common location, then these 
countries may choose to expand the coimections to a wider sphere depending on the 
particular issue they wish to discuss or seek opinion. Sharing borders would be the most 
convenient factor for representatives to travel to another country in a shorter period of time. It 
could also help the government to spend less travel costs, and would be generally optimal 
unless there was political instability in one country, or both, or if the political regime did not
As this research will be focusing on the Thai Parliament (Senate) later on, a distinctive example o f countries 
that share the same border and have close parliamentary relations would be the Thai -  Laos Parliament 
exchange visits.
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enable representatives from the neighbouring country to travel on diplomatic missions eg. 
North Korea-South Korea, Israel-Lebanon etc.
A specific case of political instability between neighbouring countries that could strengthen 
the argument on the impact of regional political proximity in the current situation pertains to 
the Thai-Cambodian border conflict* .^ At this point, I would not go into detail about the 
situation but this case has been raised to explain that there are possibilities that states tend to 
go to war with neighbouring countries and as a case on political instability as. a constrain to 
the development of international relations. A recent explanation on border conflicts would be 
that the spatial hardening of states during the 1990s, in other words “deterritorialisation”, 
became one of the many ironies of globalisation and this underlied the tension and 
opportunities that shaped Thailand's broader economic and political relations with 
neighbouring countries (Battersby, 1998-99, p.473). The border conflict between Thailand 
and Cambodia has been an ongoing regional issue that authorities from both governments are 
constantly negotiating with one another while preventing any further military clashes 
(Bangkok Post, 15/08/11). Relating this border conflict issue to the Thai Senate, the former 
President of the Senate has had a role in being part of the negotiating team from the Thai 
government’s side to resolve the situation. We shall talk about this further in detail in a later 
chapter.
in. Economic relations
Moreover, countries that are in the same region would usually be in the same trade agreement 
zone, or other joint agreements, so it is quite automatic for the diplomatic actors to 
collaborate within the member group. An obvious example of regional cooperation, or
Case studies on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and the ASEAN 2015 community development plan will 
be discussed separately in chapter 5.
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multilateral regional diplomacy (Barston, 2006), would be ASEAN (Association of South- 
East Asian Nations). ASEAN member countries maintain regional cooperation to accomplish 
their mission in tackling political, economic, cultural or security independency issues in 
Southeast Asia and that its most distinctive features is the ideational and institutional 
structure that forges ASEAN’s regional identity (Wunderlich, 2007). Moreover, ASEAN 
illustrates associative diplomacy in transition from one of initial concerns with development 
projects to international trade and security issues (Barston, 2006, p. 109), As earlier, this 
matter has not been raised simply to give descriptive detail or to critically analyse the role of 
ASEAN in detail, but rather to demonstrate the regional association as an example of an 
institution active in economic integration plans and other security related issues within the 
region. From this, we can see that the country’s geographic location has an important impact 
on the political representative’s decision to select corresponding partners, or in the long run 
countries they wish to visit and in turn officially receive as diplomatic guests (Shinn, 1989, 
and Tuan, 2002, p.311).
Of course, other smaller issues are included. Not only the location of the country is crucial, 
but domestic aspects including social stability, economic status, and other assets would also 
be taken into consideration as national factors that may contribute to the development of 
parliamentary diplomatic relations. As for ASEAN, the first period of membership did not 
include all countries in the region''*, as certain countries did not join initially due to political 
instability. Up to now, although the Asia-Pacific region has made some progress on 
institution building and has witnessed growing economic interdependence, the risk of armed 
conflict remains serious in many areas putting security at risk (Yuzawa, 2006, p.786). 
However, at the moment all Southeast Asian countries are ASEAN members and
The first ASEAN members in 1967 include Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. At 
present, 5 other countries in the region are included; Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar.
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governmental representatives including civil servants and parliamentarians meet twice 
annually to discuss social and economic issuesM em ber countries take turns being host for 
the ASEAN Summit. Another example of regional cooperation relates to ASEAN member 
countries who while ready to cooperate on certain issues but are not yet ready to participate in 
full regional cooperation have been encouraged instead to participate in a formally 
recognized but lesser regional grouping called ASEAN-X'^. This is an improvement 
mechanism upon bilateralism as it extends to more than two countries (Chavez, 2007, p.360). 
A roadmap to ASEAN 2015, or to be more specific an outline development plan for 
economic integration and drug trafficking elimination is presented here in the following 
section to provide an introduction to the case study on the Thai Senate’s role in regional 
integration later on in chapter 5.
iv. Globalisation
Carrying on from the previous factor, it could also be possible to say that another factor 
regarding locations and boundaries that influences parliamentary diplomacy is globalisation. 
Nowadays the world is moving fast with respect to the speed of communication. Territories 
and borders only exist on maps, but people and places are virtually connected together no 
matter where they are. The prominent feature of political, economic, and social discourse has 
been increasing in the popular press and policy making, not only limited to the academic 
community, therefore deriving the term ‘globalisation’ which has been used since the 1990s 
(Christopherson, Garretsen, and Martin, 2008, p.343). Therefore, a lot amount of time is 
saved in corresponding with each other through rapid internet communication. The world 
system now has a new international agenda where countries have become interconnected and
See the ASEAN Secretariat website for details; www.aseansec.org
ASEAN-X is an alternative programme where regional members have the opportunity to explore common 
concerns and have members participate from national and sub-national authority. See Chavez, 2007.
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interdependent in ways unimagined before (Riordan, 2003). Further explanation is given as 
follows: -
“Domestic policy has been internationalised and diplomacy politicised as key 
political, economic and social issues have escaped the territorial boundaries of the 
nation state. A new international agenda has emerged to test.the structures and 
persormel of traditional diplomacy (Riordan, 2003).”
From here, we are able to assume that due to the rapidly modernised world of advanced 
technology, parliamentary representatives like any other individual would want to keep up to 
dated with the latest worldly issue and communication trend. Even though representatives 
from parliaments -  MPs or staff - are still following the traditional diplomatic route of 
carrying out official visits to other countries'^ their correspondence about the mission has 
already been way ahead or may even have been concluded, credits to the internet. Global 
computer networks including satellite communication systems, computerised networks, and 
linked software and hardware have made globalisation possible by not only producing a 
stream of correspondence but also a technological infrastmcture for the global economy 
(Kellner, 2002, p.287). Globalisation, moreover, is placing governments under increasing 
scrutiny, as well as prompting governments and policy practitioners into providing a secure 
and stable economic domestic environment by conducting responsible economic policies 
(Cheema, 2005, p.5).
Thus, it is evident that globalisation is a key factor that influences the procedures of 
parliamentaiy diplomacy. However, to conclude exactly what sort of influence globalisation 
is on parliamentary diplomacy is still debatable. The reason lies in the fact that there are
Traditional diplomats believe that for the courtesy o f  the other behalf and for a successful diplomatic 
progress, it is better the meet representatives in person rather than keeping distant correspondence.
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different streams of globalisation; the hyperglobalists, sceptics, transformationalists 
(McGrew, 2001, p.20). From this reason, to justify whether globalisation is a major influence 
on parliamentary diplomacy would depend on which approach is adopted for explanation. All 
in all, the argument will be maintained that the level of performance is dependent on the 
diplomatic actors’ perceptions and values on their duties. Shifting slightly back to the impact 
of the current global trend on international activities, it has been stressed that globalisation in 
itself is neither inherently good nor bad, as citizens can choose to shape global opportunities 
and benefits to their national and international advantages (Talbott, 1997, p.71). This is 
saying that globalisation along with the diplomatic actor’s values, should they have it, would 
enable them to decide what is more advantageous for their representative countries. Critics of 
globalisation see the shift in power fi-om sovereign states to technologically advanced global 
elites as an adversely impact on national sovereignty (Preble, 2010, p.341, 343). Global elites 
in this case are multilateral companies, NGOs, and third-party organisations. The emergence 
of individual actors has also shaped the way international diplomatic duties are being 
perceived. This assumption, interestingly, could lead us to think further about the role of 
parliamentarians and parliamentary staff as alternative to, or contemporary with, diplomatic 
actors. This issue will be discussed later on in the research in chapter 3.
V. Culture: politics and parliaments
The factors being stated in this part of the research are respective influences that are 
deliberately linked to one another. The next factor that has inevitably influenced 
parliamentary diplomatic practices would be culture. It is argued here that culture is the most 
universal factor which strongly shapes who we are and how we react in the society. Culture 
includes legal and political institutions, economic systems, religious ideas, methods of social 
organisation, technologies and scientific concepts (Wesley-Smith, 1981). Moreover, cultural
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differences among people are reflected through their values, outlooks, intentions, interests, 
habits, historical hopes and fears (Anand, 1981, p.l 13). Bringing the argument on to a more 
specific level, cultural diplomacy would be more connotated with propaganda, imperialism, 
and colonialism, immoral and unethical practices that are associated with such activity*\
Although it has been previously argued that parliamentary diplomacy is a relatively new and 
not widely studied subject in the studies of international relations, research has been done on 
other related issues including political culture and parliaments. An interesting fact worth 
noting on political culture, in particular parliamentary culture, is that most studies of 
parliament had been focused on two particular institutions, reflecting the Western experience; 
the U.S. Congress and the British House of Commons (Banjo, 2009, p.61). The distinction 
between the two parliamentary models is that although both national parliaments are 
bicameral, the UK House of Lords acts as ‘check, and balance’ in legislative scrutiny on bills 
passed forward from the House of Commons. On the other hand, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate of the U.S. Congress have equal power to collaborate in joint 
consent for the passing of any drafted legislation. Moreover, US Congress members are all 
elected (Smith, Roberts, and Vander Wielen, 2006, p. 55). As a result people tend to assume 
that the procedures and parliamentary ‘culture’ should be conducted according to these two 
distinctive models. Most national parliaments and their members, parliamentarians, in fact 
adopt the rituals and customs from either one of the two, or both. From a critical point of 
view, there are no disputes about that as it helps with the developing of a solid structure and 
identity of the institution. One study on identification processes say that identities emerge and 
movements ensue because collectives consciously coordinate action, as intellectual concerns 
with self-direction and agency (Cerulo, 1997, p.386, 393). However, the most important point
See Nisbett, 2012, p.2. More recently in the age o f  globalisation and the rapid growth o f  in the internet, the 
rise o f Western corporate power has stimulated the transmission o f political, social, cultural and economic 
values.
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here is that different cultures and personal values of parliamentary representatives should not 
be an obstacle to the development of parliamentary diplomacy with other counterparts. Yet, it 
is difficult to predict whether parliaments with similar cultures (e.g. same religion, language, 
located in the same region, adopts the similar parliamentary system) could form a successful 
parliamentary relationship as leaders and members of parliament are all different individually 
and have diverse styles of performance in their duties. Another study from a Western 
parliament, the Scottish Parliament, proved its goal of establishing a ‘new politics’ by 
deliberately taking the decision to forge a strong support and linkage between the parliament 
and public (Carman, 2010, p.731). Nevertheless, examples here are all taken from the 
Western parliament. A suggestion here would be that further discussion needs to be added on 
the Asian parliamentary culture to clarify the argument on elements that make Asian 
parliaments distinctive from the Western parliament. Culture includes everything related to an 
individual -  language, tradition, beliefs, and these can be incorporated into formal institutions 
including parliament. Not only in Asia, but in other continents the influence of institutional 
systems have also shaped the policy structure and the performance of its actors.
For example in central and eastern European countries, a difference between formal and 
informal institutions in respect of institutional change is informal constraints change very 
slowly, while formal rules can be changed overnight by discretion (Ovin, 2001, p. 133-134). 
Having stated this factor on culture, it is intended to say that values and beliefs of politicians 
in other countries where the US Congress or Westminster style parliament are adopted are 
usually merged with the bureaucratic system and political culture of that respective country. 
Therefore^ the amalgamation of Westem-style parliament models will then reflect the values 
of that country.
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Coming back to parliamentary diplomacy, therefore, my interpretation of culture as an 
influencing factor of parliamentary diplomacy would be that parliamentary representatives 
are encouraged to perform international diplomatic missions in order to build networks with 
foreign peers and to exchange professional opinions and values on worldly issues that may be 
of benefit to their respective countries. Foreign peers in this sense meaning parliamentary 
representatives who are from different countries, speak different languages, have different 
religious beliefs and customs. More specifically, to make the argument more relevant we 
could speculate that diplomatic duties in the parliamentary level are acknowledged as part of 
a political culture. Cultural dimensions in politics is more restrictive in a way that complex of 
subjective beliefs, attitudes, sentiments, and behavioural patterns that presumably sustain the 
structural make up and functional operation of political order (Gebhardt, 2010). As this 
thought is somewhat linked to the sociological aspect on determining individual behaviour, 
we will be discussing more theoretically in the next part on New Institutionalism as the 
approach that will be emphasised as the shaping of parliamentary diplomacy.
These factors, overall, are major factors that have an extent of impact on parliamentary 
diplomacy. When we analyse these factors, we see that they stimulate parliamentarians, as 
national representatives, to create networks and discuss with peers from other parliaments in 
particular problematic issues (e.g. social conflict, economic stability, terrorism, human rights, 
etc.), whichever subject that needs advice for improvement, even for a resolution from other 
parliamentary counterparts. Also, if the parliamentary representative does not have the 
purpose to seek advice, then he or she would want to learn what other countries are doing and 
how they are tackling the problem on a particular topic (Simpson, 1968, p. 137). They might 
select an issue to talk about and simply exchange opinions about it. Opinions could be based 
on their national ideologies and their personal values. An example from a US Foreign Service
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officer’s perception on his diplomatic duty was that he. wished to do well in his work, 
meaning that he will maintain communication with those he would be frequently associated 
with on specific subject matter content, and he wanted others to regard his professional 
qualifications highly (Lazorchick, 1968, p. 108). As a result, the constant correspondence and 
exchange of opinions might be a pattern for further consideration for problems if occurred 
within the representative’s own country. This usually happens when countries are from 
different geographical locations and have started to develop a diplomatic relationship.
b.Shapings
Moving forward from factors, this part of the thesis will be looking at shapings of 
parliamentary diplomacy. Even though the main argument is focused on the evolution of 
traditional diplomacy and the nature of parliamentary diplomacy, examining the functions of 
parliament as an institution is also crucial to strengthen the discussions on how diplomacy in 
the parliamentary level has been shaped and developed. The theoretical idea that will be used 
as the main discussion in this part would be New Institutional theory. This idea concerns the 
relations between the individual and the institution, and thus I will refer this theory as a 
shaping influence on the evolution of parliamentary diplomacy. When placed in the context 
of parliamentary diplomatic development, we could assume that the evolution of 
parliamentary diplomacy, including the outcomes and future prospects of parliamentary 
diplomatic missions, are mainly shaped by the actors involved. In other words, parliamentary 
diplomacy could be viewed as an alternative institutionalised function in the international 
society. An emphasis on diplomacy studies is that the articulating of an institutional function 
is an illuminating way of looking at diplomacy (Melissen, 1999). This introduces an 
argument concerning parliamentary diplomacy as being an institutionalised form of
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diplomacy. The theoretical framework for this research will be argued based on the 
sociological institutionalism theory of March and Olsen, focusing pailicularly on the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. I argue that if individuals have membership of a certain group or 
association, they will tend to behave and react according to specific rules within that 
establishment. This statement will be further supported in terms of the logic of 
appropriateness -  a perspective that sees human action driven by rules of exemplary 
behaviour (March & Olsen, 2009). Such a theory holds to the view that tradition, political 
ideology, the socio-economic structure of society, the role and importance of the 
bureaucracy, the weight and character of the main political groups, and the personal strength 
of the leader are all factors that shape the existence of a particular set of governmental 
arrangements (Blondel, 1982, p. 57).
The interaction between parliamentarians and the institution contribute towards the purpose 
of international parliamentar)^ activities in that they create relations, build networks for 
further correspondence, or meet for discussions on a current issue, whether or not seeking for 
a resolution or only to get suggestions and exchange opinions. Interestingly, there has been 
scholarly speculation on the performance of members of parliament and parliamentary staff 
that what they do is shaped by the set regulations and prospects of the institution. The 
constitutive rule of an institution provides a certain class of distinct systems of legal norms 
that can achieve validity rather than giving a specification of a certain class of single legal 
norms (Ruiter, 1998, p.217). In other words, the individuals including the parliamentarians 
and parliamentary staff are the political actors of the institution, or the parliament, and 
parliament represents the values of the parliamentarians. Ifiese values, more or less, would 
presumably reflect through both their domestic and international duties. The definition of
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new institutionalism is able to clarify the functioning between the human agency and the 
institution as the base for their actions.
For this research, the arguments will be based on the sociological institutionalist approach. 
Yet, there are three general schools in the New Institutionalism debate; historical, rational 
choice, and sociological institutionalism. These constitute “The three major ,research pillars 
of contemporary political science”. However, different titles were also used for the type of 
approach; normative, constructivist, organizational (Campbell, 2004). The new generation of 
West Europeanists on institutions was more on the informal rules of the game, organisational 
patterns of political behaviour, and organisational structures both within and outside of 
government rather than the formal understanding based on constitutions (Immergut and 
Anderson, 2008, p. 346).
i. Historical institutionalism
The . original scholarship in the studies of institutions is referred to as historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalists are interested in identifying the functioning of an 
institution from elements during the construction of that institution through different time 
periods. In formal aspects of government, analysing the determinants of policy and its 
outcomes in historical and comparative perspective, developing and testing theories of 
political institutional development and policy performance are focuses of historical 
institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo in Campbell, 2004). Broader societal and state 
structures matter more to historical institutionalists than organisations per se (Ma, 2007, 
p.57). The preferences of interest groups reinforce the stability of the original set of policy 
preferences, as political institutions shape the preferences of interest groups (Drezner, 2012, 
p.793). Historical institutionalism offers a perspective that recognises both the constitutive
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nature of institutional contexts and the critical role of unanticipated consequences in driving 
future policy change stressing the importance of time and timing in causal processes (Farrell 
and Newman, 2010, p.611).
ii.Rational choice institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalists imply that an institution is a set of information and rules that 
‘gains from exchange’ are being promoted associated with the pursuit of strategic interactions 
of individual rationality (Harty, 2005). This is to say that individuals use institutions as a 
pathway to achieve their professional goals. For parliamentarians, accordingly, parliaments 
are the place to be for them and parliamentary diplomatic procedures could be presumed as 
the tool to fulfil their goals including fame as being the institutional representative and 
success as political actors and negotiators. Rational choice theory stated that outcomes are the 
result of choices made by actors. It is also considered applicable to a wide variety of social 
situations, where various informational, structural, and psychological factors are claimed to 
interfere with rational decision-making (Quackenbush, 2004, p.87).
Rational choice institutionalism might appear to be the most suitable theory that can be used 
to elaborate the discussion on conceptualising parliamentary diplomacy. However, the reason 
I did not adopt the rational choice institutionalist approach for this research will be briefly 
explained here. The main idea on rational choice institutionalism is that actors would become 
members of an institution to pave way for their professional goals. This may be true for 
members of most political institutions. However, on the case of the Thai Senate, senators are 
senior professionals who are elected or appointed based on their profiles and achievements 
respectively. From a personal point of view, it can be argued that senators enter a temporary 
political career in order to enhance their already notable profiles. After their term in
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parliament ends, they would usually return to their previous professions. In the following 
section, an explanation will be included to give the reason why the sociological 
institutionalism approach has been adopted to develop arguments for this research rather than 
the other approaches. An explanation of how this theoretical approach fits better into my 
arguments about the relations between the parliament as an institution and parliamentarians 
and parliament staff as the institutional actors will be given.
iii.Socioldgical institutionalism
In this research, the sociological institutionalist approach has been adopted to examine the 
relations between the institution (parliament) and its actors (parliamentarians and staff). New 
Institutionalist scholars March and Olsen (1989, p.3 8) have stated that the relations between 
structure and agency are important, and that behaviour is driven by elements including 
internalised principles and values, cultural features, identity, and habit. Moreover, this 
thought supports the fact that actors interpret their situation, their particular place in it, and 
the most appropriate course of action for whatever decision faces them. So they say, the 
developing human being interrelates with a specific social and cultural order, apart from the 
natural environment, and these are mediated by the significant others who have charge of him 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.66). Yet, all this has to be done within the frame of the 
institutional regulations. Therefore, it is likely to say that the mediator is the institution. 
Parliamentarians, in this case, are expected to act, perform their domestic and international 
duties, as well as make the right decision on matters that are duty-related.
“Much of the behaviour we observe in political institutions reflects the 
routine way in which people do what they are supposed to do. Institutions have a 
repertoire of procedures, and they use rules to select among them. The rules may
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be imposed and enforced by direct coercion and political or organisational 
authority, or they may be part of a code of appropriate behaviour that is learned 
and internalised through socialisation or education”.
(March and Olsen, 2009)
This quote fits in with my intention to argue that actors of parliament, a political institution, 
are by all means members of the society and that their behaviour and interactions in office are 
mostly driven by their personal backgrounds. In other words, the way they interact 
professionally can reflect the way they would behave off-duty in a personal setting. A reason 
for this statement would be that individuals tend to create and become occupied with 
expected roles or behaviour when they are in particular positions or statuses, reflecting large 
complexes of cultural patterns focused on some important human activity (Gordon, 1988, 
p.63). In other words, they entitle themselves to enter a routine of work that at the same time 
fits in with their personal habits and decisions. It is clear now that members of parliament are 
supposed to follow the rules once they enter parliament, in other words be obedient and ‘go 
with the flow’, even though they may not agree with parts of the institutional regulations. 
Routine refinement of rules can be imagined to improve their fit to the environment as 
experience are routinely coded into rules, rules into principles and principles into systems of 
thought in many spheres of life (March and Olsen, 2009, p. 15).
An interesting aspect would be to consider that some parliamentarians may have already 
known what they will be doing before they stood for election or being appointed for office, 
which shows that they are well-prepared for their prospective terms in office and presumably 
for what the institution has to offer for them to pursue their goal if they were successful. This 
would be the case where parliamentarians know they have a high chance to be successful in
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the elections. At the same time, most of them may not have realised what they would be 
doing once they are elected or appointed. So we see there are two distinct groups of 
parliamentarians; the assertive and the passive. A study on political deliberation showed that 
internal policy had an effect on citizen’s feelings of their own competency to participate in 
politics, as deliberation will probably initially increase on specific internal political efficacy 
(Morrell, 2005, p.50). The group of active parliamentarians would follow the institutional 
rules as well as might initiate new rule options or imply ‘their way’ of procedure, while the 
group of passive parliamentarians would fit in the general category of following the 
institutional regulations and norms of what they are supposed to do, and be strict to the 
routine so as to avoid negative scrutiny from their peers and the public* .^
In the case of the Thai senators, which will be discussed further in the next part, the majority 
of them have little experience and knowledge of the duties in office. It may be possible that 
some already know about the upcoming duties once they are elected from peers or relatives 
who hold a position in parliament. This is different from members of the House of 
Representatives, as most of them hold positions in government, including the Prime Minister. 
It can be assumed that they take their posts in office for political reputation and to exercise 
their values through the institutional framework. Once they work together as teams, or 
committees, then their opinions would become stronger.'The matter of fact is, however, once 
the logic of appropriateness is applied for these political actors then they are held accountable 
for any improper behaviour that sometimes is associated with bad consequences (March and 
Olsen, 2009, p. 17).
Public scrutiny is part o f  public diplomacy, in other words open diplomacy. This issue w ill be discussed later 
on in the research.
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Therefore, it is clear that there is an emphasised distinction between organisations and 
institutions on the matter of the purposes of the members and to some source, the emergence 
of each particular unit. Organisations as we know them are a relatively recent development, 
whereas institutions of one type or another can be traced back to the earliest stages of history 
of humankind (Scott, 2001, p.71-72). The question now is whether the theoretical description 
of sociological institutionalism could be interpreted differently when applied to institutions 
and organisations. I do not wish to deny the fact that existing suggestions show different 
meanings of an organisation and an institution. However, to some extent it is evident that 
sociological aspects on organisational behaviour and institutional behaviour share similarities 
and can be applied to demonstrate the same collective behaviour of the actors. This argument 
is supported by March and Olsen’s view that political actors associate specific actions with 
specific situations by rules of appropriateness; that what is appropriate for a particular person 
in a particular situation is defined by political and social institutions and transmitted through 
socialisation (March and Olsen, 2009, p.23).
Logic o f  appropriateness
The logic of appropriateness -  a sub-theory related to sociological institutionalism will be 
used to elaborate the argument on the shaping of the Thai Senate. The reason for emphasising 
this particular issue is in order to generate the idea on how the logic of appropriateness in 
new institutionalism contributes to the senators perceptions on their values and identities in 
developing parliamentary diplomacy. At the same time, the logic of appropriateness will be 
utilised to explain the relations between the Secretariat of the Senate staff and their values 
towards the senators and the institution, as their duties are to support the main duties of the 
senators.
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For this research, I have chosen to adopt the sociological institutionalist approach because the 
parliament, a political institution, is a place with a set of regimes that parliamentarians are 
expected to follow and complete. In other words, it is saying that the members of parliament 
and parliamentary staff, despite ' their offices, are nevertheless normal individuals in a 
particular community. Members cooperate in a community and help each other out; therefore 
cooperation presupposes another characteristic of community; effective communication 
(Tuan, 2002; p.307-308). The argument goes on to the distinction between a community and 
society, but it is possible to say that in either one there should be an interaction among 
individuals according to the framework of routine. The logic of appropriateness has been 
used in a wider context concerning new institutionalism^®. However, this thesis plans to 
discuss only within the sociological institutional perspective. Although the argument will be 
based on March and Olsen’s theory, it will draw also on different scholarly approaches in 
terms of from those who agree or disagree with the logic of appropriateness. In addition, I 
will elaborate my own justifications in order to further support the argument.
Not only they need to follow the requirements of their positions, but they could also realise 
their values and potential from their duties. A speculation showed that institutions regulate 
the distribution of values among group members. The distribution of values, however, can be 
intensely contested by actors who desire a different pattern of value access and distribution 
(Offe, 2006). Moreover, the decision to base this research on the sociological institution 
theory was based on the logic that the regulations and norms of the workplace are reflected 
through the personal backgrounds of the parliamentarians. Research on how normative 
meanings have been generated in transnational arenas, as well as change during the transfer
"® Further studies on institutions and organisational behaviour can be referred to the works o f  Dimaggio and 
Powell (1991), The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis.
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from the transnational to the domestic political arena^*, has reflected perspectives on 
institutional norms, examining from the ‘interaction in context’ (Weiner, 2007, p.48). In 
addition, a study on the role of parliamentary politicians in Singapore has been conducted and 
stressed that the socioeconomic background of the members of parliament is important in 
shaping what they do in the legislative process: the expectation they have of themselves and 
the actual role behaviour they adopt (Ghee, 1976, p.424-425). However, there have been 
sceptical debates on the utility of the concept “logic of appropriateness”, that it does not 
actually have a total impact in shaping the behaviour, values, and decisions of the actors of an 
institution. A doubt has risen whether they are seen as theories, perspectives, or ideal types 
(Goldmann, 2005, p.35). Also, a more general approach to explain the logic of 
appropriateness in organisations should attempt to explain how both rules and anticipated 
consequences affect behaviour and outcome rather than trying to conceptualising rule- 
governed choice (Ostrom, 1991, p.239).
The logic of appropriateness, from the researcher’s point of view, is seen as a guided 
framework that shapes and conducts the behaviour of the parliamentary diplomatic actors in 
office. This is to say the logic of appropriateness does indeed have a pivotal role in shaping 
the dynamics of the institution and its actors. Even if they do not realise it, there will always 
be ‘an act of courtesy’ comprising routines and realisations within that invisible frame 
concerning what they should be doing, how they do it, and what to expect from their actions. 
Moreover, the logic of appropriateness fits in with my argument on the behaviour of the 
institutional actors, parliamentarians and parliament staff, and how the logic of 
appropriateness has an extent of influence on the perceptions of these actors on the 
international part of their duties. A statement to support this is that the doctrine of
E.g. during treaty negotiations to domestic governmental sittings.
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appropriateness can be applied to administrative planning in any level of government, 
emphasising the functioning of human activity (Kennedy, 1972, p. 142). The decisions they 
make on their missions and duties, however, would be resulted as part of the shaping of the 
logic of appropriateness and also from their experiences, training, and perceptions in life.
Accordingly, my assumption here is that parliamentarians are confident and proud about their 
titles and duties that they tend to believe they are in control of their behaviour and decisions. 
A senator from the Committee on Education stressed that both appointed and elected senators 
share the same professional knowledge and expertise, but the bias from their senatorship 
limits the opportunities for elected senators to be heard in parliament (interviewed 30 March 
2011). However, this can also lead to a possibility in a change of rules. Although the 
institutional actors are required to follow the rules and routines, it is also likely and possible 
that rules could be changed through the actors’ exposure to information, experiences and 
contact with others (March and Olsen, 2009, p. 13). Yet, an emphasis on the change of rules 
in an institution would be that actors cannot change every rule and routine all at once because 
then there would be no need for either organisations or institutions (Rowlinson, 1997, p.89).
Apart from the relations between the individual and the institution, another important 
influence that could shape parliamentary diplomacy would be the seniority and the 
professional experience o f  the parliamentarians. How does seniority shape the pursuit of 
international diplomatic practice between parliamentarians? The answer is that senior 
individuals are expected to have more experience, either personal or professional, or has 
spent more time in office (MacCormick, 1998, p.326-327). In this case it means that the 
parliamentarian has likely spent many consecutive terms in office, depending on the 
constitutional regulations of each national parliament. Moreover, senior representatives are
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likely to be selected as leader e.g. Speaker, Chairperson, Head of the House or the 
Committee, therefore reflecting a somewhat upward power structure^l To support this 
argument, Peter (2008) gives an explanation about a younger official’s perception on 
seniority and hierarchy in an intergovernmental organisation as follows;
“Age is an important factor in organisations here and as a young person you are not 
taken seriously here. People just don’t listen to you regardless of your 
qualification”.
From the quote, it is clear that age has an important part in shaping the structure of an 
institution, especially in countries where seniority is more associated with hierarchy^^ Even 
so, nowadays the structure of political institutions tends to be more open and flexible. 
Although senior officials hold the leading posts, but advice is taken from other junior 
members despite their age and experience. The reason would be that the responsibility and 
performance would depend on the specialism of the individual rather that than age difference. 
This could be considered as a positive aspect towards the distribution of duties within the 
institution, as well as the duties extended across institutions. Seniority, accordingly, would be 
a factor to maintain courtesy and respect among peers.
As for professional experience, this is another important shaping strategy that could 
determine the success of parliamentary diplomacy. When we say that members of parliament 
have various professional experiences in order to be qualified for office, it refers to the fact 
that their knowledge and experience should be universal as well. Members of parliament
"" The structure o f power, on the other hand, could also be downwards or centred. Again this depends on the 
system within each parliament.
Examples o f  countries that seniority and hierarchy are associated include Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand. See 
Peters, 2008.
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should not only have specialised knowledge and experience about what they do domestically, 
but should have the worldly knowledge that could be discussed universally with foreign 
counterparts. If parliament were to develop and become a strong trustworthy diplomatic 
actor, it needs people who are not only experienced in their profession, but should also have 
sound experience with international diplomatic activities. This is to say that they should have 
a good understanding about their diplomatic duties and aim for the improvement and success 
of the institution. The issues about the image of parliament as a diplomatic actor will be 
discussed in the following point on motivations that influence parliamentary diplomacy.
However, the arguments and discussions have been based mainly on the sociological 
approach because the Thai Senate is seen as a somewhat ‘closed’ institution with a specific 
group of actors that perform their duties separately from members of the House of 
Representatives. In this case, it could be termed as an organisation with members from 
diverse backgrounds. By applying the sociological institutional approach to this case study, 
we are then able to examine the understanding of values of the actors towards the institution 
and whether the legislative setting has impact on their behaviour and performance in 
international diplomatic duties (Searing, 1991, p. 1240). In the next section, the discussion 
will move on to the actors’ motivations in developing and strengthening parliamentary 
diplomacy.
iv. Constitutional arrangements
The constitutional arrangements of a country are considered as another influence that have 
impact on shaping the performance of diplomatic actors. Raising the Thai Senate as a focal 
point for this research, evidence in the findings chapter later on will demonstrate that the 
constitutional framework has a limitation on the procedures and outcomes of parliamentary
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diplomatic duties. In diplomatic missions, the completion of a mission should include a 
formal agreement between the parties involved -  where it be two parties or more. In the case 
of the Thai Senate, both domestic and international duties are clearly restricted by the 
constitutional framework. Therefore, the perceptions and outcomes of the Senate’s 
international diplomatic missions may not reflect a complete course of a diplomatic 
procedure where negotiations, decisions are made and document evidence is signed between 
the parties as of conventional diplomacy. Under Section 190 in the Thai Constitution, 2007, 
any planned foreign affairs mission that would be relevant to national security needs to be 
approved by parliament. In this sense, parliament has got a degree of impact and rights to 
approve the procedures of international diplomatic missions. Section 190 reads in full;
“The King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and 
other treaties with other countries or international organisations.
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has jurisdiction 
in accordance therewith or in accordance with international law or requires the 
enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof or has extensive impacts on 
national economic or social security or generates material commitments in trade, 
investment or budgets of the country, must be approved by the National 
Assembly. For this purpose, the National Assembly shall complete its 
consideration within sixty days as from the receipt of such matter.
Prior to taking steps in concluding a treaty with other countries or 
international organizations under paragraph two, the Council of Ministers shall 
provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings and shall give the 
National Assembly explanations on such treaty. For this purpose, the Council of
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Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for negotiations 
for approval.
When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of 
Ministers shall, prior to the declaration of intention to be bound thereby, make 
details thereof publicly accessible and, in the case where the implementation of 
such treaty has impacts on the public or operators of small-or medium-sized 
enterprises, the Council of Ministers shall take steps in rectifying or remedying 
the impacts suffered by aggrieved persons in an expeditious, appropriate and fair 
manner.
There shall be the law on the determination of procedures and methods 
for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national economic or 
social security or generating material commitments in trade or investment and 
the rectification and remedying of impacts suffered by persons in consequence 
of the implementation of such treaties, having regard to justice to persons 
benefited and persons aggrieved by the implementation thereof as well as to 
general members of the public.
In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, 
the power to make the determination thereon shall be vested in the 
Constitutional Court and, for this purpose, the provisions of section 154 (1) shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to the referral of the matter to the Constitutional Court."
Section 190 justifies the duty framework for the Senate in foreign and diplomatic affairs.
From this fact, the arrangements of the Constitution do have an impact on shaping the 
perspectives and attitudes of the legislators on foreign affairs, thus having direct impact on 
parliamentary diplomacy. However, the issue which needs to be supported by evidence along
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the course of this research is the extent of the international duties of the Senate. On this point, 
the matter of the Senate’s diplomatic duties would be more of a focal point in research than 
the constitutional arrangements. Purposes, procedures, and outcomes of these duties will 
reflect and provide analysis for the research questions and hypotheses on parliamentary 
diplomacy.
V. The Military
The military has always played a major role in shaping Thailand’s political system. Since the 
political transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy in 1932, the Thai 
political system has always been prone to military dominance. The majority of prime 
ministers or political institution leaders were usually military personnel. Even in parliament, 
members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate are from a military 
background. To understand political relations in Thailand, the creation of parameters from 
political institutions and material conditions are able to determine the relationship between 
the country’s military and society. Various institutional, ideational, and macro-structural 
factors have been realised through agents’ choices and strategies through the conditioning of 
structure in explaining the erosion of Thai democracy (Chambers, 2011, p.290-291).
Focusing the impact of the military on international diplomatic duties of the Senate, the 
composition of senior military generals in the Senate is considered as a lesser factor on the 
outcomes of parliamentary diplomatic duties. The reason for this statement is because once 
the senators hold membership in parliament, they also hold equal opportunities to legislative 
scrutiny, be active in individual committee settings, and participate in international 
diplomatic missions. Their background, as the argument goes, can facilitate their duties in
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terms of building existing relations with previous contacts in their professional fields. 
Throughout the course of Thailand’s political history, there has always been a struggle 
against dictatorial military regime. The 1997 Thai constitution presented major shifts in 
developments for democracies in Thailand by strengthening representative democracy to 
make the political system more responsive to the differing demands and needs of the people 
and to establish a more effective means of checking politicians’ abuses of power (Maisrikrod, 
1999,p.355).
c. Motivations
There are several motivations for the practice of parliamentary diplomacy. We will be talking 
about motivations for the individual parliamentarian, and for the parliament as a political 
institution. First, we will discuss the motivations of the parliamentarian as an individual. The 
main duties of parliamentarians, as individuals, are legislative drafting or scrutiny within their 
national government. Apart from that, international duties are assigned according to expertise 
and experience of the individual representative^'*. This becomes automatic when 
parliamentarians join different committee groups in parliament, in particular the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, as they usually continue to carry out their discussions in ‘another 
country’ with another friendship group abroad on a subject that would be beneficial to both 
sides. National parliaments, whether the system is unicameral or bicameral, have different 
committee groups to focus the discussion on specific issues.
A member of parliament can choose to join one or more committees according to his or her 
expertise or personal interest. His or her professional technical expertise in virtue of 
experience, otherwise ‘experience-based expert’, apart from personal interest on the issue
Regulations on the international duties o f  parliament is considered as a crucial part o f  the institutional 
structure, apart from the domestic duties.
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would be the main factor for choosing to become member of a committee or even member of 
the institution (Collins and Robert, 2002, p.238). As a result, international diplomatic 
activities are prestigious opportunities for parliamentarians as individuals to adapt their 
knowledge and skills in performing their international diplomatic duties. In other words, the 
international missions in proceeding parliamentary diplomacy would motivate the actors, 
parliamentarians, to demonstrate or to test their potential in international affairs. Members of 
parliament would have the opportunity to practice their discussion and negotiating skills as a 
diplomatic actor, thus opening up the traditional frame of domestic responsibility in 
legislative drafting or scrutiny^ .^
However, some parliamentarians from non-English speaking countries find the thought of 
speaking with foreign counterparts somewhat intimidating (interview with Secretariat staff 
from Bureau of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2011, Bangkok). Even though they have sound 
knowledge about the particular issue under consideration, and professional translators are 
requested to interpret or translate the discussions during official meetings, this particular 
group of parliamentary representatives would not say a word. The reason for not giving any 
opinions might not only be language difficulties, but lack of specialised knowledge on the 
topic or even for security reasons. When parliamentarians meet with international 
counterparts, they may choose not to speak as they are aware that their opinions might be 
referred to in a negative aspect. This could make the conversation less worthwhile, as 
exchange of opinions may not be successful due to language obstacles. Also, this would be a 
fact that could discourage parliamentarians from being less active in international diplomatic 
duties.
This is a general implication to the duties o f  both Houses (bicameral parliaments); the House o f  
Representatives and the Senate respectively.
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When the parliamentarians are motivated to perform international diplomatic duties, the 
following motivation would then be competitiveness among parliamentarians. Each 
individual who runs for parliamentary elections or appointments has a sense of pride in 
himself. The extent of pride would likely to increase when he has a respective political title -  
MP - and an extent of capability in office. Moreover, competitiveness can begin to form even 
before parliamentarians take their position in office, during the election period. This fact can 
be used to explain the composition of senators who are elected, but then again the aggression 
of openly lobbying and vote-buying among senators are not considered as serious as 
candidates who expect to be elected as members of the House of Representatives. An 
example of the U.S. Congress electoral process on political competition speculated that 
limiting an incumbent’s term of service to a specified number of years guarantees a minimum 
level of legislative tumoveE^ (Cain, Hanley, and Kousser, 2006). Interestingly, the authors’ 
analysis later showed that other trends in the electoral environment and the strategic 
behaviour of incumbents also had dramatic effects on competition during election.
i. Electoral competitiveness
So what does electoral competitiveness have to do with parliamentary diplomacy 
development? The assumption is that competition during election, or appointment to office, 
could shape the candidate and further on his political values when he takes up parliamentary 
duties. A fact is that, party members will collude to prevent the rivalry between the branches 
of government necessary for mutual monitoring to occur when unified government exists, 
giving way to the classical approach of electoral competition encourages executives to pack 
the legislature with members of their own parties in a world of partisan competition 
(Lehoucq, 2002, p.31). As mentioned earlier, members of parliament are likely to adopt their
The example raised here on the effect o f term limits in office and political competitiveness was taken from the 
U.S. Congress electoral process. However, the argument meant to show that after elections MPs continue to 
compete against each other in office for successful political profiles.
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professional skills and knowledge to their parliamentary responsibilities. Further, their 
political values could alter or change when they are surrounded by other parliamentarians 
who have different skills, knowledge, and values during their term in office and this would 
make competitiveness in office more intense. We would be able to observe when we see 
parliamentarians taking special training sessions to improve their interpersonal skills so they 
would be as competitive as other peers in the House, or when he tries to get the attention of 
the House leader or Committee leader by putting himself forward in parliamentary activities 
that may not be his direct responsibility. These duties might include both domestic and 
international duties. We shall discuss about parliamentarians as diplomatic actors further on 
in this research.
Moving on from the individual parliamentarian, the next point to observe is the motivations 
for parliamentary diplomacy from the parliament itself as an institution. When we think about 
the nature of diplomatic practice, governments and foreign ministries would be the most 
prominent national bodies that perform international diplomatic missions. However, in 
today’s globalised world there has been a series of international instruments and 
organisations emerging as substitute actors in the international relations process (Riordan, 
2003). National parliaments are postulated as one of the alternative diplomatic actors that are 
also becoming more and more active. International diplomatic activities including courtesy 
calls, official trips and meetings with foreign parliament members abroad are all part of the 
parliament’s ‘diplomatic missions’. Some motivations for carrying out international 
diplomatic missions are suggested in the following sections.
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a. Creating stable and reliable political network and counterparts would be the expression to 
describe as a motivation for constant parliamentary diplomacy development. Even if not 
having ambassadorial postings abroad like the foreign office, there are many friendship 
groups between parliaments who share interest in a certain area. The interest may be on 
anything; political, economical, social or cultural issues. At this point, the diplomatic 
relations would extend beyond regional borders and parliamentary representatives are most 
likely, to choose to build a diplomatic relationship with foreign parliaments in different 
continents, does not have to be within the same region. However, it is assumed here that for a 
beneficial connection and for security issues, parliaments tend to create and maintain 
diplomatic relations with equivalents that have similar political statuses. Apart from this, 
parliaments may find that connecting with countries that have similar cultures would also 
make the bond stronger. Usually this happens more progressively when parliaments are in the 
same region. In the long run, this would be beneficial for national interests of the country that 
each parliament represents. However, a thought about the above assumption would be that 
national parliaments are seen as weak in developing international relations (Stravidis, 2005), 
and that it needs to build a strong parliamentary connection to reflect its capability in foreign 
affairs, apart from domestic legislative duties.
Another obvious motivation for parliaments, as a political institution, that may be possibly 
assumed on the development of parliamentary diplomacy is the ambition to create a notable 
institutional identity. As parliaments, either unicameral or bicameral, have domestic duties in 
drafting legislation. For bicameral parliaments, the main domestic duty of the upper house 
would be to scrutinise legislative documents passed on from the lower house (Tsebelis and 
Money, 1997, p.53). As a result, the international duties of the upper house may not be as 
distinctive as that of the lower house. However, this research will raise a case study later on
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focusing on the bicameral parliament system, and will base the discussion on the international 
duties of the parliament’s upper house.
As previously mentioned, international diplomatic duties are supposedly missions of Foreign 
Ministries and national governments. If we examine their diplomatic duties as part of a set of 
institutional regulations, for the said institutions the diplomatic missions are their main 
responsibilities. However, for parliaments the international duties are supposedly secondary 
or in some places joint duties which need to be accomplished along with the domestic duties. 
From this, it is obvious that parliaments are constantly engaged in diplomatic duties so that 
they could improve the image and status of parliament as a substantive diplomatic actor. 
(Tickamyer, 1981, p .17). There may be a group of parliamentarians who have less or no 
interest in foreign affairs. This also needs to be proven from fieldwork research. 
Nevertheless, further research needs to be conducted in order to ascertain whether purposes 
and outcomes of international diplomatic duties are successful and that parliaments are 
indeed prospective diplomatic actors. Findings will be reported gradually later on as the 
research develops.
d. Prospects fo r  parliamentary diplomacy
A discussion about factors, shapings, and motivations for the procedures of parliamentary 
diplomacy have been emphasised in this part. The next question that would follow would be 
whether parliamentary diplomacy can be successful. However, there has been limited 
research done on parliamentary diplomacy, and some reasons were stated above. Scholars 
including Stravidis (2005) wrote about the dearth academic research on the question of what 
‘parliamentary diplomacy’ actually is, what role it plays in international affairs, and what the 
normative implications of such a phenomenon could be for democracy, diplomacy, policy­
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making, and conflict resolution. Weisglas and Boer (2007), moreover, even point that 
parliamentary diplomacy is in fact only in its infancy^ .^ From several scholarly interpretations 
drawn together at this stage, diplomacy can be referred to the procedures of building bilateral 
or multilateral relations between nations by different actors. Conflict prevention and peace­
keeping, accordingly, can be referred to discussions and negotiations between state 
representatives to maintain and stabilise any occurring conflicts, domestically or 
internationally, in such cases where military force may or may not be required.
As a result, most of the assumptions on factors, shapings, and motivations are analysed from 
various existing research materials as well as the researcher’s own speculations on the 
interpretation of parliamentary diplomacy. It would be best to assume for now that the 
prospect of parliamentary diplomacy depends on whether the members of parliament see 
themselves as diplomatic actors, and how they apply the thought of parliamentary diplomacy 
into practice. This is to say that if the parliamentarians and staff understand and acknowledge 
the purpose of parliamentary diplomatic duties, then the outcomes would be more successful. 
On the other hand, if they perform diplomatic duties only to fulfil the required institutional 
regulations -  only to get the work done on time and by duty - then the prospect of 
parliamentary diplomacy may not be as successful, reflecting that particular parliament as a 
weak diplomatic actor as it was not seen as a strong representative in the first place. The most 
important fact for now, as the study goes on, is to perceive parliamentary diplomacy as a 
means to create and expand a political identity among the actors who represent their
Despite having decades o f existence, parliaments are relatively weak actors in the international arena when 
compared to governments, NGOs and businesses. See Stavridis, 2005, and Weisglas & de Boer, 2007.
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institution. In the following part, I shall be moving on to discuss specifically about the Thai 
Senate, a case study for this research to examine whether the perception of values and 
identities within the sociological institutional framework enable them to be a significant 
diplomatic actor.
To give a brief conclusion to this chapter before moving on to discuss the Thai Senate, the 
series of factors, shapings, motivations raised to discuss the development of parliamentary 
diplomacy including geographical settings, economic relations, globalisation, culture, 
sociological institutionalism, logic of appropriateness, seniority and professional experience 
of parliamentarians, to name but some, has helped clarify my main hypothesis that the Thai 
Senate is a main institution in domestic legislative scrutiny, but is yet to fully develop as a 
prominent diplomatic actor. Part of the fact is because the duties of the institution are limited 
by rules stated in the Constitution. Another reason would be that the individual actors do not 
truly realise the importance of international diplomatic duties and how these duties would 
enable the Thai Senate to grow further from its current position. The research will be carried 
on specifically in the next part of this report where discussions will be based on the 
theoretical elements in chapter 1, chapter 2 and the constitutional framework on duties of the 
Thai Senate. Findings that will be presented in the following chapters will seek to measure 
the significance and purposes of the Senate’s international diplomatic duties, therefore 
gradually clarifying the initial hypotheses on the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor.
From a series of observations and from document consultation, we can say that the Thai 
Senate is considered as another possible diplomatic actor in developing parliamentary 
diplomacy, but before this claim is able to be confirmed as true and that the enhanced role of 
diplomacy in the twenty-first century can be better understood, the disparity of views in 
diplomatic studies must be consolidated and classified (Murray, 2008, p.22). Even though
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parliamentary diplomacy seems a relatively new sub-theme in the studies of diplomacy, the 
attempt to define its procedures as to whether it is more relevant to international law or 
international politics have been discussed for decades. At this point, it may be worth to look 
at diplomacy and its dimensions as a consequence of the shifting global trend. Part of the 
speculation would be the enthusiasm in new dimensions of political studies, expansion of 
diplomatic routes and actors, individual attitudes towards the political system and their 
position within the international settings (Meisel, 1974, p.602).
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Chapter 3 
A Bureaucratic Model: the Thai Senate
“Modem parliaments are assemblies representing the people who are mled 
by the means of bureaucracy. It is, after all, a condition of the duration of any 
rule even the best organised that it should enjoy a certain measure of inner assent 
from at least those sections of the ruled who carry weight in society. Today 
parliaments are merely the means whereby this minimum of assent is made 
manifest.
(Max Weber, in Allen, 2004, pp .144-145)
The Thai Senate is a relevant example of a group of elite representatives whose main duties 
are to scmtinise legislative bills and drafts. On the thematic discussion about parliamentary 
diplomacy, as the title suggests, parliaments and their members are the key figures involved 
in the whole process of building international relations. The stmcture of the Thai 
governmental system, in particular, provides a perspective for examining intergovernmental 
relations through horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as behavioural outcomes as they 
centre on the competition for power, influence, and authority; and they generate and resolve 
conflicts over important group and societal values (Krannich, 1979, p.506-508).
In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the Thai Senate as a case study on a domestic 
political institution that has responsibilities in international diplomatic duties. The main point 
intended to be examined further as the discussion and research goes is whether the Thai 
Senate understands and applies the model of parliamentary diplomacy, judging from the 
purposes and outcomes of the international diplomatic duties the Senate actors take part in.
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Also, the individual perceptions of the Thai Senate actors towards the significance of 
international diplomatic duties will be taken into consideration as a means to understand the 
role of a non-conventional diplomatic institution in strengthening and developing 
parliamentary diplomacy, which will also contribute to the encouragement of further studies 
in diplomacy as it is claimed that diplomacy is an understated yet important field of study 
within international relations. An explanation to this statement may be that diplomacy and 
foreign affairs are procedures and events that require “an intuitive resolution of uncertainty”, 
they are crucial to national interests but are not reiterative (Howe, 1968, p.39). Another 
speculation is that studies on diplomacy would not be directly referred to as ‘diplomacy’ but 
would be referred to in other dimensions or other titles. Also, most of the studies on 
diplomacy were originally used for conflict prevention and peace-keeping (Pin-Li, 1993, 
p.349-350). Therefore, studies on these fields then needs to be strategised and may require 
subjective or unquantifiable data, and this also should be researched later on.
a. Historical background: semi-structured democracy, military and elite dominated 
The reason that the Thai Senate has been classified as a non-conventional political institution 
is because the conventional diplomatic institution is usually regarded as a nation’s Foreign 
Office, that is how it is acknowledged and that is how it is expected to remain. A national 
Foreign Office or Diplomatic Corps, either way they are addressed, is the “phantom of 
international politics” and a primary symbol of diplomatic culture, as its ceremonies, rituals, 
and rites confirm the existence of an international society which acts according to agreed 
upon norms and laws (Sofer, 2007, p.31). However, the general theme of this study is
mainly to examine the role of the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor, not attempting to seek 
evidence to prove that the Thai Senate should in fact be a more prominent diplomatic 
institution and therefore should replace the conventional duties of the Foreign Office
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altogether. The discussions below will be about Thai political culture and the historical 
background on Thai politics, as this will be the grounds to which my research arguments stem 
from. The following arguments will focus on the fact that the diplomatic duties of the Thai 
Senate and the Foreign Office remain distinctive from one another, as they are two separate 
institutions with unique functions. However, the question whether conventional diplomats are 
made redundant has been raised as the changing nature of international relations have led to 
the shift of conventional diplomatic practice, as they are long standing calls from states for 
modernity, relevance, and joined-up representation (Black, 2010, p.248). At one point, 
however, information may have to be gathered from Foreign Office representatives to 
measure the argument on the Thai Senate’s diplomatic values.
As mentioned earlier, parliamentary diplomacy is still regarded as a developing evolution 
from traditional diplomacy. The nature of its practices and its actors are yet to be 
strengthened for the term to be distinguished as a notable method of diplomatic practice. 
Most importantly, the development of parliamentary diplomacy should also stand on the 
original ground of the desire to introduce democratic procedures in the field of international 
politics, as expressed by former United Nations’ Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold 
(Bailey, 1962, p.310). For the time being, my further arguments on the Thai Senate and 
related issues towards the nature and duties of the Thai Senate will be based on my 
interpretation of parliamentary diplomacy that it is another branch of representation, 
communication, and a lesser form of negotiation. The reason I interpret parliamentary 
diplomacy as a ‘lesser’ form of negotiation fits with the nature of the informal diplomatic 
discussions of most parliamentary institutions. Also, formal procedures of negotiation would 
involve sequential changes of offers, changes of state of environment, and opponent’s 
responses (Kersten, Michalowski, Szpakowicz, Koperczak, 1991, p. 1270). For this country-
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specific study, the important actors would include parliamentarians and parliamentary 
working staff from the Thai Senate, who are political civil servants and permanent civil 
servants respectively (see figures 1 and 2). The difference between these two categories of 
political membership is that in Thailand, political civil servants are temporary. They have a 
fixed number of years in office which then expires and they would have to reapply if they 
wish to continue their terms depending on the regulations of their position. For the current 
constitutional acts on senators, they are not allowed to take consecutive terms in office 
(Secretariat of the Senate handbook, 2008). It has been debated, however, that governments 
adopt a “platonic guardianship” in an open move toward technocratic elitism as a mode of 
transnational governance development. This approach on platonic guardianship socialise 
them to believe that deeply political trade-offs are value-neutral choices based on “objective” 
expertise^^ Moreover, most legislators do not worry much about the tension between public 
opinion in their districts and their personal ideology, as a legislator’s personal ideology does 
not stand at one pole and constituency preferences or political environment at the other 
(Uslaner, 2000, p.52).
The main lesson leamt from the functioning of the Thai Senate, again, is that the actors needs 
to develop their own solid policy on international diplomatic affairs, for the benefits of the 
institutional proficiency in the future. The major hindrance to self-improvement of senators’ 
understanding and skills as diplomatic actors is the impact of the patron-client relationship in 
the Thai bureaucratic system - contrast to the reality that they are expected to contribute their 
knowledge and experiences to their political duties. The country's politics and bureaucracy 
remain trapped in an archaic culture of hierarchy, patronage, highly centralised power, and
See Slaughter, 2004, p.219.To allow them to escape politics is to allow these officials to come together off­
shore, fi-ee fi-om the usual mandated intrusions o f public representatives and private interest groups in their 
decision-making process.
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social conflict is growing. Parties freely contest elections but huge numbers of votes are 
bought. Citizen's have little political participation outside elections despite enjoying extensive 
personal liberties (Eng, 1997, p. 169).
Figure 1: Structure of the Thai Parliament
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Source: Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Secretariat of the Senate, Bangkok, Thailand 
(updated December 2012).
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Figure 2: Structure of the Secretariat of the Senate
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Source: Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Secretariat of the Senate, Bangkok, Thailand 
(updated December 2012).
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Permanent civil servants, on the other hand, have life-long tenure in their positions until the 
official retirement at the age of 60, or until other circumstances force them to resign earlier. 
From the professional distinction between the senators and the staff, this raises a speculation 
that senators should in fact be referred to as ‘contemporary’ diplomatic actors, while they 
hold their term in parliament. If they chose to pursue a career in diplomacy later on after their 
senatorship, then we could refer to them as ‘permanent’ diplomatic actors. However, the 
extent to which politicians pursue other occupational affiliations they have prior to or 
simultaneously with involvement in politics depends on time, interest, and necessity 
(Tickamyer, 1981, p. 19). The senate staff, however, are likely to be viewed as more 
prominent diplomatic actors, due to their longer period in office and a more repetitive routine 
of work preparation and maintaining diplomatic correspondence. Their ‘more prominent’ 
diplomatic role might change in time if they are transferred to another department or 
establishment that is not so much involved in international diplomatic duties. Therefore, 
further on in individual roles and duties of the parliamentary actors I will be asserting that the 
position and statuses o f  these actors have impact on their perceptions towards their 
diplomatic duties.
As Reischauer, Director of the United States Congressional Budget Office stated as follows: 
“Parliament could use a larger and more capable staff. Governance is not a matter for 
amateurs any more, and politicians have a lot of other demands on their time and a limited 
amount of expertise and providing them with capable staff can only help the overall progress 
that countries are being made, by and large in parliament systems, the parliament has been 
starved of capable staff’.
(Hennessy and Smith, 1992, p. 10).
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From this quote, it is clear that parliamentary staff form part of a smooth and successful 
functioning of parliament. In certain situations, depending on the purpose of the diplomatic 
mission, factors to consider regarding parliamentary staff would be more on their experiences 
and competencies, rather than the number of staff assigned to facilitate the parliamentarians. 
In either way, parliamentary staff need to acquire general skills and knowledge to assist 
parliamentarians.
Moreover, another point which needs to be stressed about in this part is that Thai politics has 
a distinctive feature in terms of being shaped by domestic political outbreaks and worldly 
influences, resulting in a unique political culture that is reflected through the international 
diplomatic customs from any Thai political institution. All national governments have been 
affected virtually by global interdependence, stimulating them to think more about paths and 
procedures of international relations and paths of diplomacy (Talbott, 1997, p.75). The Thai 
Senate is a domestic political institution comprised of elected and appointed representatives 
as well as the permanent civil servants who are based within the Secretariat. In this part of the 
research, several issues will be raised to give a brief understanding of Thai political culture 
and a clarification of Asian political and parliamentary cultures in general. This would be a 
focal background in developing my arguments on the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor.
The international diplomatic missions of the Thai Senate might be able to clarify a point that 
parliaments, as well as other institutions who are partly international representatives, tend to 
keep contact and linkages with particular countries. This is because states promote their 
political and economic interests through diplomatic representation to coordinate, negotiate, 
and solve problems by gathering information that is not otherwise publicly available. Thus, 
sharing a particular view of the world generates a sense of ideological affinity and sense of
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belonging to the same group (Neumayer, 2008, p.228-231). Also, further study would need to 
examine whether the Thai Senate has regular contacts with parliaments of any particular 
country, as this could be considered as a form of linkage diplomacy where the initiator 
country seeks the cooperation of the other state and communicates through techniques of 
influence, making threats or promises in areas over which it has little control (Pin-Li, 1993, 
p.349).
The main reason that the arguments are based on the Thai Senate is because this particular 
institution is considered as another emerging diplomatic actor within the scope of diplomatic 
practice, apart from the traditional diplomatic actor being civil servants from the Foreign 
Ministry. As mentioned before in the theoretical part, globalisation has created and unfolded 
new identities and part of that was the emergence of new diplomatic actors (Hogan, 2004, 
p.l). At this point, I do not wish to make a distinctive comparison between the purposes and 
outcomes of the international duties of the Foreign Ministry and the Thai Senate as the 
international duties of the Ministry are their main responsibilities whilst that of the Senate, so 
far that I have acknowledged, are secondary responsibilities. Whether the senators consider 
the international diplomatic duties as important as their domestic duties is a matter that would 
be clarified during conduction of fieldwork.
However, national and international circumstances nowadays have encouraged Thai Senate 
actors to give more priority to the international duties. The effective exercise of influence is 
related increasingly to forging, partnerships, managing networks, and shaping opinions 
(Copeland, 2009, p. 146). Therefore, if a comparison between the two institutions were to be 
made it would be more likely to focus upon the basis of the Foreign Ministry being a
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traditional diplomatic actor and the Thai Senate being an emerging, in other words a “new” 
diplomatic actor.
i.Thaipolitics: a background " -
When we talk about politics and international relations, the thought that comes up to mind 
would associate political and institutional structures with the citizens of a country. Every 
person, not only political leaders, whoever they are and whatever their role is in the society is 
expected to be a representative of a common national culture that shapes a nation’s character 
(Pye, 1991, p.501). Political systems encompass attitudes and values which pertain to its 
political system. Certain attitudes are also fostered in their citizens and, therefore, demarcates 
the boundaries within which governments can legitimate act. These provide an invisible, 
overarching bond of values, ideologies, customs, traditions, symbols, myths, and beliefs 
which unifies its citizens (Jackson and Jackson, 1993, p.84-85).
However, it is important to note that culture can imply a diverse branch of implications. If 
speaking about people, then culture would signify the mass culture and the. elite culture, 
particularly in Asia. Asian governments have had the opportunity and obligation to learn 
from older democracies in the West, therefore democracy in Asia has encouraged their ovm 
greater self-reliance while respecting cultural values (Dae Jung, 2002, p.272). Further 
explanation on the Asian model of parliaments, apart from the adoption of the Western 
legislative system, in this case I have raised an example of the South Korean parliament 
where the dominant modem strand of the Confucian moral tradition rejects the underlying 
ethos of democratic institutions such as separation of powers and checks and balances as the
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innate goodness of human nature are instead assumed^^ (Park & Shin, 2006, p.353). However, 
the Thai parliament cannot be compared to the other far Asian parliaments as the adoption of 
Confucianism is not as prominent. But then again, this point on spiritual morality and the 
perception on democracy can still be argued as a cultural impact of personal beliefs on the 
collective performance and competency of the political actors..
ii.Asian parliamentary culture: models o f  new democracy?
The parliament of Thailand has its own distinctive characteristics, as could be claimed with 
any other national parliament from a developing country. While the bicameral Westminster- 
style model has been adopted, the functioning system heavily reflects a common Asian style 
which is instilled with Asian values of courtesy, tolerance, and a struggle of autonomy of the 
only regional country to avoid total Western colonisation. The issue on Asian parliamentary 
culture, accordingly, has been brought up here to look at other Asian parliamentary models in 
terms of measuring the suitability of democracy and the preference for democracy - how it 
will fit into the political culture of that Asian country. This will also reflect how other Asian 
parliaments reflect their political attitudes and represent development of new democracy^”. 
Apart from the subservient characteristics of parliamentarians to party lines and the 
leadership of the political party having a majority in the lower house and partly due to the 
socio-economic conditions of the country, parliament needs to maintain the momentum for 
consolidation of democracy in the country -  live up to constitutional expectations by playing 
a key role in the process of démocratisation and modernisation (Subedi, 1998, p. 163).
According to Far-Eastern tradition, both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian orientations are negatively 
related to each o f  the two broad dimensions -  social and political -  o f Asian values. See Park & Shin, 2006.
In 2002, the East Asia Barometer (EAB) conducted national random-sample surveys in five new democracies 
(Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), one old democracy (Japan), one quasi­
democracy (Hong Kong), and one authoritarian system (China). Public satisfaction with the regime among these 
eight political systems is surprisingly highest in authoritarian China, lowest in democratic Japan and Taiwan, 
and fragile in the other new democracies. See Chu, Diamond, Nathan & Shin, 2009.
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An identifiable “Asian model” of democracy can be characterised by centrist political 
competition, nascent two party systems, aggregative electoral politics, and the impact of 
institutional reforms to elections via deliberate political engineering^^ (Reilly, 2002, p. 1351). 
Models of other Asian parliaments including South Korea, Phillippines, and Japan are raised 
here to give a general view on the system of political representativeness in the region. Party 
systems in South Korea and Thailand, compared to other Asian countries, are characterised 
by unstable party organisations, high vitality, and weak foots in the society. In Japan’s 
political and democratic history, for instance, the period has been divided into democracy 
under military occupation, democracy during state developmentalism, and democracy in an 
era of globalisation respectively^^ (Inoguchi, 2008, pp. 118-120). However, institutionalised 
systems of political parties have strong organisational roots among their respective 
electorates and are well linked with society (Croissant and Vogel, 2010, pp.241-246). So to 
speak, the background of other Asian countries’ political background also reflects the 
representation of their parliamentary incumbency.
b. On representative democracy
Modem democracies have to cope vGth the structural conditions of modem rule to fulfill 
various functions, both intemally in terms of complex societies and extemally in terms of a 
challenging environment, therefore they are complex institutional structures (Merkel, 2004, 
p.36). Parliamentarians are representatives of the people. Even though they come from 
appointment or election, they are expected to contribute their skills and knowledge to 
building a competent political institution and promoting democracy in the society.
Political engineering is defined as the conscious design o f political institutions to achieve certain specific 
objectives. Some institutions o f government can be purposively engineered so as to reward particular types o f  
behaviour and thus achieve particular outcomes. See Reilly, 2002.
In the 2nd phase, Japanese politics was heavily bureaucratic-driven by government. In the 3rd phase, 
globalisation ignores national borders, it divides national economies, and it facilitates the merger o f  the highly 
competitive.
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Démocratisation broadens the scope of the agenda of institutions, creating a deeper basis for 
regional socialisation and allowing these institutions to address issues such as human rights 
promotion beginning from a regional sphere (Acharya, 2003, p.377). The discussion in this 
part aims to examine dynamics of parliamentarians -  particularly in the case of the Thai 
Senate -  as elite representatives of the people, how it reflects the relationship between the 
politicians and the citizens.
G.S. Pathak, Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Senate), India has given a description on 
Parliamentary democracy as follows;
“Parliament is in touch with the day-to-day life of the entire nation and is the 
centre of the net-work of political opinion from all quarters. It is the mirror of 
public opinion. Parliament controls the purse of the nation; it has an impact on the 
policies of the government and where foreign policy is concerned it affects 
relations with foreign countries also. It is truly said that a democratic political 
system will always seek, in the long run, to become a democratic society. It is the 
medium for achieving social and economic objectives through constitutional 
methods” (Pathak 1971, p.5-6).
The Thai Senate, consequently, might be domestically generalised as a representative 
institution of the elite considering its members and their professional backgrounds. Therefore, 
the study of elite political culture would be another focal point to discuss in order to help 
clarify the nature of Thai senators and might constitute to their perceptions towards both their 
domestic and international duties. A group of people when formed together may encompass 
not only their preferred form of external boundaries and social organisation, but a group
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identity that includes their idea of time, imagined and shared history, language, even conflict 
resolution mechanisms (Verwiej, Oros, and Jacquin-Berdal, 1998, p.5).
Thai politics has its own distinctive characteristics. For this research, the background on the 
nature of Thai politics should also be discussed in order to understand the structure and 
functioning of a Thai political institution. As a result, I shall be giving a description about the 
nature of Thai politics and the impact it has on domestic political institutions and its actors. 
Ever since adopting the system of becoming a democratic Constitutional Monarchy back in 
1932, all Thai citizens know that the patronage way of governance still dominates the society 
until today. A straightforward description on the nature of Thai politics was stated as 
followed; “Thailand is going nowhere because the military and politicians are greedy for 
power, and the citizens are stupid” (Laothammatas, 1995, p.4). Supposedly the Thai 
parliament, in general, has adopted the Westminster system and has formed the current model 
of parliament in 1932 after the country transferred from absolute monarchy to constitutional 
monarchy. After the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, a struggle to control the 
institutions of the monarchy began almost immediately (Ockey, 2005, p. 118). Focusing on 
the Thai Senate, it needs to be pointed out here that particular historical facts about Thai 
politics have played a crucial role in shaping the structure and status of Thai political image 
and identity. This is an undeniable shadow that has followed the development of Thai 
political culture throughout the decades. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that 
has never been colonised during the Western colonisation period in the 19^ "^  century. 
Therefore, the country does not have a direct Western influence and seeing this from a long 
run, Thailand has thus struggled to create and maintain her own social, cultural and political 
identity. During certain periods, the country went through a stage of economic prosperity
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before the burst of the Asian crisis. However, until present Thailand has been struggling to 
handle its domestic political stability and democracy when there is conflict.
The political system of Thailand has only transformed Jhom absolute monarchy to 
constitutional monarchy in 1932. Referring to the previous point, Thailand was never 
colonised but members of the Transformation Group - Kana Radsa; “the people’s group” - 
were mostly educated abroad; in the United Kingdom or France, reading Law or Politics. 
This has undoubtedly influenced their political beliefs and therefore led to the idea of 
revolution. They then went on to transform the governing system of the country, adopting 
their knowledge to suit the local values and norms, rather than becoming under convention of 
a Western nation. The King remains the highest state power, but has limited political powers. 
Moreover, the rapid modernisation since the mid-1900s had introduced an active civil society 
and a vigorous middle class, even the newest constitution describes Thailand as a 
parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy and unitary administration (Dressel, 
2010, p.447). The shifting of the traditional norms of bureaucracy has made a government 
official no longer a ‘boss’ or a ‘master’ in the eyes of modem educated Thai people, but a 
public servant even though in provincial or rural areas many government officials still act like 
‘masters’ (Dressel, 2010). The Prime Minister is leader of the Cabinet and governs under the 
current Thai Constitution, version 2007. Another fact on the Thai Constitution is that it has 
constantly been revised every few years, and this point will be elaborated as the arguments 
develop later on in the research.
Remaining on the historical part of the argument, the next point I wish to elaborate in order to 
clarify my arguments is the realisation of political legitimacy, developing from the relations 
between the political and social outbreaks in Thailand and its impact on political institutional
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actors. The event I will be raising here is the Asian Crisis in 1997. An interesting fact is that 
not only did the financial bubble burst in 1997, but also it is the year when Thailand had its 
then new Constitution inaugurated as a following consequence from the economic crisis^\ 
Cross-regional thresholds on party formation were designed to reduce party fragmentation 
and restructure the political system in Thailand’s ambitious 1997 constitutional reforms 
(Reilly, 2006, p. 817). Nonetheless, underlying problems for Constitutional reform in 1997 
that were discussed among academics, lawyers, politicians included lack of government 
transparency, electoral fraud, lack of legal measures to prevent corruption, and inefficiency of 
political and legal process in punishing corrupt politicians (Uwanno & Bums, 2011, p.l). 
These problems were seen as major faults for the country’s economic and political instability. 
Therefore, the following discussions will be on the background of this particular period in 
Thai politics and I will then seek to explain the relevance of the Asian Crisis, the 1997 
Constitution, and the influence it has on the perceptions of the Thai Senators currently in 
office.
An observation is that the Asian Crisis has had a cmcial impact not only on key economic 
and political actors but also on a wider group of Thai people from different professions as a 
whole in terms of their reactions and further plans. The financial crisis in Thailand and other 
Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea not only highlighted 
nepotism, cronyism and corruption problems but also urged the need for more transparency 
and accountability in government (Quah, 1999, p.483). Moreover, the Asian crisis has lead to 
the questioning of political legitimacy and the level of effectiveness of government authority 
(Alagappa, 1995, p.2). Speaking about the Thai Senate, the current Thai senators have 
undoubtedly experienced through the financial crisis period as any other Thai citizen, as they
In Thai political history, the Constitution has been frequently revised and inaugurated since 1932 when the 
political system changed from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. Up to now, 17 Charters and 
Constitutions have been revised.
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are from various professional backgrounds so during that time they might have been 
businessmen, academics, or legal officials. Moreover, the drafting of the 1997 Constitution in 
that same year -  known as “the People’s Constitution”- also had a major impact on political 
actors in all sections of government '^*. The new constitution by then, as it is suggested, was 
poised to make far-reaching reforms in the quality of the country’s democratic system by 
strengthening political parties, consolidating a strong check-and-balance system, and 
upholding social, political, economic rights. However, the former Premier Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s monopolisation of power resulted in the party list elected Senate ending up 
functioning as the second arm of the Thai Rak Thai party rather than as a check on parliament 
(Kuhonta, 2008, p.374).
The most important limitation on the effectiveness of the new Constitution, nonetheless, is 
the nature of the Thai political culture itself. It remains to be seen whether this change in the 
law can alter the historical reliance of Thais on patron-client relationships within their 
political culture. It is unlikely that rural peoples in particular areas will change their 
behaviour and no longer vote for their patrons. Beyond the culture itself, is the issue of good 
governance among corporations. Drawing in my previous arguments on diplomatic theory, 
diplomacy has enabled Thailand to manage its foreign affairs flexibly and become adaptive to 
shifts in international currents or intrusions of major foreign powers. In the region, Thailand 
has almost always aligned itself with the dominant power; in this case Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, in its efforts to ensure security, increase trade, and preserve national independence 
(Shinn, 1989, p.214). Part of the reason is because these countries, including Thailand, were 
the fore founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Details will be
The 1997 “People’s” Constitution’s concern with political stability ironically facilitated the consolidation o f  
electoral authoritarianism. This period o f electoral authoritarianism, coupled with charges o f corruption, in turn 
generated a response by the military.
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discussed later on in chapter 5 on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and ASEAN 
specifically. An issue on the conflict in the 3 Southernmost provinces of Thailand will also be 
added to clarify the discussion on civil rights and democracy. The constant clashes in villages 
and neighbourhoods stem from the inequality of living, religious disputes as seen by citizens 
from other parts of the country. The population are separated into 2 large groups; the peaceful 
and the violent. There is a large Muslim population in the Southern part of Thailand, as it is 
near the Thai-Malaysian border.
i.The Thai Senate: a typical reflection o f  bureaucracy
Following on from the recent discussion on new democracies and an ‘Asian’ parliamentary 
system, it is worth examining the role bureaucracy plays in the functioning of national 
legislative institutions. According to Weber, the general process of rationalisation can be used 
to explain the development of a bureaucratic organisation which distinguishes modem society 
and centres on shaping the apparatuses and functional means mling social life (Senigaglia, 
2011, p.54). Structures of most national parliaments worldwide reflect the bureaucratic 
system of their countries. In the case of East Asia, a debate has risen over the political and 
institutional foundations of rapid growth, basing it on the fact of authoritarian, centralised, 
and insulated nature of political institutions (Cheng, Haggard, Keng, 1998, p.88). As in the 
case of Southeast Asia, both politicians and citizens in some cases have been calling for 
greater bureaucratic accountability in a variety of country settings. These settings range from 
rudimentary bureaucracies, one-party states to emerging democracies and countries with 
capabilities. The rhetorical emphasis of such reforms, however, is often similar with calls to 
promote positive behaviours, increase the transparency of decision-making, and constrain 
corrupt civil servant behaviour (Fritzen, 2007. p. 1435).
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The constant revision of the Thai Constitution has been raised as one of the main factors that 
has set a strict framework to the senators’ authority in decision-making. Throughout the 
recent political history since the regime transformation to Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, 
there has been a total of 18 written constitutions. Up until the present version of the 
Constitution, the limitation of the senators’ authority have had impact on their domestic and 
foreign duties. Recent public statements on an urge to revise the current version of the 
Constitution -  inaugurated in 2007 -  has been put forth. A statement from a senator from the 
Committee on Tourism has given a public statement that elected senators share similar 
opinions for the Constitution to be revised, particularly on the act stating that elected senators 
are not allowed to take consecutive terms in parliament (Section 117).
About 40% of people believed the government's latest attempt to rewrite the constitution 
would deepen the political rift in the country, but only 34% gave it full support, Nida Poll of 
the National Institute of Development Administration (Nida) reported on Monday. The 
pollsters surveyed 1,255 people of all education levels and occupations nationwide on Dec 7- 
8, seeking their opinions on the government’s plan to amend the charter. Nida reported 
60.40% of respondents said they knew about the government’s intention, while 39.60% said 
they were unaware of it; 90.63% had no idea which articles are going to be changed; 4.75% 
knew that the charter changes will touch on Articles 68, 117, 190, 237, 291 and 309; and only 
4.63% believed that it is aimed to facilitate political amnesty.
When asked who they think would benefit, 29.64% of the respondents were unsure, 20.16% 
pointed to politicians, 16.18% believed the people and 1.75% said both, according to the 
pollsters. Questioned whether they support it, 39.84% said no, believing that it may further
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divide the nation and would only help politicians, 34.10% pledged their support, thinking that 
it will bring national reconciliation, and 26.06% were unsure.
Thanavath Phonvichai, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce vice-president for 
research, said the country's economy would not be at risk from the constitutional amendment 
process if there is no prolonged political rally that could affect the confidence of investors 
and the tourism industry. Mr Thanavath said it is still too soon to determine what type of 
impact the charter amendment will have on the Thai economy^\
Furthermore, a critique from Dr. Theerayut Boonme^^ asserted that another revision of the 
Constitution would not do any drastic change to the country. Reasons for this claim are 
because of the ‘non-existence’ of democracy in the Thai society from the very beginning 
since the inauguration of the first Constitution. According to Dr.Theerayut, parliament has 
full authority to propose a constitutional amendment, therefore members of parliament should 
remain professional and not seek to amend the Constitution in order to suit the wrong 
person^’. The most important fact the Constitution Drafting committee should bear in mind is 
the equality of the acts applied to the citizens from every level of the society under a 
democratic order, whether or not the Constitution will be partially or fully revised and 
rewritten in the near future.
Published: 10/12/2012 at 11:59am. 
Source: Bangkok Post online news: Politics
URL: http://www.bangkokpost.eom/news/politics/325449/poll-most-ao:ainst-charter-change 
(retrieved 10/12/2012)
Source: Thairath Online, 8/12/2012, 1.30am.
URL: http://www.thairath.co.th/content/pol/311702 
(retrieved 11/12/2012)
Referring to the former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, who is currently abroad and on criminal charges. He has 
strong supporters in every sector o f the society; parliament and certain regions in Thailand.
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We now move on to discuss about the case study for this research; the Thai Senate. It has 
been pointed out that the nature of Thai politics has always been the major influential 
background on the performance and output of the Thai parliament. Also, it is claimed that the 
Thai Senate affects the nature and quality of diplomacy. The uncertainty and continuously 
shifting social and political events in Thailand have had a certain amount of impact on 
political representatives, shaping their behaviour and values. During the past decade, 
government after government relied on the strong and competent bureaucrats and technocrats 
to formulate and carry out public policy and administration, therefore providing a higher 
degree of policy stability and continuity despite frequent changes of government due to coups 
d’etat or elections (Pupphavesa, 2002, p.20). In the following parts the discussion will focus 
on two groups of the institutional actors -  the senators and the secretariat of the senate staff. 
Both actors form an important part of a bicameral parliament, therefore their duties and 
relations will be discussed and how domestic legislative scrutiny strengthens the images of 
senators as capable professionals and politicians.
Senators
In Thailand, the Senate is viewed as a conventional, elite, and prestigious political body. The 
Senate (Upper House) is part of the bicameral Thai parliament and is comprised of 150 
members with a 6-year office term^^ The senators in office at present were appointed in 2008. 
Most members were appointed from various professional sectors; agriculture, business, legal, 
academic, and others, according to their respectable backgrounds. As intensive professional 
experience and seniority is required, the minimum age requirement for a Senate candidate
The number o f  senators appointed to office can vary according to the version o f the Thai Constitution. 
However, the term remains 6 years. This information is based on the 2007 Constitution.
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must be 35 years or more^^ If one chooses to leave office, another suitable candidate will be 
appointed in place. The 2007 constitution stated the qualifications of a senator as follows;
“Section 117, the term of membership of senators is six years as firom the date 
of election or the date of the Election Commission published the result of the 
selection, as the case may be, and no senator shall consecutively hold office more 
than one term. Senators retiring at the expiration of the term shall remain in office 
to perform their duties until new senators are obtained.
Section 118, upon expiration of term of senators from election, the King will 
issue a Royal Decree calling for a new general election of senators in which the 
election date must be fixed within thirty days as from the date of the expiration of 
membership of senators from election and the election date must be the same 
throughout the Kingdom.
(Kitisin, 2008, p.67)
The main duties of the Senators are to scrutinise legislation being passed forward from the 
House of Representatives (Lower House). In other words, we could say that they are required 
to watch over and double-check the duties and progress of the Lower House. This is stated in 
the Thai Constitution, and this is in fact similar to responsibilities of other upper houses in 
bicameral parliaments around the world (Banjo, 2009, p.61). The characteristics of Thai 
senators, once they enter politics, can also be heavily shaped by seniority, institutional norms 
and regulations, and political beliefs and values. Relevant in this context is that Thai society 
is becoming “polarised” between two groups characterised variously as “pro-military” vs
Chapter 6, Section 122, Constitution o f the Kingdom o f Thailand B E. 2550 /  A.D. 2007.
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“pro-democracy”, “conservatives” vs “reformists”, and “traditional military/bureaucratic 
power holders” vs “the new business-based power-seekers” '*°(Ockey, 1996, p.346). The 
patron-client structure of the Senate not only runs among the senators and the public, but also 
between senators themselves during their term in parliament. As most of the senators are 
senior military officials, the nature of the patron-client relationship model is inevitably 
reflected on senators from other professional backgrounds. Considering this particular 
relationship model on the Senate’s diplomatic efforts, furthermore, there has not been a vast 
impact on the building of diplomatic relations with other parliamentary peers. However, the 
composition of senators from military backgrounds is more to do with domestic governance 
as military officials, whatever political position they hold, would have an extent of influence 
on the moulding of social mobility and democratic prospects. These political values on 
patron-client relations are inevitably reflected through all institutions in Thailand. Speaking 
about the impact of age difference and the senators’ performance in office domestically and 
internationally, a description to support this statement is stated as follows:
“Senators who are official retirees of 60 years or more can usually 
provide good advice on performance for younger senators. Therefore, they 
are regarded as senior advisors. Senators who are between 45-50 years of 
age have better understanding of the managerial structures including 
benefits, policy outlines, and passing policy laws. Senators aged 40-44 
would be those who know details of legal acts and are better in problem­
solving”.
(Sotanasathien, 2005, p. 212 )
The definition o f these terms; pro-military vs pro-democracy, conservatives vs reformists, and traditional 
military/bureaucratic power holders vs the new business based power seekers all share a similar definition. The 
former terms refer to the conservative military-dominant governing system, which is seen as autocratic. The 
latter terms, on the other hand, refer to a more democratic approach where citizens have more authority in 
national governance.
108
Chapter 3 : A Bureaucratic Model
Apart from their domestic responsibilities of legislative scrutiny, senators also have the 
international component of their duties. Most national institutions nowadays have their own 
international department to deal with their foreign affairs. Yet, official correspondence would 
have to be forwarded through the conventional Foreign Office diplomatic route. These 
international duties include corresponding with foreign representatives in Thailand, usually 
Ambassadors or other international representatives who may want to call on the Senate 
President on a particular matter, and travelling abroad on official diplomatic missions. Also, 
they would do it the other way round which is receiving official delegates from other national 
parliaments as guests of the Thai Senate (ethnographic observation, August 2007-July 2009). 
Building relations with foreign counterparts means that there is a lot of continuous 
communication going on, and it is expected that senators need at least to be able to 
communicate reasonably well in English. There are senators who are not able to speak the 
language, but have secured a place in office due to their advanced professional experience 
and strong political connections. There are also some senators who can speak English, but 
would rather remain passive until a discussion is brought up or until it is the appropriate 
‘time’ to express an opinion. During courtesy calls or short meetings, the discussion would 
usually vary from 15-30 minutes, depending on the individual knowledge on the subject and 
level of engagement of senators in the discussion. However, not every senator can be 
spontaneous during courtesy calls or official meetings, as their educational backgrounds vary 
considerably. They are usually provided with briefing scripts about the topic that will be 
discussed, or sometimes scripts of short speeches they need to say. This usually happens 
when senators do not have previous knowledge about that certain topic. Bureaucracy also 
plays an important part in shaping the functioning of such procedures. I will discuss this issue 
about the overlapping of the duties and the knowledge and values of senators further in 
chapter 4.
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Moreover, another interesting observation on the nature of the senators’ performance in 
diplomatic duties is that the overall activities are mostly associated with ceremonial 
proceedings in traditional diplomacy; protocol, representations, visits (Barston, 2006). 
Historically, the main ceremonial figure would be the Ambassador, but now more 
distinguished persons are replacing the traditional model. The argument here is to support 
that senators are indeed substantive diplomatic actors, and can therefore continue to develop 
their skills and knowledge on parliamentary diplomacy even after they finish their term in 
office. Another question rises on the extent of perception. A discussion on political 
entrepreneurship -  whether parliamentary diplomatic duties would lead the senator’s career 
path further down the diplomatic road - will be added in the next part to give an idea of the 
professional prospects of the senators after they finish senatorship.
Before moving on to the next point on the temporary establishment of the National 
Legislative Assembly, a discussion on the potential cost of the Senate being a diplomatic 
actor will be included here. In the methodological limitations for this research, official 
documents from 10 years and further back are usually destroyed. However, a Foreign Affairs 
committee report -  categorised as ‘most confidential’, recorded around 12 years ago -  was a 
summary of a foreign diplomatic visit to Myanmar. The underlying reason for the discussion, 
and a dispute which occurred later on, was about the problems of democracy in Myanmar, the 
military junta and the house arrest of then opposition party leader Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi.
110
Chapter 3 : A Bureaucratic Model
a. Turning point: The National Legislative Assembly
The National Legislative Assembly was designated to act as members of parliament, both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, on 24 October 2006 according to the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim edition) B.E. 2549 (2006)'**. The temporary appointment 
of the National Legislative Assembly, from a general point of view, is considered as a bridge 
to keep the government functioning after a military coup to oust the former Prime Minister 
and cabinet a month earlier on 19 September 2006. Information on the appointment and 
functioning of the National Legislative Assembly has been given here in order to provide an 
understanding of the constant change in Thai politics. It is also obvious that the interim 
constitution was promulgated only to be applied for the temporary period while the NLA 
members held position. Afterwards, the 2007 Constitution was promulgated and a new 
cabinet was approved for parliament'*^ In the following chapter, I will then discuss in detail 
on the impact of the National Legislative Assembly on the institutional performance of the 
Thai parliament when members of the House of Representatives and members of the Senate 
were officially elected and appointed to office. As this research is specified on parliamentary 
diplomacy and whereby the international diplomatic duties of the Senate are focused upon, 
the discussion will be based on numbers and figures from summary reports on the President 
of the Senate’s diplomatic duties abroad.
Party politics, moreover, plays an important part in reflecting the performance of political 
actors under their affiliation. The individual and collective performance of senators reflect a 
connection and contribution to the political party they hold membership'*^ It is evident that a 
party majority can determine an effective success of legislation as some members would use
'*' See the Summary o f  Foreign Diplomatic Duties, National Legislative Assembly B.E.2006-2008.
'*■ The National Legislative Assembly during the period o f late 2006 to early 2008 not only act as an interim 
government, but also to keep the check and balance o f  the country’s politics during this transitory period.
'*■’ The two dominant parties in the Thai parliament are the Democrats and the Puer-Thai (“For Thailand”) Party. 
The latter was originally known as Thai Rak Thai (“Thai loves Thai”) party.
I l l
Chapter 3 : A Bureaucratic Model
their own legislative skills or take advantage of the political context to move legislation from 
one stage to next (Hasecke and Mycoffe, 2007, p.607). Further on in this part, a discussion on 
electoral competitiveness will be added to give a general understanding on the formation of 
parliament -  the Senate to be precise -  and how the background of each senator constitutes to 
their performance, choice of committee membership, and role within the committee'*'*. Social 
group identities on attitudes and voting decisions differ in a variety of political contexts. In 
Western democracy, in the event that a particular social group is not a relevant political 
cleavage characterised by unique voting patterns, the relationship between social structure 
and support for political parties for voting is often attributed to a lack of attitudinal 
differences between that group and other relevant social groups (Andersen and Heath, 2003, 
p.301). On the parliamentary level, there has been less attention to what is left of parliament's 
plenary identity including the power of decision-making after authority from cabinet has been 
delegated to ministers (Shaw, 1998, p.226).
At this stage, it would also be worth discussing further the motivations for the senators’ 
performance and decision-making in office. As stated earlier, there are two key actors of the 
Thai Senate that I will be talking about; one is the parliamentarian and the other is the 
parliamentary administrative staff. From my investigation, the working nature within the 
parliament is that the staff are the most prominent individuals who put together the 
diplomatic procedures and the parliamentarians carry out these procedures which are already 
prepared for them. Therefore, my assumption at this stage would be that the staff are very 
important actors in the shaping of the institution as well as the development of parliamentary
'*'* The senators positions within each standing committee would include chairperson, vice-chairperson, 
committee secretary, and committee member. Senators are able to hold multiple membership in the standing 
committees.
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diplomacy'*^.The parliamentarians, although elected, are nevertheless dependent upon the staff 
in carrying out the diplomatic missions to fulfil their part in international duties. Unless 
parliamentarians were able to be responsible for the whole preparation and planning of the 
trip, this assumption could not be different. Again this thought would take us back to think 
about the actor’s perception on the institutional regulations and how he has chosen to pursue 
his duties as member of the institution. Whether my claims are proven wrong, we shall 
discuss further about it in the findings from the interviews.
The argument on the Thai Senate as a model of parliamentary diplomacy would be that by 
image the Senate is an active diplomatic actor and is well-know within the circle of 
parliamentary relations as having professional and experienced members. This is to say that 
the Senate is a model of a globalised  institution that constantly keeps itself up-to-dated with 
current worldly issues and maintains constant diplomatic connections with other national 
parliaments. However, consequences of these actions would be the main point that makes the 
Senate a relatively weak diplomatic actor, as most foreign missions rarely conclude in formal 
agreements or a resolution of a problem. This may sound quite diplomatic in itself as it is not 
justifying whether the Senate is a good or bad diplomatic model, but this is an attempt to 
point out different perceptions about the nature of the Senate’s diplomatic duties. To 
conclude, foreign missions are seen as an opportunity for the senators and staff to expand 
their personal experience, rather than stimulate their political values. Also, from the argument 
above, it can be justified that senators are sub-actors in the international arena. Their 
international duties do not provide an outstanding national benefit.
Assumptions are based on the frequency and repetition o f  the Secretariat staffs’ duties in assisting and 
facilitating senators. However, the thorough understanding o f  the international diplomatic duties in detail is yet 
another point that needs to be analysed from relevant data. Any findings will be presented in the next chapter.
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Another distinction between the senators and secretariat staff, Foreign Office Ambassadors 
and ministry staff can also justify the outcomes of international diplomatic duties. 
Conventional diplomats eg. Ambassadors are representatives who have had intensive 
experience in country profiles (political, economical, social, and cultural). To elaborate on 
this point, ambassadors are actually senior civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who have had extensive training and experience as junior envoys. As a result, members of 
staff -  in other words junior diplomats -  are accustomed to the knowledge and diplomatic 
procedure in an extensive level. The difference with the secretariat of the senate staff, 
however, is that they are likely to be more familiar with the routines of their duties - which 
involves assisting and facilitating senators -  rather than possess in-depth knowledge on 
country profiles and/or other issues relevant to each particular diplomatic mission.
An explanation to this distinction between the diplomatic nature of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Senate staff personnel can be due to the fact that the civil servants in the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry including the foreign affairs minister, ambassadors, senior and 
junior diplomats, staff fi*om internal departments in the ministry - basically the composition 
of the ministry - are the main representative institutions in the state’s foreign affairs as being 
responsible for international matters that would be of benefit or constitute towards the 
country’s benefit. This would also enhance bilateral and multilateral relations between the 
Thai government and other foreign counterparts. On the other hand, the Senate: comprised of 
senators who are temporary diplomatic actors, their limited period of term in office, the level 
of diplomatic efficiency would depend not only on the frequency of the international 
diplomatic activities but also the purposes and outcomes of these diplomatic activities would 
also need to be taken into consideration. For only under transient and peculiar circumstances 
have legislative institutions operating in the context of parliamentary democracy been in a
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position to initiate any kind of policy on foreign affairs (Hocking, 1976, p.280). Therefore, 
the level and intensity of experience, knowledge, and procedural circumstances between 
Foreign Ministry diplomats and Senate staff actors are by no doubt different.
Parliamentary staff
In this research, my argument will be based on the duties of parliamentary staff, who can be 
referred to as the steering wheels of the institution. Parliamentary staff in this interpretation 
include career staff who work in the parliament’s foreign affairs department. President and 
Vice-Presidents’ office, and committees department'* .^ In contrast to the senators, staff are 
permanent civil servants who stay in office until they chose to leave or until their formal 
retirement at 60 years while senators are only appointed there in office for a fixed 6-year 
term.
Senate staff are responsible for the preparation of the entire process of a diplomatic mission. 
For instance, the Senate’s Foreign Affairs Department, so the name says, needs to facilitate 
any diplomatic procedures including national and international correspondence, courtesy calls 
and meetings, and formal receptions between senators and other foreign delegates who could 
be either within Thailand or from abroad (Secretariat of the Senate, 2008, p.4-5). Some 
senators are helpful in the preparation stage, as they might have personal contacts with key 
persons who would be useful in corresponding. Nevertheless, most senators are usually 
informed about their responsibilities and what they are required to be doing during the trip 
prior to the travelling date, showing that they do not actually take part in the preparation 
stage. It is clear from here that some senators know what they are doing, and some do not. 
The level of assertiveness also varies among senators, and, simply put, it is clear that some
'*^  The Secretariat o f the Thai Senate has 3 committee departments. The Senate’s sub-committees are divided 
into each department.
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senators are less assertive, while some are not assertive at all. As a result. Secretariat staff 
need to be knowledgeable and alert when they are on duty along with senators during 
international missions in Thailand and abroad.
From this fact, it is clear that the routine responsibilities of preparations for international 
missions often enable parliamentary staff to be more experienced in their duties than the 
senators. At the same time, it is also possible to say that parliamentary staff, despite their 
ranking and position in the office, might not know what they are supposed to be doing unless 
assigned by superiors. They also may not appreciate that their roles entail the duties and 
responsibilities of service. The question moves on as to how does the knowledge and 
experience of the staff coordinate with parliamentary diplomacy development. It is necessary 
over and above normal routines for members of an organisation to have routines directed 
towards exploring new knowledge. Incremental innovation could be seen as a part of 
exploiting the capabilities and resources, meaning that does not have to be necessarily 
equivalent to exploration (Jensen, Poulfelt & Kraus, 2010, p. 2046). It has been noted earlier 
that in this research there are two diplomatic actors considered, the senators and. the staff. If 
the duties and knowledge of senators and staff were compared, the parliamentary staff are 
more likely to be seen as the key functional actors in the diplomatic procedure. It is clearer to 
say that the responsibilities of the staff and senators contribute towards one another. Senators 
will then carry out these procedures - do what they are supposed to do. Only a few would 
collaborate in the preparation stage. However, it is also possible to think that the 
parliamentary staff do what they require to do, that is a ‘routine’ of preparation for diplomatic 
missions. It is the same for the senators in that they carry out these diplomatic missions as 
required. The status and routine of employers are influenced by their professions and regimes 
in the publicly-established regulatory bodies. These allegiances between the staff and their
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membership organisation are increasingly in tension, as the impact of public sector reforms 
has resulted in changes in the status of professionals leading to . increased de- 
professionalisation (Hutton and Massey, 2006, p.23). The discussion goes further as to 
whether the parliamentarians and staff learned anything new from their routine duties, 
particularly parliamentarians who have a fixed office term and some staff who are being 
transferred to different departments more than the others.
Another observation from the interviews was that the clash of ideas between parliamentarians 
and staff were likely to happen, despite the bureaucratic relations. In certain times, the 
attitudes and opinions of staff could clash with the senators’. This would happen if the staff 
had more knowledge or experience on parliamentary diplomatic practice than senators. From 
a personal observation, clashing between the two actors would be most likely to happen with 
staff from the foreign affairs committee, the President -  Vice Presidents office, Foreign 
Relations Department whose main responsibilities are dealing with foreign related issues 
when staff are always engaged in correspondence and preparations for official trips abroad. 
As a result, the staff would understand the details and procedures whilst the senators would 
have no knowledge on that particular mission, but then would have to be provided with the 
complete details and documentation later prior to the mission abroad. Nonetheless, the most 
important part of the international diplomatic mission is that senators and staff are required to 
collaborate officially with respect and looking forward to a successful diplomatic mission, 
whether be only creating political networks and gaining experience and knowledge from 
foreign geographical surroundings.
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iii. Political entrepreneurship
When speaking about political careers, it is likely that politicians would continue their duties 
after a particular political term is completed. While studying the Thai Senate, an interesting 
thought had risen whether the senators would still choose to pursue a political career after 
they finish their senatorship. This issue was explored during the interviews, and most answers 
were that senators would not have future political opportunities so diplomatic career 
prospects would be difficult. An option, however, would be to continue working with existing 
connections they had prior to entering office or during term. Political career patterns, in 
particular, may provide clues about the nature of informal ties in the political system and 
career ambitions also shape legislative ambitions. Here the main question is whether 
legislators have good reason to hope for advancement by moving to other political levels, in 
other words stepping stones (Scarrow, 1997, p.254-255). Thai senators would already have a 
professional career prior to taking up post in the Senate, particularly those who are involved 
in business and academia. They would usually continue their previous jobs when they finish 
their term in office. Some findings have suggested that a number of senators might not 
continue their profession in politics. The main reason is because of the lack of opportunities 
and connections. Again, this would differ between senator and their background profession.
My concluding remarks to this part of the discussion about the Thai Senate as a diplomatic 
model would be that the perception of parliamentary diplomacy falls down to the individual, 
whether senator or staff. This includes how parliamentary diplomacy is being pursued. The 
understanding about the values of international diplomatic duties and its outcomes are to 
some extent based on the professional backgrounds of both senators and staff; educational 
qualifications, professional training, experiences abroad and opportunities of interactions 
with foreign counterparts. All these personal factors influence the person’s daily work routine
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and how they think about parliamentary diplomacy. These factors influence the actors’ daily 
routine and their perseverance about parliamentary diplomacy. The reason is because if they 
see international diplomatic duties as part of their responsibilities, that will enhance their 
performance and be a responsibility to utilise and improve their professional skills. This will 
also enhance their status, both individually and collectively. Institutions are conceptualised as 
embodiments of accepted practice in society and repositories of common knowledge. 
Individuals or social groupings, therefore, are viewed as malleable agents whose in whole or 
partial actions may be externally defined in any institutional change (Karantalidis and 
Fletcher, 2012, p. 199-200). In this case on the Thai Senate, it should be viewed as the other 
way round where the structure and functionality of the institution may have impact on the 
senator’s future professional paths post-incumbency.
c. Conclusion
The Thai Senate has been raised as an example of a bicameral parliament which reflects a 
strong bureaucratic system. The system itself is an underlying impact on the performance and 
functionality of parliament in domestic and international diplomatic duties. Certain factors 
and elements have played a crucial role on the procedure of international diplomatic 
missions. The question of democracy has put a challenge on the preliminary arguments and 
discussions. Foreign missions of the Senate are only seen as an opportunity for the senators 
and staff to exercise their personal and professional experience rather than to stimulate their 
political values. Nevertheless, there are certain elements in the research that suggested a 
possibility of the improvement of the actors’ values towards their duties. In the following 
chapters evidence from fieldwork will be presented either to support or to contradict against 
claims that senators are sub-actors in the international arena as the international duties 
conducted do not provide an outstanding national benefit..
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The evidence-based discussions in the following chapters will provide an analysis from the 
collected interview data from selected interviewees and document information from the 
Secretariat of the Senate, Bangkok. The further analysis will seek to testi^  my research 
questions, hypotheses, being in accordance with the theoretical framework which has been 
drawn out in the earlier theoretical chapters of this research.
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The Thai Senate as a Diplomatic Actor: findings and analysis
“Over time, diplomatic institutions have risen and fallen in the 
popular mind, taking with them the reputation of academic fields devoted to 
their study. In our own age, diplomatic history in the West appears 
anachronistic, bigoted, and irrelevant; like diplomacy itself, it has largely 
withstood the influence of divergent movements across the intellectual and 
political landscape.”
(Schweizer and Schumann, 2008, p. 149).
a. Structure o f  the interview data on the theoretical assumptions
In the previous chapter, a detailed discussion on the chosen case study for this research has 
been given; the Thai Senate. Relevant explanations on the historical background on the 
formation of the Senate and political culture of Thailand were also discussed to give the 
readers a basic understanding on the underlying motive that directs the decision-making of 
the parliamentary actors. The hierarchical structure of the Thai Senate, as discussed 
previously in this research, also internally divided by the composition of senators who are 
appointed and who are elected. After having conducted semi-structured interviews with Thai 
senators. Senate staff, and a group of interviewees who are members of the public, in this part 
a structural account based on the findings from the interviews will be given and related to the 
theoretical framework and literature review in the first part on conceptualising the theory of 
diplomacy, paying specific attention on the definition of parliamentary diplomacy. Further, 
findings have also suggested a distinction between appointed and elected senators, as the
121
Chapter 4: The Thai Senate as a Diplomatic Actor
former appearing as more privileged than the latter. The thematical approach on sociological 
institutionalism and the logic of appropriateness will also be included as themes for 
discussion. The information obtained from the interviews and official documents have given 
an extent of support for my hypotheses by reflecting the view that parliamentary diplomacy is 
indeed a crucial path in developing contemporary international relations. However, a number 
of specific issues have risen during the triangulation of the obtained data, including a 
suggestion that the composition of senators should not be a hindrance to distinguish 
advantages and disadvantages among senators in the same incumbency. All senators -  
whether appointed or elected -  are equally expected to conduct proficient domestic and 
diplomatic duties according to their committee memberships and responsibilities. Further 
detailed data will be presented accordingly under each theoretical headline.
During the years 2008-2011, there have been 2 senatorial incumbencies. The researched 
incumbency started in April 2008, but elected senators and a group of appointed senators 
resigned in February 2011 and then the rest of the incumbency terminated their senatorship in 
April 2011 respectively. Nevertheless, the most interesting point that has been found from 
these reports were that details, missions, and procedures of the domestic and international 
duties are all similar as there has been, and still are institutional outlines on how to proceed 
these duties. As stated earlier, the oldest official report summary on foreign diplomatic duties 
of the Senate which was capable of access was dated only as far back as 2000 (B.E. 2543) as 
official documents older than 10 years old are usually destroyed. Recorded details from the 
report, in particular, did not reflect any dramatic differences from the Senate’s current foreign 
affairs. In other words, it can be implied that the nature of the Senate’s international 
diplomatic practice has not changed very much during the course of 10 years'*  ^ It is, however, 
possible to assume that the frequency of the diplomatic activities would vary depending on
Referring to the year 1992 when the Secretariat o f  both Houses were separated.
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the initiative and activeness of the President of the Senate, the Vice-Presidents, and 
committee chairpersons in each incumbency.
The data presentation has been categorised in the first instance as the Senators and the Senate, 
the Secretariat of the Senate staff and the Secretariat. The several themes that have stemmed 
from data triangulation shall be brought up and discussed respectively. Then in the final part, 
the discussion will be expanded on the public opinion from interviews with selected members 
of the public. Their opinion, in particular, would be a reflection not only on the international 
diplomatic duties of the Senate but also on the overall functioning of the Senate and 
expectations from the public. In the section on public participation, the discussion was raised 
according to the gathered information. However, after the triangulation of the data it appeared 
that public participation is not considered as necessary to the functioning of the Senate due to 
the status of the institution'*^ What matters more happened to be the accountability of 
parliament towards the people. As a result, the discussion aimed more on improving the 
transparency of parliament and building people’s trust. Transparency works through 
increasing the amount of information available to voters, therefore it is often considered 
beneficial in information-scarce contexts (Alt and Lowry, 2010, p.380). Citizens have 
different degrees of interest in and demand for governmental transparency. Some feel 
strongly to learn more about what government is doing and the need to access government 
information whereas others are less interested. Transparency is a fundamental value of 
democratic accountability that at times is manifested in administrative reforms (Piotrowski 
and Van Ryzin, 2007, p.306).
'*^ To the public, the Senate is seen as a closed institution. Even though selected parliamentary sessions are 
broadcasted, they are mostly joint between the House o f  Representatives and the Senate. As a result, groups o f  
citizens would be skeptical as to what are the actual responsibilities o f  Senate.
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The planned analysis of with the interview data was done by triangulating the information 
between the three groups of interviewees; the senators, the senate staff, and the external 
interviewees in order to check and establish validity in the study according to standard 
methods (Guion, 2002, p.l). Moreover, the triangulation of data between these interview 
groups are expected to stimulate relevant ideas and thoughts that might have been obvious at 
the beginning. When compiled with the existing hypothetical arguments, then it will make the 
discussion valid and more credible. However, further fieldwork from document analysis was 
gathered and included in the data analysis, adding to the triangulated information to 
strengthen the arguments.
i. On parliamentary diplomacy
The interpretation of diplomacy in the first chapter has been supported by evidence from the
interview and document findings. It has been stated that the general interpretation of
diplomacy is that it is the art of communication, representation, negotiation, and international
relations practice between representatives of states. At present, the rapid modernisation of the
world societies have urged more actors in diplomacy and international relations to develop
themselves and become more active. Parliamentary cooperation has been superceded by
‘parliamentary diplomacy’, referring to both institutional links of a traditional kind as well as
those formed spontaneously and then institutionalised. Parliamentarians, thus, are able to act
within their remit by tackling major problems which transcend national borders. Accordingly,
fora for multilateral consultation eg. Inter-Parliamentary Union have a key role in raising
parliamentarians’ awareness and keeping them informed about matters relating to the
objectives of the various organisations of which they are a part. This gradually leads to a
collective conscience developing around shared interests, which simplifies preparatory work
in the run-up to formal negotiations between governments (Squarcialupi, 2000, p.4-5). The
extended appointments enjoyed by parliamentarians in many other countries creating what is
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in effect a parliamentary career path, enabling them to concentrate and set goals to their 
interest. The contribution that individual members have been able to make and the 
satisfaction that they have derived from their involvement has varied greatly in the growing 
field of parliamentary diplomacy (Canadian parliament papers, 2003, p. 4, 15).
The senators perform their duties along with the facilitation of the Secretariat staff. The
conduction of 33 semi-structured interviews with Thai senators, Secretariat of the Senate
staff, and external interviewees from various professions have raised several issues related to
the theoretical approaches that has been adopted for this research. At the same time, thoughts
from most of the interviews have fitted into the main hypothesis; that the Thai Senate is a
distinguished institution in domestic legislative scrutiny, but is yet to develop in becoming a
prominent diplomatic actor. However, a question arises as to whether the Senate is in fact a
strong domestic actor on its own right. The readers need to be reminded at this stage that the
structure of Thai political institutions are shaped by social and cultural hierarchy. Thailand’s
governance context is best understood as the emergence of new social actors seeking political
accommodation against the background of a rapidly modernising political entity (Dressel,
2009, p. 164). As a result, members of the middle class have a clear interest in preserving a
relatively privileged social and economic position (Wyatt, 1983, p.296). At this stage, a
reminder to the reader that the senators interviewed were the ones who have been in office
since April 2008 up to present. However, there were a number of senators who resigned in
February 2011 in order to put themselves through to the following election and appointments.
As stated by the Thai Constitution, 2007, senators are not allowed to take consecutive terms.
After the results of the newly appointed and elected incumbency came out, not all of the
former senators who resigned earlier succeeded in holding a place. This reflects influence
from party politics and favouritism in parliament. Delegates’ positions on expanding
competences and qualifying majority voting were determined by national interest, party
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political related factors, or institutionally determined patterns depending on the extent to 
which they are directly accountable to domestic electorates or whether they belong to parties 
that are in government or in opposition domestically (Treib, 2010, p. 121).
Most of the interviewees, including the senators and secretariat .staff, think that it is important 
to understand and value the benefits of maintaining strong international relations with foreign 
counterparts, as this is a way to ‘keep up with the world’ and also to require for assistance on 
urgent matters when needed. An interview with the Chairperson of the Committee on 
Economics, Trade, and Industry (interviewed 23 March 2011) suggested that international 
visits provide an opportunity for senators to learn new technology and innovations from more 
developed counterparts, considering Thailand as being a developing country. For instance, 
policies on mass public transportation in Japan should be taken into formal consideration as 
the government would be able to consider how this scheme may be adjusted to the plans, 
settings, and national budget of the country. All of the senators gave opinions on the 
importance of international relations, as they think that parliamentary diplomacy is a valuable 
channel for improving connections. The speaker for the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(interviewed 28 March 2011) emphasised this issue that the Thai government should 
strengthen and maintain good foreign relations with neighbouring countries in the first 
instance as part of a global community. As a continuing discussion on the hiatus period when 
parliament was dissolved from October 2006 to April 2008, the transitory period of the 
National Legislative Assembly and the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution as a reflective 
background on the impact of political transitions on the functioning of the parliamentary 
institution shall be further explained. Political institutions including parliament are combined 
structures of human actors, roles, and rules who generate activities, and depending upon how 
people perceive these entities and assess their actions they may choose to trust or distrust 
such entities (Askvik, Jamil, and Dhakal, 2011, p.419).
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The promulgation of the 2007 Constitution shall now be raised as one of the influences on the 
restoring of the parliamentary structure. This recent constitution is a result of yet another 
transitional period in the Thai government and the political institutions. The Chairperson of 
the Committee on Energy (interviewed 2 May 2011) stated that although international 
diplomatic duties are yet to be clear the constitutional framework in particular section 190 
points out the role of the Senate in approving foreign affairs procedures. Such political 
transition and revision of the constitution has an underlying impact on the functioning of the 
Thai Senate, which shall also be discussed accordingly.
The promulgation o f  the 2007 Constitution
Apart from the period of political uncertainty, it can also be argued that the constant revision 
of the Thai constitution is considered as another reason for the President of the Senate from 
the 2008 to 2011 incumbency to become more distinctively active in both domestic and 
international diplomatic duties in order to reestablish a better image and reputation for 
parliament. The reason is stated according to section 190 where foreign missions need to be 
approved by members if parliament in joint sittings. Moreover, the promulgation of the 2007 
version, the current version in use, has reflected yet another example of the authority of 
military personnel in constructing Thai politics. An argument on civil-military relationship 
stressed that ‘civil control of the military is a sine qua non for democratic rule’, however the 
interactions between these two agents are beneficial towards the ability to make political 
decisions on relevant political issues. There can be no power over the military by the civil 
society, not to mention the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government without 
civilian controP^ (Chambers, 2011, p.291).
For Civil-Military relationships, see Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf, 2010; Croissant, Kuehn, 
Chambers, Voelkel, and Wolf, 2011; and Welch Jr., 1976.
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If human relationships are to be calculable, the people of a community must know, and know 
in advance, the rules by which they are to act and by which they may expect other men to act. 
The promulgation of law; The very idea of obedience presupposes knowledge of that which is 
to be obeyed, without which knowledge there could be only the coincidence, never the 
obligation, or obedience (Bailey, 1941, p. 1059). Furthermore, during the period when 
parliament was dissolved and the National Legislative Assembly was appointed temporarily -  
with a provisional constitution of 2006, stating the appointment of a National Legislative 
Assembly to administer the country while on yet another political transition. This can be 
viewed, according to a Thai politics scholar, as a “vicious cycle of Thai politics”, as an 
election is held after a new constitution, thus producing a corrupt government, leading to 
political crisis, engendering a coup, and then going back to the constitution again 
(Pongsudhirak, 2009, p.29). The Thai propensity for changing constitutions has been referred 
to as "faction constitutionalism," whereby each successive draft reflects, makes legitimate, 
and strengthens major shifts in factional dominance. Thai constitutions have not been 
considered the fundamental law of the land; rather, they have functioned to facilitate the rule 
of the regime in power (Neher, 1970, p.240). This also implies that the senators -  as members 
of parliament -  are able to enhance their individual and collective performance within the 
institutional frame, at the same time convey their professional knowledge through their 
political duties. Knowledge creation, retention, and knowledge transfer can all be related to 
the status of the political actor (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans, 2003, p.573). Moreover, 
institutions may even help keep the peace among non-democracies as they are understood to 
constitute frameworks of reference for politics (Brock, 2006, p.90).
The uncertainty in Thai politics reflected from coup d’etats and governmental transitions also
have impact on the country’s foreign networks. During the period from September 2006 -
April 2008, Thailand’s membership in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) was temporarily
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suspended. According to the IPU regulations, member countries must demonstrate by the 
status of their governments that, they promote representative democracy. Any civil unrest or 
political transits would reflect not only an unstable government but lack of democratic 
accountability, therefore memberships can be suspended or terminated^”. Basically a way to 
look at this is that the instability of Thai politics seen through concurrent transitions, coup 
d’etats, and constitutional changes have somewhat reflected the social and civic status. Not 
only does it show the instability of the social and civic status, but also it can be considered as 
a challenge for parliament to prove its competency in handling and restabilising its affiliation 
during political unrests. Party fragmentation and decentralised parties have become 
increasingly concentrated due to constitutional reforms in the late 1990s, when leading 
parties remained internally weak, resulting in the reform process being more decisive but 
remaining less credible (Zhang, 2009, p. 1382). Therefore, one way to improve the image and 
proficiency of the government is that politicians must perform their duties by aiming to 
distribute benefits to the groups whose support brought them to office, as they cannot afford 
to ask what is good for society as a whole in the long run, lest they lose power in the interim 
(Garrett and Lange, 1995, p.631).
The instability of Thai politics including concurrent transitions, coup d’etats, and 
constitutional changes does, in fact, have an impact on the functioning of parliament. From 
the period of rapid economic growth in the 1970s, the concentration of power has been 
reflected by the military coups, very few democratic elections^', and the ruling elite from 
Bangkok. Being retired military generals, most prime ministers since military rule have 
created political parties based on supporters and their own personalities rather than pre-
For further information on functions and prospects o f the IPU, see the IPU Strategy 2 0 12-2017 “Better 
Parliaments, Stronger Dem ocracies” http://www.ipu.org/pdf/pubIications/strategy-e.pdf (retrieved 15 June 
2012).
The only democratic election was that in 1988. The elections in 19 9 1 and 2006 were disturbed by military 
coups. See Forsyth, 2010.
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defined political positions of left and right (Forsyth, 2010, p.461-462). This explains a lot 
about the continuous conflicts and corruption which undermine the actions of political 
representatives, despite their background and selection to membership in office. Coming back 
to parliamentary diplomacy, the international diplomatic duties of the Thai Senate are only 
part of the parliamentary institutional regulations that the actors need to follow while they 
hold membership in office. Another factor to add up to the collective performance of the 
senators are individual backgrounds of each senator and secretariat staff. What I attempt to 
say is that despite shifting periods or political turmoil which may cause a stir and hindrance 
to the political situation in the country, it is only an external factor that would have a limited 
effect on the decision-making and performance of the President of the Senate and Committee 
Chairpersons in each senatorial incumbency. In the following part, the discussion shall 
continue on the themes that have risen from the triangulating of the interviewed data. These 
themes, so the argument goes, are all relevant to the understanding of the evolution of 
parliamentary diplomacy as well as how the actors perceive parliamentary diplomacy.
a.Sociological institutionalism: the actors and the institution
In an organisation, the institutional policy is important for the actor’s functioning. When 
considering the Thai Senate, however, a criticism has risen on the lack of proper institutional 
strategies and policies on the conduct of international diplomatic affairs. A senior secretariat 
staff from the Bureau of Strategy and Policy (interviewed 2 May 2011) suggested that the 
Senate’s institutional policy on foreign affairs is not clear. Above all of the questions, such 
policies may not even exist. Considering the nature of foreign diplomatic conduct and 
procedures, the vagueness of the institutional policy on foreign affairs stems from the original 
fact that the Senate is a political institution whose main responsibility is domestic legislative 
scrutiny. The reason for no institutional policy was that traditionally there has never been
proper policies on foreign affairs, so senior civil servants do not know where or how to begin.
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Additional information was that the Senate did not copy the diplomatic procedure pattern 
from the Foreign Office, but rather each committee or individual would mold their own 
pattern for a specific diplomatic mission abroad. From this reason, the Senate’s international 
diplomatic duties do not really show any prospects of being a prominent diplomatic actor.
Suggestions from this senior member of staff was that the Bureau of Foreign Affairs should 
have specialists who would be responsible for providing information and contact for each 
region in order to assist with foreign mission planning. If possible, there should be staff 
responsible for each country within that region. For instance, if the Foreign Office provides 
general knowledge about each country, the Bureau of Foreign Affairs should be able to 
provide specific introductory knowledge on national parliaments and other local 
establishments which would suit the purposes of the committee visit. Although the norms of 
protocol should always pass the Foreign Office, the Senate should have a level of 
independence and not rely on gaining information or putting their missions solely on the 
Foreign Office. Senate staff, as with other people in administrative and facilitative positions, 
should learn to adopt their skills and knowledge -  benefit for future transfers of positions. 
The repetition of their routine in administering and facilitating senators should equip them 
with a more thorough and practical outlook on their duties, therefore stimulate the secretariat 
staff to initiate working plans that could be improvised for their duties.
An interview with the First Vice-President of the Senate^- on the importance of institutional 
policy reflected that parliamentarians should perform together, despite being member of the 
House of Representatives or member of the Senate. They represent parliament in any way or 
the other. However, the most important part on reorganising the functions of parliamentarians 
is to restructure internal institutional policies (interviewed 17 March 2011). Another point
The First Vice-President is currently President o f  the Senate, as o f August 2012.
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that was stressed here was an initiative to establish an e-parliament. E-parliament is about 
changes in using IT to develop internal and external integration, cooperation, and automation 
among government agencies and as a tool to assist in decision-making^^ These decisions, 
therefore, are forward in forms of directives to the administration (Gronlund, 2003, p.5 5). At
this point an in-depth discussion on e-parliament will not be elaborated, as this would rather 
be a suggestion that fits into a separate discussion on public relations and civic engagement 
towards parliamentary affairs. The main focus here is on parliamentary diplomacy, therefore 
the concept of e-parliament may be less relevant to the debate on the diplomatic affairs of the 
Thai Senate other than being more of a method to improve parliament accountability and 
public knowledge on parliamentary affairs.
Apart from the opinion on international diplomatic duties, the exchange visits aim to provide 
secretariat staff with the opportunity to learn, observe, and acknowledge similarities and 
differences in other foreign institutions. Nevertheless, whether the outcomes of the foreign 
visits are successful - that is whether the staff have gained much from the official visits would 
depend on how well they understand their own duties and whether the knowledge they 
achieve would be concrete. This issue can also be drawn back to the purposes of the visit, and 
we shall discuss later on. Further fieldwork and additional document analysis would be to try 
and find out which specific countries the senators choose to visit, whether there are any 
particular reasons or if they have special connections. The possible reasons in choosing 
countries to visit are that there are existing connections or agreements with that particular 
government or friendship groups. Reversing the research strategy would be to do additional 
consultation on archival material stored at other parliament counterparts where the Thai
E-Govemment: apart from being a method in enhancing public participation with parliament, this is also a 
way to keep connection with the public as a result o f global technological advancement. However, I have only 
raised this issue as it has been mentioned during an interview with the former First Vice-President o f the Senate 
(who is now the current President o f the Senate).
132
Chapter 4: The Thai Senate as a Diplomatic Actor
Senate has paid for an official visit. This would be an option to understand the reasons why 
the senators choose to go to that country more frequently than another and whether any 
objectives of the trip were accomplished. However, obstacles would include confidentiality 
issues, accessibility, as well as willingness of the foreign parliament in providing information 
on certain trips. Also, the question of whether such a report exists or whether reports had 
been written at all after the trip should also be considered as possible.
Many countries have initiated broad public sector and civil service reforms as a response to 
the age of globalisation and informatisation demands new systems in society and government 
(Kim, 2002, p.389). All countries today should not lose out in a global rule setting, thus they 
must gear up so as to play an effective role in intergovernmental bodies. Several factors 
motivate committee members to choose the countries they plan to visit and study on a foreign 
mission. Most of the countries they choose to visit would be the countries that are advanced 
in specific fields which are relevant to the committee objectives '^ .^ In trips lead by the 
President of the Senate, there are usually courtesy calls to foreign counterparts. This would 
include the speaker of the Upper House or speaker of parliament - if the parliamentary system 
were unicameral -  and an official call to the Thai ambassador residing in that particular 
country^^ Unfortunately, there is little personal or professional interest for political actors and 
decision takers to see essential re-making of public institutions right through until it has been 
realized. The reasons are many, but include the hostile power of special interests, the absence
Other issues apart from socio-econom ic discussions would include technological advancements in 
transportation, education, health and welfare etc.
During 10-16 July 2012, the former President o f  the Senate made an official trip to the UK and paid a 
courtesy call to Baronness Frances d’Souza, speaker o f the House o f Lords. Their discussion was an exchange o f  
information about the composition o f the current Thai Senate incumbency. At the time o f  visit, the House o f  
Lords reform bill was being debated. See Colin Low, “Lords Reform; the Lords is more diverse and democratic 
than the Commons”, the Guardian, Monday 9 July 2012 (retrieved 30 August 2012). 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/iul/09/house-of-lords-commons-democracv
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of media attention, the lack of votes to be won, or the long time required to get visible results 
(Onnond, 2010, p.221-222).
In the following sections, a discussion on different types of international diplomatic duties of 
the Senate will be considered. Outlined figures will also be added to each section in order to 
present the trend of international diplomatic duties of the Thai Senate in the studied period; 
from 2006 to 2012 - the time of writing^”.
Diplomatic activities of the Senate
The diplomatic activities of the Senate will be categorised into 4 parts in the following 
sections; official visits, courtesy calls, reception hosting, and participation in international 
conferences respectively. A description will be provided for each section on the nature of the 
activities, purposes and motivations, and any consequences of the activities that may have 
had an impact on parliamentary diplomacy in a collective context (See appendix 2 for 
numbers of international diplomatic activities).
Official visits
Official visits include planned diplomatic missions led by the President of the Senate to 
foreign countries as guests of that respective parliament, at the same time receiving foreign 
parliamentary delegates as official guests of the Thai Senate. Countries they chose to visit are 
usually countries with an advanced parliamentary system eg. the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, countries in the same region which share similar cultural 
and traditional values eg. Bhutan, Mongolia, China, ASEAN member countries -  the latter 
group as having convenient access. Moreover, the countries they chose to visit may also be 
countries they already had previous connections with. In the exceptional case of the official
Graphs last updated 4/1/2013.
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visit to Bhutan, the former President of the Senate stated that since the Bhutanese parliament 
are at a developing stage, the formal relations with the Thai parliament has enabled them to 
gain knowledge about the Thai parliamentary composition and committee structure 
(interviewed 28 March 2011).
However, there are differences between countries that senators in previous incumbencies 
have already visited (relations exist) and countries where senators choose to visit and create 
new relations. This would, of course, depend on official invitations from Presidents or 
speakers of other foreign parliaments. Nevertheless, in cases where the country the senators 
visit already has existing relations, political representatives whom the senators meet may not 
be the same persons. If we consider this from two sides of the argument, the senators 
themselves may already have changed incumbencies -  if they visit the same country twice or 
more then the composition of the Thai Senate delegation may be different. Since official 
visits and other international diplomatic visits would involve courtesy calls and general 
meetings to discuss current affairs rather than make a formal agreement, a view on this point 
about visiting the same country but meeting different people is that it will provide the chance 
for people on separate occasions to engage in a more diverse discussion and prevent 
information being ‘locked’ amongst a small group of elite actors. Moreover, official visits are 
good opportunities for senators to meet with foreign representatives from all sectors 
(administrative, legislative, and the court). As a result, the exchange of ideas and opinions 
would be beneficial for both parties -  referring to both the Thai senators and the foreign 
government representatives.
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Figure 1: Official visits to and from the Senate
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Official visits would be considered and organised according to previous courtesy calls from 
ambassadors of that particular country. The ambassador may request a courtesy call as an 
opportunity to convey an official invitation from their President of the Senate, or Speaker of 
Parliament in cases of unicameral parliaments. Also, the President of the Senate from a 
foreign country may send an official invitation directly to the Thai President of the Senate, 
and vice versa. This would depend on previous conversations and relations between the Thai 
President of the Senate and foreign ambassadors who paid courtesy calls to the Senate. 
Moreover, not only do courtesy calls from foreign envoys to the Senate serve as introductory 
meetings, but they can also help remind the President of the Senate of the represented country 
-  leading on to check the existing relations if there has been official visits to that country in 
past incumbencies or any official visits to come to Thailand as official guests of the President 
of the Senate. This would also contribute towards the decision to accept an official invitation 
to visit a foreign country or to extend an invitation to a certain country.
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Official visits - whether from the Thai Senate to a foreign country as guests of parliament or 
from foreign parliaments to Thailand as guests of the Thai Senate -  frequently have similar 
members in the delegation. A delegation, for example, would comprise of the President of the 
Senate (or speaker of parliament), several members of parliament, and staff members from 
different Secretariat departments. The person with the highest position in the delegation eg. 
President, Vice-President, or Chairperson of a committee would usually be leader of the 
delegation. Other delegate members would be senators from different committees, but they 
may also be invited to join a delegation according to their professional background, expertise, 
provincial constituency, and by personal cordiality.
During some official visits, the foreign President of the Senate or Speaker of Parliament 
would request for a courtesy call to HRH the King of Thailand at the Royal Residential 
Palace in Hua Hin, Prachuabkirikhan province. However, several factors including the status 
and position of the delegation leader, the country they represent, the composition of the 
delegation, and purposes of their visit to Thailand must be considered in advance to request 
for a royal visit. Depending on these factors and the availability of the King, a courtesy call 
cannot be appointed. Other official places the delegation would normally visit would be to 
seek courtesy calls with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the President of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, and the Ambassador who represents their country 
in Thailand. The duration of an official visit would usually last from 3 days up to 10 days, the 
normal period being one week including travelling dates.
The number of official visits have remained stable during the period of 2006 and 2008. The
reason is because there were political coups and transitions accordingly; the former period
when the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted and parliament was dissolved,
and again in 2008 when parliament was undergoing a transitional period from being the
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National Legislative Assembly (NLA) to a normally structured bicameral parliament. In 
2007, interestingly, numbers of official visits have risen. An explanation for this increase can 
be due to the maintaining of the normal parliamentary functionality through an uncertain 
cabinet hiatus period. Although the titles of the. persons who hold leading positions in the 
National Legislative Assembly are slightly different from when parliament is sitting 
normally, however the functioning of the institution maintains the same to assure that the 
legislative institution has not undergone any dramatic changes despite political turmoil.
Example o f  official visit to observe parliaments o f  Korea and Japan
In 2009, Mr. Nikom Vairajpanich, then First Vice-President of the Senate led a delegation to 
the Republic of Korea and Japan on an official visit to observe the National Assembly library 
and the National Diet Library respectively. During the visit to the Korean National Assembly 
library, the delegation acquired information about laws and ethics on internet usage in Korea, 
internet law. On the institutional structure, the Korean National Assembly parliament is fully 
digitalized, therefore the transparency of information among members of parliament and the 
public is regarded as highly efficient. Moreover, the National Assembly Library of Korea has 
281 staff members who are responsible for providing research abstracts, papers and reports 
on parliamentary policies and affairs for members of parliament. On the public relations side, 
the editorial section and news articles on politics and economics from 5 foreign newspapers; 
U.S, Japan, U.K., France, and Russia are being translated on a daily basis. These details are 
then sent to the parliamentarians via email. As for Japan, the e-library of the National Diet 
has limited access only in the Japanese language and information from the library can only be 
accessed within Japan.
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Observations from this official visit have stimulated the Thai Senate delegation in future 
improvement of the parliamentary institutional system in Thailand, in particular information 
services and library settings. The settings in the National Assembly Library of Korea and the 
National Diet Library in Japan are examples of the application of digital technology to 
parliamentary documents. The official visit to observe the e-parliament systems and 
organisational PR have provided the senators with extended knowledge on more advanced 
institutional structures. The matter of taking a further step by implementing these 
advancements to the Thai parliament is another important issue that senators should propose 
to the relevant committees. In addition, advanced digital technology in the National 
Assemblies of Korea and Japan have provided convenient links and contacts to legislative 
specialists, scholars, and institutions.
When a delegation of senators visit a foreign country, they would generally pay courtesy calls 
on national representatives; the Prime Minister, speakers of parliament, Thai ambassadors in 
that country, and foreign representatives of establishments according to the planned schedule. 
There are possibilities of appointments being postponed or cancelled, therefore it is necessary 
for the secretariat staff to check promptly before appointments during the foreign visit. The 
nature of a courtesy call is usually a visit and briefing from the Ambassadors and other 
foreign representatives, then the senators may have the chance to inquire further on specific 
issues. A lengthy debate-like conversation is not very typical during official visits. However, 
a more open discussion or debate on new information from the official visit is more likely to 
be carried out when the trip is finished and when senators meet during post-trip committee 
meetings.
139
Chapter 4: The Thai Senate as a Diplomatic Actor
Moreover, the objectives of a foreign visit of the Committee on Economics, Trade, and 
Industry to US and Canada during 25/5/2010 -  2/6/2010 has stemmed from the government’s 
urge to strengthen economic policies and industrial states^\ The emphasis on improving the 
economic situation in Thailand is to adjust the whole structure in agriculture and industry. 
The purpose of this foreign visit is to observe methods and paths for economic, trade, and 
industrial development. These initiatives shall be considered for committee performances and 
will be proposed to the government. Moreover, the foreign visit aims to enhance bilateral 
relations between the committee (as representatives of the Thai Senate) and foreign 
institutional representatives. The following copy of an open letter reflects part of the duties of 
senators on official diplomatic duties as mediums who are able to convey governmental 
messages as such from Thai ambassadors abroad back to the main headquarters in Bangkok. 
Therefore, this is considered as part of the Senate’s duties on being a diplomatic actor in 
assisting the government envoys^^
An open letter from the Thai Embassy, Washington D.C. given to the Committee delegation 
to pass forward to the government in Bangkok. The letter was a follow up from the civil 
tragedy in Thailand on 19 May 2010. Therefore, the ambassador and staff from the Thai 
Embassy in Washington, D.C. wished to express their concern and reconciliation from the 
Thai community in US to fellow Thai citizens that people who live in rural communities 
should be provided with support in all terms. Unity policy must be proceeded vertically and 
horizontically in coordination with transparent legal regulations and every province should 
have regular community meetings (like town halls in US) to stimulate local cooperation. 
Further, the National Council should propose initiatives to parliament in order to improve the 
situation and restore peace and stability as soon as possible. The establishment of a “national
During that period the US was suffering a bad economic retention.
Group report o f  Committee on Economics, Trade, and Industry, Bureau o f Committees 1, Secretariat o f the 
Senate.
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unity government” should also be taken into consideration, although it may be a difficult task 
for some politicians who are not willing to give up their political benefits, but the idea for 
national improvements. This may be a new dimension for Thailand in terms of education, 
police, military, agriculture, industry, technology, economics, politics, bureaucracy, and 
ethical values etc^ .^
The number of visits have obviously risen sharply during 2009-2010 (post-NLA period). The 
rise of international visits to foreign parliaments can be interpreted as a reassurance of trust -  
a strategy of H.E. Mr. Prasobsook Boondech, former President of the Senate, who held office 
term during the 2008-2010 incumbency. It is also a matter of informing foreign governments 
that recurrent political transitions in Thailand have become a normal part of the Thai political 
culture. Non-state and non-regime actors who have fought against liberal and illiberal elites 
to advance substantive political and economic equality has emphasised the democratic 
struggle in Thailand (Connors, 2009, p.356).
The examples of official visits raised in this section were aimed to present an analytical 
viewpoint of international diplomatic duties of the Senate. On observing the details of the 
foreign duties, it is more obvious that the majority of foreign visits of Senate delegations are 
to gain new experiences and knowledge from other advanced parliaments. By mentioning the 
advanced parliaments, in this case the term is referred to the reference on advanced 
information systems and technology.
The example on the official visit to the United States and Canada is a more obvious case 
where the Thai Senate delegation has represented the government as a diplomatic medium by 
conveying the message from the Thai ambassador to the US to the Ministry of Foreign
Ibid.
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Affairs in Bangkok during a conflicting period. Otherwise, most official visits will be to 
observe the systems, structures, and environment of the country. When the visits are over, a 
report summary is provided with details of the trip and brief summaries on places the 
delegates have visited. It can then be summarised at this point -  seeing from the reports on 
foreign official visits -  that only occasionally would official visits from the Senate 
committees contribute to diplomatic practices. Even if the delegation were lead by the 
President of the Senate, the visit would not have been much different from committee visits.
Courtesy calls
The courtesy calls are opportunities where foreign envoys or representatives pay a brief visit 
to the President, Vice-Presidents, or Committee Chairpersons. The main reason for courtesy 
calls is when foreign ambassadors who are based in Bangkok meet with the President, Vice- 
Presidents. Apart from exchanging views on current affairs that relates to both parties, 
referring to Thailand and the represented country, courtesy calls are also considered as 
opportunities for reassurance. The meeting between the foreign envoy and member of the 
Thai parliament during periods of conflict is to reassure that the political situation in Thailand 
is stable and not a threat to good democratic practice. However, the data absence during 
2006, 2008, and 2009 respectively reflects a flaw in the record storage system of the 
Secretariat. The summaries of official visits have not been properly stored, therefore data 
which is supposed to be available cannot be presented. This flaw on data storage and filing 
systems reflect an institutional system where a concise outline on proper data storage and 
filing is lacking. As a result, this case should be properly considered for institutional 
improvements regarding the structuring of the institution itself, the roles and duties of 
institutional actors, stating precise departmental policies and models according to the staff 
responsibility.
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Figure 2: Courtesy calls to the Senate
calls to the Senate
40
; Courtesy calls
to the Senate
10
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Courtesy calls are considered the most, frequent activity, compared to other international 
diplomatic missions. This is because courtesy calls are from foreign envoys who are based in 
Bangkok, therefore it is more convenient for them to pay a visit to the President of the 
Senate, the Vice-Presidents, and Committee Chairpersons. The purposes of occasions where 
Ambassadors or foreign representatives pay an official visit to the Senate are usually to 
congratulate when the President and Vice-Presidents of the Senate take their positions at the 
beginning of the incumbency. During the term in office, regular courtesy calls would also be 
from foreign delegations on official visits to the Thai Parliament, in order to exchange 
opinions on certain issues or seek resolutions for recent conflicts that, may have effect on 
bilateral relations.
Courtesy calls, from a personal observation, are mainly to address and discuss about certain 
issues. Considering from the frequency of numbers each year, it is clear that courtesy calls 
are a routine activity between foreign envoys to Thailand and executive government members 
to follow up on current situations. A courtesy call would normally comprise of the
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ambassador and several embassy staff; first secretary or the personal assistant to the 
ambassador. In some cases, the ambassador may pay a visit alone without any accompanying 
persons. This depends on the familiarity of the ambassador and the President of the Senate, 
the urgency of the matter, and the availability of the ambassador and embassy staff. Some 
ambassadors pay more courtesy calls to the President of the Senate, Vice-Presidents, or 
Committee chairpersons more frequent than other countries. An insider’s observation would 
be that ambassadors from Asian countries eg. China, Japan, Lao PDR are the most frequent 
visitors to the Thai Senate. In the case of the ambassador from Lao PDR, the acquaintance is 
more convenient than the others as there are less language barriers and a translator is not 
usually required during the conversation. As a result, similar communicating languages can 
convey messages more straightforwardly than translated messages.
International conferences
The attendance and participation in international conferences are one of the few opportunities
where the senators get to represent the Thai parliament. Members of parliament would
participate in international fora to discuss and exchange opinions on political, economic,
social and cultural issues. Members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate
would attend the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference, which is held twice annually
in its headquarter office in Switzerland and regulating again in another member country. The
recent hosting of the IPU conference in Thailand was during April 2010, when the Thai
parliament had resumed its functioning status and its membership in the Inter-Parliamentary
Union. Prior to this, during the transitional period of 2006 -  2008 the Thai parliament’s
membership in the IPU was temporarily suspended as it is an IPU regulation that member
parliaments should represent a government with good and stable democratic values.
Accordingly, the attendance in IPU conferences in 2006 and 2008 were low as these years
were periods of political transition. The participation in international conferences is also seen
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as an opportunity to confirm their attendance as IPU members. However, the chance to 
discuss and exchange opinions on certain issues, would be possible only when 
parliamentarians attend smaller sessions during the conferences. These sessions are usually 
relevant to parliamentary committees that senators hold membership.
Figure 3: Participation in International Parliamentary Conferences
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During the inter-parliamentary union conference, another conference that is usually held in 
tandem with the main conference is the Association for Secretary-Generals of Parliament 
(ASGP) conference. This function is organised for members of Secretariats of the IPU 
member parliaments, in order to provide an arena where members of staff from different 
departments can engage in discussion as well as exchange opinions on topics related to that 
held in the General Assembly. The idea on ASGP meetings is that the Secretariat staff have 
the responsibility of supporting and facilitating duties of parliamentarians, therefore it is 
essential that staff members from IPU member Secretariats should take this annual 
opportunity to discuss about their working experiences and methods to improve their
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functionality. Moreover, the ASGP meeting would equally provide the opportunity for 
Secretariat staff to integrate their knowledge on maintaining a good relationship between the 
parliamentarians and the Secretariat staff. Other conferences that senators may chose to 
attend would mostly be specific conferences on parliamentary friendship groups, regional 
conferences associated with ASEAN, and subject-related conferences which is more relevant 
to committees or professional backgrounds and affiliation of senators.
The consequences of attending international conferences are usually only an exchange of
opinions over topics, not to mention the annual attendance being a confirmation of the Thai
parliament’s membership in an international parliamentary function. After consulting archival
documents from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, reports on the attendance to international
conferences would show topics included in the sessions, list of participants, and areas that
were covered during conversation. There are not any evidence which showed that the
attendance in international conferences has resulted in formal agreements, apart from
exchanging views and discussion. Nevertheless, the opportunity to attend and participate in
international conferences provide the chance for parliamentarians to interact and engage with
foreign counterparts. As a result, they will be able to build new relations or carry on existing
relations with representatives they are already familiar with. This applies not only to
members of parliament but also to Secretariat staff who accompany the delegation attend
other meetings that are held separately in tandem with the main functions. The group
discussions between staff from different parliamentary secretariats is also considered as an
opportunity to learn about various institutional policies and initiatives on duties to facilitate
parliamentarians. A seminar on “The Role of Parliament in the Treaty Making Process”
Held on 24 November 2008 in Bangkok by the National Assembly of Thailand and King
Prajadhipok’s Institute in Cooperation with the Inter-Parliamentary Union stressed the notion
on importance of negotiation and treaties. Governments, further, can shape their approaches
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to issues that lie beyond national borders. These issues include trade flows, international 
rights standard, environment, climate changes, and international crime. The rational of the 
seminar also stated that parliaments are rarely involved at the negotiation stage of the treaties 
as this task is often seen as an executive power. Therefore, parliament should play increasing 
role on specific issues at the negotiation process, particularly for the issues that affect people 
and other stakeholders. Additionally, they often lack the knowledge of international standards 
and mechanisms to fulfill the role that makes it difficult for them to perform their role. They 
are seldom aware of the work of the numerous treaty bodies in existence and therefore do not 
adequately monitor government compliance with their obligations. However, the recent 
constitutional amendments in Thailand recognise the growing influence of international 
treaties and commitments on the domestic legal system. The treaty making process has been 
reformed in a way which provides greater accountability to the Thai public. Specially, section 
190 of the 2007 Constitution provides for thé provision of information and requires 
consultation of community sector and prior approval by the Parliament of Thailand. The 
objectives of this seminar was to provide an opportunity for the parliamentary authorities to 
acquire an understanding of the role of parliament in the treaty making process, to examine 
the role of legislative and executive in the treaty making process by sharing parliamentary 
comparative experiences and lessons learnt, to enhance the role of parliament in monitoring 
the compliance of international treaties®®.
The example of an international conference presented here is to highlight international 
conferences where senators participate. Members from the Thai Senate have participated in 
other conferences like this one, however their attendance would have been more likely to 
observe rather than join in a debate. This, again, can be applied to other international 
diplomatic duties of the Senate where the visit would be to confirm attendance and
Seminar report “the Role o f  Parliament in the Treaty Making Process”, Bangkok, November 24, 2008.
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observation. The impact of diplomacy does not really show through the senator’s 
participation in international conferences. Their participation, however, is to confirm their 
attendance and receive information from other parliaments rather than provide information 
opinions on the specific topic. The senators who attend international conferences are mostly 
the president, vice-presidents, chairpersons and members of the specific committees that are 
relevant to the theme of the conference®\
The people they meet would be their international counterparts. Sofne senators may engage in 
a discussion but would only listen to other opinions rather than initiate a proper agenda. This 
can be concluded that the international diplomatic duties of the Senate -  in general they give 
an outlook of activeness, but when it comes to specific details as such, their participation in 
international diplomatic activities do not reflect proper international relations practice. The 
conventional diplomatic practice in building international relations normally includes a 
discussion that leads to a formal agreement e.g. Declaration of policy or MOU. The 
international diplomatic duties of the Senate do not reflect agreements, but rather a 
coordinating in a more personal level. Again, this is not to say that parliamentary diplomacy 
through the Thai Senate does not have any positive effect on governmental relations.
The examples of international conferences are presented here to highlight international 
conferences where senators participate. Their participation, however, is to confirm their 
attendance and receive information from other parliaments rather than provide information 
and opinions on the specific topic. The senators who attend international conferences are 
mostly the president, vice-presidents, chairpersons and members of the specific committees 
that are relevant to the theme of the conference. The people they meet would be their 
international counterparts. Some senators may engage in a discussion but would only listen to
Report summary, Bureau o f Foreign Affairs, Secretariat o f the Senate.
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other opinions rather than initiate a proper agenda. This can be concluded that the 
international diplomatic duties of the Senate -  in general they give an outlook of activeness, 
but when it comes to specific details as such, their participation in international diplomatic 
activities do not reflect proper international relations practice. This is contradictory to the 
conventional diplomatic practice in building international relations where a formal discussion 
would lead to a signing of agreement e.g. Declaration of policy or MOU, or disagreement. 
The international diplomatic duties of the Senate do not reflect agreements, but rather a 
coordinating in a more personal level. Again, this is not to say that that parliamentary 
diplomacy through the Thai Senate does not have any positive effect on governmental 
relations. The attendance in international conferences and meeting with foreign counterparts 
would be an opportunity to build relations with other parliamentarians who are from similar 
professional backgrounds. Again, this would depend on the scope of the conference whether 
it be a national, regional, or committee-specific conference.
Reception hosting
Reception hosting is part of welcoming delegations from foreign parliaments, when they have
been invited for official visits to Thailand as guests of the Thai parliament. Foreign
parliaments, in this case, also refers to foreign counterparts hosting formal dinner receptions
for Thai delegates when they are visiting respective countries. Therefore, reception hostings
are considered as part of parliamentary diplomatic protocol. Receptions are usually organised
at traditional restaurants or international restaurants in hotels in central Bangkok. Staff from
the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat of the Senate are responsible for organising formal
receptions. Protocol customs are required in the preparation procedure e.g. number of guests,
dietary requirements, the level of formality, where they are staying etc. These information
can assist in selecting the location for hosting the reception. Although it may seem as if
hosting a dinner, but the procedure of reception hosting for foreign delegations require an
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amount of time, formality, and preciseness. An awareness of cultural differences between 
foreign delegates is also an important point to consider when hosting receptions. During 
reception dinners, informal conversations are normally carried out. However, there are 
possibilities that those conversation can be taken forward in a more serious matter. The 
interpretation of this point is that conversation during dinner may be an informal discussion 
carried on from a previous matter, or matters suggested during an informal atmosphere during 
the dinner reception maybe an introductory conversation leading on to a more formal 
discussion.
Figure 4: Reception hosting for international delegates
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The focused study period of the President of the Senate during the 2008-2010 incumbency, it 
is observed that reception hosting was quite frequent. A personal assumption on this issue is 
that the President and Second Vice-President of the Senate during that incumbency were very 
active in foreign diplomatic activities, therefore they would ensure that reception hosting as 
part of a parliamentary diplomatic process should be well-prepared in advance and be done as
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complete as possible. This would, therefore, give a cordial gesture to international delegates 
that members of the Senate are professional and are aware of universal protocol customs. 
Beyond promoting standards of shared values and official behaviour, the club-like 
atmosphere of the diplomatic realm has supported the common view of diplomacy as a 
specialist and elusive pursuit (Kelley, 2010, p.287). The reason can also be explained further 
that reception hosting as part of a good diplomatic gesture has many detailed elements of 
protocol^ combined with the personality, gesture, preferences of the hosts.
The explanation for the high peak in 2007 would be similar to that of receiving official visits 
as guests of the Senate that the interim government would plan to keep a normal functioning 
of diplomatic activities during the National Legislative Assembly period. It is noticed that 
compared to other international diplomatic activities, reception hosting for foreign delegates 
appear to be having a decline towards the recent incumbency. From the data collected during 
the interviews and from personal observation during the period between 2007-2009, reception 
hosting are only part of the hospitality of welcoming foreign delegates as official guests to 
the Thai Parliament. The impact it has on the exchange of views and opinions over a specific 
topic is not as formal as that of an official meeting or discussion.
Analysis of international diplomatic activities
The international diplomatic activities of the Thai Senate have been categorised in graph 
forms. Supporting information can be seen from the four figured graphs respectively; official 
visits to and from the Senate, courtesy calls, international conferences, and receptions 
hosting. During the period presented in the graphs from 2006-2012, there have been 1 
President of the National Legislative Assembly and three Presidents of the Senate 
respectively. The analysis that will be related to my research hypotheses will remain focused
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on the President of the Senate and senators during the 2008-2010 incumbency^, as there is an 
amount of information from official records and personal observations to support my 
arguments.
As seen from the graphs, the peaks are mostly high in 2010, the period before the former 
President of the Senate finished his term in office. Analysis from the graphs adds to my 
observation that after an unstable period, the President of the Senate needs to stabilise the 
image and accountability of parliament, reflecting political and professional leadership. 
From the presented data, the President of the Senate in this current incumbency is not as 
active in foreign diplomatic duties compared to the previous President and the President of 
the National Legislative Assembly respectively^^ It is obvious that an institutional regulation 
pattern is set up for each President to follow, but then again it also depends on the 
combination of each individual leadership style combined with the professional background 
of the person.
As regards leadership, not only does this apply to the President and Vice-Presidents of the 
Senate, but also with chairpersons of standing committees. The existing research has 
established that the type of the governmental system defines the roles that the government, 
parties and committees play in the legislative process (Khmelko, Pigenko, and Wise, 2007, 
p.211). Nonetheless, the role of the President of the Senate is quite limited. He can only 
represent the institution and give opinions, but does not have the authority to put forward any 
final decisions -  as that has to be done by government members of the administrative e.g.
Information to support this research has been gathered mainly from records o f  the former President o f the 
Senate from 2008-2010. The succeeding President held office term for a very brief period and had his position 
suspended due to fraudulence. The current President o f the Senate was former First Vice-President during both 
previous incumbencies.
At the time o f  writing, the former President o f the Senate who held office from June 2011 until late July 2012 
had to resign from the position on criminal records o f corruption. He still remains a senator. The new President 
o f  the Senate was former First Vice-President, and has recently been appointed (31 August 2012).
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Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the Senate’s representation in 
international diplomatic functions be it abroad or in the country, the role of the President, 
Vice-Presidents, and senators representing different committees are mostly limited to the 
exchange of opinions and courtesy gestures. Further, evidence from interviews has provided 
various views on the senators’ perception on parliamentary diplomatic duties. All senators 
see the importance of building and extending relations with foreign counterparts, yet there are 
some senators who do not even know their duty framework (interviewed 25 March 2011). 
They only understand that foreign diplomatic trips are opportunities to travel abroad and meet 
new people from the same position and background. The extension of diplomatic agreements 
beyond that are very rare, as these groups of senators assume that it should be a separate role 
for Foreign Ministiy envoys -  the administrative sector.
The Thai propensity for changing constitutions has been referred to as "faction
constitutionalism," whereby each successive draft reflects, makes legitimate, and strengthens
major shifts in factional dominance. As was observed above, Thai constitutions have not been
considered the fundamental law of the land but rather have functioned to facilitate the rule of
the regime in power (Neher, 1970, p.240). From the empirical data gathered in this research,
it can be observed that the collective performance on international diplomatic duties of the
Thai Senate depends on the professionalism and leadership of the President, according to
each particular constitution. For this research, the President of the Senate who took office in a
period following a political crisis tended to be more active in domestic and foreign diplomatic
missions, in order to build a better image and reputation to the unstable Thai parliament.
Diplomacy becomes the means to create legitimacy. Broad-based support and consensus to
make the political process efficient and secure are required in democratic political systems.
However, the prospect of or the potential for regime change underlies an autocratic
government while policy adjustments under a democratic government may help reduce long-
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term radical political change (Feng, 2001, p.272). In a system of indirect democracy the 
people delegate their sovereignty to political and administrative institutions and actors, 
trusting that this mandate will be handled in an appropriate way as the legitimacy of these 
situations and actors is based largely on trust (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, p.487).
A distinctive observation would still remain to the fact that the President of the Senate in 
whichever constituency holds the authority to steer the initiative of each foreign mission. In 
some views, concentrated power in Westminster model parliaments allows for the creation 
and bestowal of collective benefits through the political marketplace. Most of parliament's 
problems are not due to institutional design but to failures in the party system. The 
concentration of power inherent in the Westminster model may appear as a threat to 
individual freedom (Atkinson and Thomas, 1993, p.424). Findings from one working paper 
on the UK parliament, for example, were the very different perspectives on the Committee 
held by ministers and the bureaucracy. Ministers found the Committee’s work useful in 
influencing policy on occasion and signaling political priorities. However, the bureaucracy 
was dismissive, arguing that the Committee was telling them nothing new and that 
parliamentary committees are made up of politicians behaving politically rather than 
professional policy makers '^  ^(Monk, 2010, p.3).
The findings from fieldwork would indeed support my initial theoretical argument on 
parliamentary diplomacy and sociological institutionalism -  the main theoretical approaches 
to this research. From my personal observation at this stage; most of the countries the 
senators choose to go to would be developed countries, apart from countries that they already 
have bilateral relations with, the countries that have paid a visit to the Senate as official
^  See Hindmoor, A., Larkin, P. and Kennon, A., (2009), Assessing the Influence o f  Select Committees in the 
UK: The Education and Skills Committee, 1997-2005. The Journal o f Legislative Studies, 15 (I ), 71-89; 
O’Keeffe, P., (1992), The Scope and Functions o f  Parliamentary Committees. Parliamentarian, 73 (4),
270- 275.
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guests. The reason why senators go to countries categorised as developed countries can be 
explained as a combination of personal and professional. This could be related back to the 
critical opinion from the senior Secretariat staff from the Bureau of Strategy and Policy that 
the Senate has never had an institutional policy on international diplomatic missions before. 
Therefore, the presumed reason for senators to plan a visit to a specific country would be as 
to exchange visits between delegations and also to seek assistance with current plans or 
projects that the committee has in schedule. For example, the chairperson of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs has given examples of current topics that have been discussed among 
fellow parliamentarians as well as with foreign counterparts. These topics included education, 
women and children welfare (interviewed 21 March 2011). Again, the exchange of opinions 
would also apply to senators from other committees. An observation is that when the senators 
travel to a foreign country and meet with a government representative of that country, he or 
she would prefer to receive briefings and information on specific topics rather than engage in 
a two-way conversation'^^
Again, another suggestion from a senator of the Committee on Energy was that in terms of 
background prior to taking political positions in parliament senators were not diplomats. 
However, the chance for senators to become diplomats, or at least to consider themselves as 
diplomats, would depend on the generosity of the senators when communicating with foreign 
representatives on particular matters (interviewed 2 May 2011). Through a genealogical 
approach, diplomatic partners are peripheral to official accounts of the state that are located 
as central to everyday political processes (Domett, 2005, p.290). It can be argued that this 
could be one of the factors on how senators would realise and develop their potential to 
become parliamentary diplomats when they happen to be in a requiring situation. The ability
Unless the senators are able to communicate fluently in English and have a level o f knowledge on that 
discussed topic.
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to express opinions spontaneously as well as negotiate on issues that need to be discussed, 
senators should think further about the psychological effects of their communication, not 
limiting on looking for networks of interpersonal communication but have to think way 
beyond the purposes of informal communication that would lead on to interpersonal influence 
and whether that would be taken into consideration later on in the paths of their duties 
(Bauer, 1958, p.67). Again, factors which lead to the possibility of pursuing a diplomatic 
career later on would also depend on the opportunities and connections the senators have.
Hi. Political Socialisation
When applying data findings to the theoretical approach on sociological institutionalism, a 
main point stands out to support my adopted theory that the relations between the actors and 
the institutional regulations are obvious. Actors, referring to senators and senate staff, are 
from different social, educational, and professional backgrounds. When examining the 
relations in two individual groups; senators and the senate, senate staff and the secretariat, we 
are able to understand the impact of the actor’s background towards their performance and 
duties. Therefore, their knowledge and understanding of their duties are reflected in various 
levels. Main factors that influence the performance of these actors not only would be the 
responsibilities and tasks within each diplomatic mission, but their background knowledge, 
training, and discipline. These latter factors would, to an extent, determine the level of 
success in the outcomes of these missions.
An obvious example would be from international conferences, referred from a senator who
was secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (interviewed 28 March 2011), that an
international conference like the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference, members of
parliaments would choose to attend specific sessions that suit their background interest,
training, and professionalism, not to mention the areas in standing committees they hold
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membership. My personal observation during the period of attending the 125* Inter­
parliamentary Union Conference in Bern, Switzerland, in October 2011 was that senators do' 
in fact attend the plenary sessions, to confirm their attendance as delegates from the Thai 
parliament. Again, the question leads on to how far do the senators take their attendance and 
details of these seminar sessions further in terms of implementation. This would be proven 
with further document analysis.
Applying the sociological institutionalist approach: the argument is that the senators act like a 
collective group of individuals. Accepting that they hold temporary posts in office, when they 
work together as a team they are able to perform their duties at hand more effectively. Groups 
of peoples coordinate their individual actions and perform a collective action under particular 
circumstances (Ernst and Chant, 2007, p.415). However, evidence from a senator from the 
Education Committee suggested that most senators tend to be quasi-individualistic, that is 
they think and plan work individually with their own team of personal assistants -  who are 
not secretariat staff. For senators who prefer working as a team, then this would be 
considered as selfish and irresponsible. As a result, the reality within the institution 
contradicts with the policy expectations (interviewed 30 March 2011).
When thinking about the senate’s policy, rules in the constitution combined with internal
institutional policies are set for the members to follow and accomplish, but the policies on
international diplomatic duties would have to be drawn up in each incumbency. All of the
senators and the Senate staff interviewed would say that the President of the Senate would be
the person responsible for constructing the policies on international diplomatic duties,
therefore their attendance and participation on any foreign mission would depend upon the
decision of the President. In other words, it is to say that the values and professionalism of
the president of the senate would be the issues that would determine the direction of the
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policy on international diplomatic duties of the Senate, thus shaping the outcomes of 
parliamentary diplomacy. In other words, the president of the senate C as the leader of the 
group -  should have the knowledge and professionalism to establish rules, regulations, 
policies, and, most importantly, should have leadership; able to make abrupt and precise 
decision on certain issues.
One senator from the Committee of Transportations stressed that ‘everyone is a diplomat” 
meaning that it does not matter whether you are a senator or hold any other profession 
(interview 3 May 2011). Once your duties require foreign contact, then you should have the 
knowledge, professionalism, and generosity to communicate with the other representative. It 
can also be argued that if a senator considers himself as a diplomat, apart from all these 
qualities he should also know how to communicate proficiently, where the diplomat would be 
able to talk and implement their own values through their conversation without constraining 
the atmosphere or stirring a dispute (Gomes de Matos, 2001, p.282). At this stage, diplomatic 
communication among the senators in the parliamentary level would be to create and 
maintain good relations rather than to negotiate or hoping for a formal agreement. Shifting 
back to the aspects on the senators membership, from an interview with the former President 
of the Senate (given at the end of his tenure, 11 March 2011)^ :^ the candidate selected to 
become President of the Senate should have prospects on the international duties of the 
Senate, apart from domestic legislative scrutiny. The prospective President should also see 
parliamentary diplomacy as a bridge to strengthen international relations with foreign 
counterparts. Also, does not matter whether you are member of the House of Representatives 
or the Senate; as long as you are a parliamentarian you have every right to be a diplomatic 
representative of parliament.
A reminder that this research is focused on the 2008-2011 incumbency. Since June 2011 to present there has 
been a change o f  President o f the Senate.
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The general information on the National Legislative Assembly including its functioning and 
membership has been given in chapter 3 on the Thai Senate. In this chapter, the discussion 
will continue in detail on the impact of the NLA whether it has influenced the functioning of 
the 2008 Senatorial incumbency. My opinion on this point is that the temporary governing 
period of the National Legislative Assembly has not had any drastic impact in the consecutive 
performance of the Senate after the general elections because the period during which 
parliament was dissolved and the NLA was appointed was considered as a separate period. 
The prospects and functioning of a particular senatorial incumbency, I argue, would solely 
depend on the leadership of the President and Vice-Presidents.
In addition, the institutional norms and regulations would also have an impact in shaping the
decisions and performance of the President and Vice-Presidents. By saying so, my opinion
here can be related back to the theoretical approach on sociological institutionalism where the
performance of the actor reflects his or her professional and personal background. High
personnel who hold political positions tend to act as part of the political elite as well as
members of the bureaucracy to create an organisational identity in a bureaucratic system,
based on their societal norms and background. Normative variables used to measure the level
of leadership constitute societal norms such as the propensity to innovate, policy traditions,
religiosity, and political culture which may be defined as historical differences in habits,
concerns and attitudes across states (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005, p. 192). From this, the
fact of having both appointed and elected senators can create a balance of power in itself for
the institution of the Thai Upper House. In any other way, both categories of senators are
senior professionals with numerous years of experiences and therefore can contribute their
knowledge to their duties in office. However, it is undeniable that among all the senators
there are some who possess the skills and knowledge to perform in the Senate, but instead
take their positions for granted particularly in foreign diplomatic duties. They seem to not
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acknowledge the professional part of their duties, meaning that they would complete their 
duties to comply with the individual and institutional regulations. However, they see the 
professional part of the Senate’s duties as secondary, while the ‘luxury’ part is seen as the 
primary reason to join the group. Details from a secretariat staff. Energy Committee, 
mentioned that some senators would see the opportunity of travelling abroad as a rewarding 
part of their senatorship. In fact, they should perceive international diplomatic duties as part 
of their responsibilities within the committee (interviewed 2 May 2011), In my opinion, the 
latter claim on rewarding benefits of trips abroad would apply to senators who do not yet 
acknowledge the significance of parliamentary foreign affairs, or those who do not see 
themselves as diplomatic actors. Also, the senators’ term is considered as a temporary 
political opportunity. They are not allowed to stand for consecutive elections or 
appointments, as stated by the current Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2007. There 
are, in fact, some senators who choose to resign themselves from office before the end of 
their tenn in order to stand for the following elections or appointments, depending on their 
previous approval.
Additional information from other Secretariat of the Senate staff can be used to support these
arguments. A junior official from the Committee on Economics, Industry and Transportation
has suggested a problem on the diplomatic duties of some senators, despite their professional
experience in a certain field, do not have sufficient knowledge to exchange opinions with
foreign representatives. As a result, important courtesy calls or meetings in the proposed
agenda has to be cancelled (interviewed 2 Nfay 2011). From this, it is clear that the actors -
senators and senate staff - have a lot of potential, but they do not use it to the fullest. This,
from a personal perspective, is limited by institutional bureaucracy. If the Thai parliament
were to follow the traditional diplomatic model of the foreign affairs ministry, they should at
least have a concise policy on foreign affairs e.g. how it should be conducted, the expected
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outcomes, and the qualification of the actors involved. An opinion from the deputy secretary- 
general on human resources and development (interviewed 3 May 2011) was to provide a 
parliamentary representative to be based at embassies in other countries, for there are 
currently representatives from the Commerce Ministry and the Military, so that the 
parliamentary diplomatic procedures would be more efficient.
A recent observation on the composition of delegation members on a particular foreign 
diplomatic trip would be a selection of senators from the same region. An example from an 
official visit to the UK, Northern Ireland, and France®  ^was that the delegation was composed 
of senators who represented the Southern provinces of Thailand. The issues they discussed 
about with a member of the UK House of Lords during an official visit were ethnic minorities 
and immigration control respectively. On this arguing topic of political socialisation, the 
choice of members of the delegation are seen as a form of engaging senators who share 
similarities including the same regional dialect, similar political values^\ and most of them 
have a professional background in education. On the purpose of the visit, in addition, the 
senators are from the Southern part of the countiy with 3 senators representing the 
Southernmost provinces. Therefore, the exchange of opinions with a member of the UK 
Lords was an opportunity to provide knowledge on the UK government’s perspective on the 
conflict in Northern Ireland to representatives from the Thai government in handling the 
violence in the Southernmost provinces of Thailand. Further discussions on the senator’s role 
in solving the Southernmost insurgencies will be expanded later in chapter 5.
Personal observation as part o f the working staff during an official visit to the Houses o f  Parliament, UK,
4 December 2012.
The southern part o f Thailand are mainly democrat supporters, and have a high value for democracy. An more 
in-depth discussion on the value o f  democracy from this observation will be explained in chapter 3.
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The similarities between the UK/Northem Ireland dispute and between the Southernmost 
provinces in Thailand are mainly religious conflicts. I'he UK/Northem Irish case has 
stemmed from the Catholic-Protestant dispute, thus it can be relevant to the conflict in the 
Southernmost provinces of Thailand that violence from political, social, and economic 
outcomes requires an understanding of the institutional context in every level (Brownlow, 
2012, p.723). The latter case on the Thai Southernmost provinces, accordingly, has been an 
ongoing clash through decades between the Buddhist-Muslim population^^ Further, the 
tension in the South has been overshadowed by the ongoing national conflict since late 2005 
between the loyalists’® who support the monarchy and the supporters of former Premier 
Thaksin Shinawatra (McCargo, 2009, p.55). Prior to that, confusion over responsibility for 
the attacks deepened in March 2004 when an arrested suspect alleged that two mling party 
members of parliament had planned the initial raid. Further partial explanation might be that 
elements in the army have sponsored violence to justify their claims to a stepped-up role in 
maintaining security in the south. However, criminal groups linked to local politicians and 
senior government figures, including Thaksin, were to blame despite the struggling for 
people-trafficking activities and narcotics (Strategic Comments, p.l).
iv. Diplomatic competency
An efficient way to access the outcomes of parliamentary diplomatic actors is to look at the 
performance if the actors. In this part, I will give a brief report on the Senate staff and the 
Secretariat of the Senate based on the thematical approach of sociological institutionalism. If 
I were to say that the relationship is similar to that of the senators and the Senate, a fact that 
would distinguish them from one another is that senators come and go in a fixed period of
The historical origins o f  conflict in the 3 Southernmost conflicts in Thailand can be traced back to territorial 
loss during the colonial period (late 19®’ century -  early 20'*’ century). The cultural and religious difference, 
militant insurgency has also aggravated the tension between thé people.
The loyalists refer to the supporters o f  the monarchy, the military, and the traditional institutions. See 
McCargo, 2008.
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time but most of the Senate staff stay from when they enter civil service in their early 20s 
until they officially retire at the age of 60. Therefore, the approximate duration of service 
would be 30-35 years, unless they choose to retire before their service ends. It is also possible 
that some staff might be transferred from one post to another within the Secretariat during 
their service period, at the same time transferring their existing knowledge and understanding 
from the previous duty towards the other. This explains, to an extent, that the majority of the 
Senate staff are responsible and understand their duties well, and are therefore ‘trainable’; 
able to leam new knowledge and skills that would enable them to develop their competency.
From the interview findings, one of the major concerns for the Secretariat staff when it comes 
to international diplomatic duties includes language competency and in-depth knowledge on 
specific issues. The lack of knowledge -  and courage -  to communicate is considered a 
hindrance for performing international duties as the staff need to be familiar with the whole 
procedure of the international missions. The Senate staff, from a personal observation, 
usually perform their duties according to familiarity. Another observation would be that 
senators who are not very spontaneous in communicating in English or who are not able to 
speak English at all would develop a habit of ‘tagging along’ in certain foreign trips due to 
the fact they happen to share a collective identity -  having been officially invited by the 
leader of the trip and being able to fit in with other delegate members on that trip’f In 
addition, senators going on international diplomatic trips would complete their duties 
according to previous examples and norms, therefore following a responsibility cycle. Each is 
orientated more or less towards the same idea of what is the right thing to do (MacCormick, 
1998, p.307). As a result, new ideas do not emerge and is considered, in my opinion, as a 
hindrance to their skills improvement. However, to judge from only the individual would not
” When mentioning about fitting into the group, it is referred to foreign visits where senators are from similar 
professional backgrounds, being either all appointed or all elected, and interestingly senators who are from the 
same region in Thailand where they speak the same regional dialect.
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be fair or relevant. If we consider the institutional part, there is no clarity in the structure. 
Although there are general regulations stating the expected qualifications of the senators and 
the expected duties to accomplish, there is no proper guideline on how the mission should be 
conducted. This omission has direct impact on the Senate staff, as they need to support the 
duties of the senators.
A suggestion that the Secretariat of the Senate should establish a proper institutional policy
on conducting foreign affairs was asserted by two interviewees. Both were secretariat staff,
one from the Protocol Group, Bureau of Foreign Affairs, and the other was from the policy
planning group. Bureau of Policy and Strategy. They also added that secretariat staff should
be more assertive in a sense that not only they aim to perform their duties and get the mission
completed, but they should also leam new things and transfer their, administrative skills in
future missions they are responsible for (interviewed 28 April and 2 May 2011 respectively).
However, the institutional norms shaped by the bureaucratic culture has automatically
influenced the Secretariat staff not to ‘encroach’ the skills and duties of the parliamentarians.
A fact from an interview with the Deputy Secretary-General on Human Resources emerged
that the Secretariat of the Thai Parliament used to be a single body, hence the name suggests,
and that it was responsible to serve both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Later,
in order to separate the work more proficiently and to support more Secretariat staff
professionally, the Secretariat was divided into 2 distinctive institutions. They have since
been responsible for each House (interviewed 3 May 2011). From a personal perspective,
having a separate secretariat like present is more beneficial in distributing the responsibilities
among staff and should be able to cover the administrative duties more efficiently. However,
an advice from the director of the personnel training group. Bureau of Human Resources
Development was that there has been discussions between the two secretariats about
establishing a joint centre that would overlook the international diplomatic duties of both
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Houses. This centre, in addition, would be the distributor and coordinator between the Thai 
parliament and other international organisations or establishments for which the Thai 
parliament holds membership. Moreover, the joint centre would also provide training as 
appropriate for secretariat staff who have direct responsibility in supporting the senators 
duties, both domestically and internationally (interviewed 3 May 2011).
As it has been explained, the relationship between the actor and the institution has two broad
dimensions; the senators and the secretariat of the senate staff respectively. The discussion
will now continue on the nature of the senators and senate staff working together. Earlier on,
the hypothesis was put forward that the Senate staff are in fact more active in performing
international parliamentary diplomatic duties. However, having gathered some information
from the semi-structured interviews, a point to counter-hypothesise has risen; neither the
senators or the senate staff have more capability than the other. All of them are individual
actors who happen to have different levels of education, experience, and knowledge of their
duties. Moreover, their positions within the institution would also prove to be crucial to
determining cind giving a framework to their responsibilities and decision-making. For
instance, if we look at the senators and the senate staff individually, they are a group of
individuals who perform according to their functions and have the underlying respect for
each other by seniority. Democratic theory also dictates that both staff and line officials have
their appropriate respective duties. Moreover, the objectives of the committee the senator
holds membership in would outline the position and duty framework for the senator. This
would inevitably encourage senators to pay official visits to countries in the same region or
outside the region that have expertise or professional accomplishments on issues concerning
that particular committee. If the facts about the tenure of senators and senate staff are
weighed down, senators would have more professional experience from their backgrounds
while senate staff would have intensive knowledge on the procedures of administration on
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domestic and international parliamentary duties. Therefore, these two groups of actors are 
able to coordinate their professional skills during parliamentary diplomatic missions. 
However, it is crucial that senators and senate staff do not overlap their duty frameworks. In 
the first part of the literature review, conceptualising diplomacy and defining parliamentary 
diplomacy revealed that it is an emerging path, of developing international relations. At the 
same time, we have considered an alternative approach. When talking about traditional 
diplomacy, we think of the customs and conducts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its 
actors; ambassadors that represent their country. However, if we assume that most of the 
governmental institutions follow the conventional diplomatic customs of the Foreign Office, 
then the Thai Senate does not count as such institution. The Senate, in fact, does not have a 
proper institutional policy.
V. Political engineering: constructing an institutional mechanism
The political culture of a country is considered a structural framework for the functioning of 
its institutions. Political engineering is a term used to define the mechanisms of an 
organisation where the performance of the members are adapted to suit the transnational 
flows of communication, capital, and knowledge (Trentmann, 1998, p.218). A well-structured 
institutional mechanism would be able to constitute towards an . efficient functioning of the 
government in a collective and international level, at the same time stimulate the professional 
realisation of the institution members to complete their duties. The choices new 
representative institutions make about ways they interact with other actors in systems of 
multi-level governance reflect institutional capacities and priorities. At times of constitutional 
change, however, decisions about institutional roles made are subject to the constraints of 
imperfect information (Downs, 2000, p.68).
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On a bureaucratic and norm-based approach, the spread of concepts and ideas through 
institutional paradigms are usually implemented to a higher level of competition in order to 
provide for better public services (Spano, 2009, p.329). Parliaments, as representatives of the 
people, are expected to provide information on government sittings, passing and scrutiny of 
bills. As a result, parliaments -  as well as other political institutions -  are obliged to readapt 
their internal structure and functionality so that they can maintain an efficient institutional 
mechanism. External surroundings including the political regime and government in power 
would also have impact on the internal structure of the institution. However, what matters 
more would be the duty outputs of the institutional actors and in the case of parliaments, 
transparency and accountability towards the people rather than a perfectly structured system. 
Then again, paradoxically, a well-structured parliament with a coherent policy outline would 
enable the institutional actors to perform their duties according to plan and provide a more 
efficient outcome. This is when the significance of political engineering emerges into the 
argument. Conditions that establish institutional recognition and anchoring of the democratic 
rules of the political game sufficient to stop slippage into authoritarianism may be seen as 
creating low levels of democratic consolidation, as high levels of democratic consolidation 
are associated with conditions which enable democratic institutions, processes, and culture to 
take deep root (Pasquino, 2002, p.230). A thought to consider when referring to adopting 
political engineering as means to restructure the institutional systems -  in this case the Thai 
parliament, the outlook for an effective institutional function would mean to revise the 
constitution, particularly the laws on composition of political parties which will lead to the 
qualifications of parliamentary candidates. Institutions are portrayed as instruments for 
control, learning and improvement. The identity of agents and principals are usually based on 
formal legal institutions and normative theories of sovereignty, superiority and subordination 
Therefore, a lack of effective accountability relations and processes undermines democracy
and that democratic accountability requires well-developed institutions (Olsen, 2013, p. 1-2).
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vz. Good governance in a democratic society
An argument on the Thai political culture and bureaucratic system is that the structure and 
performance of all governmental institutions in Thailand are inevitably shaped by the 
historical patronage system in the Thai society. It is a vddespread argument that the most 
common forms of government are bureaucratic hierarchies, however the present nature of 
national governments is that their governing structure has shifted more towards marketing 
and network. This raises a concerning question whether they are becoming less capable of 
getting their way or merely altered the ways in which they do so (Bevir, 2011, p.3). One 
senator from the Committee on Trade and Finance has asserted that the balance of power 
within the Senate, let alone the Thai parliament, has lost its accountability due to the fact that 
Thailand has an ‘external power’ apart from the authoritative power of parliament 
(interviewed 29 March 2011). The external power in this case would refer to the military; a 
brief explanation on how the military-dominated Thai political system relates to the 
governing model of the Thai parliament would be discussed briefly here. A study on 
organisational adaptation to complex environments arise primarily from the orientation of 
complexity theory towards systems rather than towards actors, and this lies in the all-too- 
ready assumption of environmental determinism (Child and Rodrigues, 2011, p.805). In the 
present situation of Thai politics, it is known that the military began to assert their influence 
in the politics of the country to increase the funds for the army just after the 2006 coup by 
expanding the powers of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in order to 
suppress antigovemment movements’’ (Jha, 2011, p.327).
”  Historically, the military has always been part o f Thailand’s political culture. Members o f  parliament and 
royal legal advisors would comprise o f senior military officials.
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A senator from the Committee on Education and the Committee on Trade and Finance,
further, also stressed the domination of the ‘external power’. In other words, they were saying
that the military and that does not reflect true democracy (interviewed March, 2010).
Moreover, elected senators are not really accepted by the majority of people, not to mention
among other appointed peers. The other problem is that senators are seen as unapproachable.
Thailand has got an ‘external power’ - the military. The definition for Thai politics now
would be semi-democratic, bureaucratic military-ruled. Most of the senators are also senior
military officials, therefore they would have a distinctive mind-set when they present their
opinions or perform their duties. There are a lot of capable people out there, but they are
restrained by the system and lack of freedom of speech. Moreover, another opinion from this
senator was that the appointment of senators does not provide the opportunity for competent
representatives, from his perspective referring to elected senators, to take position in the
House. In my opinion, the reason for the lack of competent senators is because bureaucracy
and elite politics have played a crucial role in shaping the Senate’s structure and the actors’
performance. It should appear that appointed senators are considered from their professional
records and the majority of them would be the more senior individuals, while the elected
senators are more likely to be younger senators. Nonetheless, when they all enter office then
there would be an inevitable situation of internal politics within the institution, among
appointed and elected senators. Reasons would most likely be from the different levels of
educational qualifications than professional experience because all senators are senior
experienced professionals on their own rights (Coghill, Holland, Donohue, Rozzoli, and
Grant, 2008, p.73-75). Suggestions on bureaucratic organisations were mostly focused on
Weber’s characterisation on public administration focusing on the role of the civil servant
and the bureaucratic machine in which he operated, impacting the person’s individual liberty
(Meyer, 1995, p.33). As senators are not permanent civil servants, but political servants, they
are obliged to perform their duties within the institutional framework. My argument here fits
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into the nature of sociological institutionalism as mentioned gradually in previous discussions 
that the actors’ perfoimance reflect their background. However, factors such as seniority or 
the taking on the position should not repress or limit the person’s ability to express and 
perform their duties to their fullest potential, although organisations have a concept of formal 
statements of missions and standards of conduct, as well as the corresponding of the formal 
structure and related physical objects; in other words official organisational structures 
(fermier, Slocum Jr, Fry, Gaines, 1991, p. 171).
Another recent public announcement from an elected senator from the Committee on 
Tourism” announced a statement that some elected and appointed senators agreed that the 
Constitution should be revised, particularly on the act where elected senators are not allowed 
to take a recurrent term in office. The revision of the Constitution would also clarify the 
doubts about power transfer within parliament through each consecutive incumbencies. 
Considerations on the willingness and agreements between the government, the opposition, 
and all senators are the main basis for decisions to amend the Constitution (Thairath 
Newspaper online, 6 December 2012). This statement can encourage readers to think about a 
separate dimension of political inequality that occurs not only within the wider society, but 
among a limited group of politicians. Moreover, the amendment of the Constitution’'*, from a 
critical perspective, can be seen as the ultimate procedure to improve the parity among 
senators. Considering the impact of hierarchy in any organisations, equal opportunities would 
lead a communicative contribution to real time negotiation and improvisation of policy 
manuals (Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren, 2009, p.4). However, legal practitioners who participate
Also holding membership in the Committee on Individual Ethics and Competency Scrunity for National Audit 
candidacies. A personal speculation is that this committee was specially formed and its duties have been 
emphasised after the termination o f  the former President o f the Senate’s position on a history o f fraud. This 
person, however, still holds senatorship in parliament.
A reminder that the Thai Constitution is a written document and has been amended 18 times since the regime 
change to Constitutional monarchy.
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in litigation try to understand legislation, some even try to misunderstand what an Act of 
Parliament says = or the conduct required under a set of Regulations (Crabbe, 2010, p. 12).
The major fact associated with the Constitutional amendment is directly related to my 
theoretical discussion on the authority of the Thai Senate in procedures on foreign diplomatic 
missions. From this previous public statement, at the moment it can be concluded that the 
senators’ performance is strictly conducted under the regulations of the Constitution. This, 
moreover, would justify their actions and limitations of decision-making in international 
diplomatic missions. In the following chapter, I will be discussing in detail on separate cases 
in the Southeast Asian region where senators in former and present incumbencies have had 
experiences in playing specific roles in international conflict resolution as well as 
international cooperation and integration.
The continuity of the actors’ position as a diplomatic actor or political entrepreneurship is, 
moreover, another important issue that has been discussed during the interviews. A statement 
on political and buieaucracy entrepreneurship gives an interpretation on the fact that 
individuals choose where they work for reasons potentially related to their entry into 
entrepreneurship, and driven factors would usually be personalities and risk attitudes 
(Sorensen, 2007, p.3 88). From the group of 11 senators interviewed, most of them considered 
pursuing a diplomatic career after their term finishes. Even though they may not have stated 
directly, but they have implied through the conversation that their professional backgrounds 
have evolved around making foreign connections. Their senatorship, in addition, has 
provided another dimension to maintain existing contacts and to build new relations with 
international parliamentary peers. However, the limitation about continuing a political career 
is the lack of funding, change of status -  senators would usually return back to their previous 
or background occupation.
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The other problem that is difficult to eliminate from Thai society concerns party politics, and 
specifically relates to vote buying, corruption (interviewed 28 March 2011). It has been stated 
earlier in the discussion that citizens who live in rural areas are likely to have less knowledge 
about politics than those who live in the city or those who have a politics-related career. The 
uneven distribution of economic wealth through Thai society, the structural background of 
social cleavages, the dominant role of traditional elites, and the exploitation by new populist 
leaders of the rural poor’s resentment of those elites are factors that can explain Thailand’s 
susceptibility to bouts of high-stake political conflict and continuing democratic fragility 
(Norton, 2012, p.47). As a result, it is more convenient for local politicians to bribe the local 
villagers into vote-buying in return of community benefits and welfare (Callahan, 2005, 
p.95). When the process of buying people into politics continues over and over again, the 
exercise of democracy will be disrupted. The main factor that influences this is also 
constitutional power: Thailand’s political instability has been obviously reflected through the 
constant revision and rewriting of the Constitution. Each written document has a set of 
similar and adapted rules, only the first 3 acts are taken as grounded statements; the state, the 
King, and the Constitution (Kitisin, 2008).
“The legitimacy crisis has also spread to the National Assembly which is no 
longer regarded as “Crand Forum of the Realm” that could help resolve political 
problems. The courts and independent bodies have all been criticised openly and 
with distrust. The ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the government and the 
National Assembly was clearly demonstrated throughout 2008. The Thai 
parliament passed less than 10 laws, while the bureaucracy abstained from doing 
their duties for fear of being scrutinised and accused of political partiality. A 
general feeling was that government officials were in ‘neutral gear’, thereby 
causing the administration of the country to slow down significantly”
(Uwanno, 2009, p.58).
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Another problematic issue is that while freedom of speech exists in principle, what you say 
may not be taken in seriously, and may be perceived to have adverse consequences. This all 
depends on who you are, your status in the society and your political position. Most people 
are refrained or limited to express their opinions and thoughts openly as it would not be 
appropriate and in certain cases might even probe risk to their personal security. 
Bureaucracies are products of stability, as they are designed to maintain course, to stabilise 
conditions, and to provide predictability amidst periods of uncertainty. The populace would 
be deeply affected when bureaucracies cease to reinforce social stability (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2006, p.978). Political institutions, in addition, are expected to respect and embody 
certain basic liberties or freedoms where all citizens can afford a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties (Richardson, 2007, p.390). The free expression of ideas, views and 
beliefs are encouraged by deliberation to help identify what people think and what is 
important to them” . Relating these scholarly facts to the issue on freedom of speech in 
Thailand, the patron-client bureaucratic culture refrains valuable opinions from members of 
the public which would help improve or to the least influence decision-making and policy 
implementation to be proceeded. Even if diverse opinions and critiques flow seemingly, most 
are not taken into account as seriously as they should” . In other words, opinions that would 
be taken into account would be those from specific elite groups; politicians, high ranking 
military officials, the upper-middle class, and part of the middle class. An example on the 
freedom of expression was that freedom of expression means the freedom to receive and 
impart opinions, information and ideas without hindrance, intimidation, or interference. It
”  See Blowers, Boersema, & Martin, 2005, p. 1 .Ideally, it should be possible for participants to express and 
understand the provenance and status o f  different viewpoints provided the process abides by agreed rules. 
Deliberation should encourage rational argument as well as enabling participants to articulate their experience 
and intuitive judgement.
”  Due to the social status o f the person giving the opinion, the particular issue being referred to, and the cultural 
“appropriateness” o f  addressing that issue in public. The theoretical approach on March and Olsen’s “Logic o f  
Appropriateness” may be relevant to support the discussion on problems o f freedom o f speech in Thailand, 
apart from the parliamentary actors’ performance which I have discussed earlier in the thesis.
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belongs to all persons and may be exercised through publishing and broadcasting, writing, 
speaking or through physical acts. Freedom of expression is a universal human right, 
enshrined in many international and regional instruments, most notably the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Martin, 2002, p.524). So to speak, the distribution of equality as regards to freedom of 
speech in the Thai society is still considered uneven.
vil. Public participation: a matter o f  interest or lack o f  information?
The matter of public participation is another consideration when studying the relationship 
between parliamentarians and members of the public. A crucial issue that has risen from the 
data collection with senators, senate staff, and a number of members from the public was that 
very little people know about the duties of the Senate. The initial .understanding was that the 
Senate are a distinguished group of professionals with extensive background and ‘help’ the 
members of the House of Representatives scrutinise legal drafts. Otherwise, senators are 
another group of politicians who attend regular meetings -  sittings -  at the Parliament house. 
Interestingly, a few of the interviewees fi*om this group has given a rather harsh comment on 
the image and performance of the Thai Senate, that we need not think further on the 
international diplomatic duties but the actors themselves should focus their attention on their 
responsibilities and duties within the institution and how it would benefit towards the people 
in a wider scope (interview with biology teacher, April 2011). Such issue can be related to 
theoretical discussions on political participation and civic engagement in politics. When 
considering this issue on the research context, it may not be as relevant to the main 
discussions and theoretical approaches. However, the issue on civic engagement and political 
participation would help clarify the explanation in the previous part on the background of
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Thai politics, as well as the nature of Thai political culture. Moreover, this issue highlights 
the part of the problem of democracy improvement in Thailand.
Civic engagement in Thailand, from the collected data, can be categorised into two general 
groups; the people who are interested in politics and those who are not interested. In another 
way to view this according to the nature of the Thai society would be the rural working class 
and the urban middle class^k The groups of people that are interested would mostly be from 
the working class in mral communities, and these are the people that are most likely to be 
drawn into politics by vote-buying. At the same time, the people who are not interested in 
politics are more likely to be the middle class. Reasons for members of the Thai middle class 
not having coherent political preferences -  being pro-democratic or not - would be from 
several factors including anger, resentment, lost of faith in politicians, and the clash of 
economic stability and the concurrent revision of the Constitution (Englehart, 2003, pp.256- 
265). The interaction between political context and civic engagement to better understand 
how the dynamic of governmental institutions, leadership or structural forces can shape the 
nature and consequences of civic engagement (Oxendine, Sullivan, Borgida, Riedel, Jackson 
and Dial, 2007, p.32).
However, another problem on the basis of political participation which endures not only in 
the Thai society but other societies is that the distribution of knowledge on political rights - 
including civic engagement - is still not widely proceeded. An opinion from a member of 
staff from the Bureau of International Organisations, the Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives (interviewed 2 May 2011) that might be able to counter-argue and triangulate
The categorisation between the rural working class and urban middle class is only used to point out the facts 
about civic engagement in Thailand, and to support the previous categorising points o f  interest groups and non­
interest groups. The main point does not intend to connote the lack o f  political knowledge and lack o f  access to 
politics in the society by class distinction.
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with other external opinions was that the citizens by nature do not understand the law^\ As a 
basis of an agricultural society, they would concern more whether they will be able to fill 
their stomachs by the end of the day. The group of citizens who would show interest in law 
would be the middle class or the upper-middle class. Also, law is a complicated matter, even 
for the middle class. Therefore, it would be even more complicated for the working class. My 
view towards this issue would be to look from both sides; the parliament and the public, as 
parliamentarians no matter being a member of the House of Representatives or member of the 
Senate are all representatives from the people. Findings from both parts are presented as 
follows; Parliament: only selected clips of sittings are broadcasted because government has 
not been very financially supportive in broadcasting parliamentary sittings - individual house 
and joint, or another assumption would be that they choose specific sessions to broadcast for 
a particular reason. On the public part: people do not have the basic knowledge about 
legislative affairs. Citizens who live in rural areas where information technology are not 
widely spread would usually have a lack of interest in political affairs -  in other words they 
would distant themselves from politics. The paradox, however, is that these groups of people 
would be the ones easily drawn into vote-buying when the general elections take place.
Whilst the value of parliamentarianism has been reinforced, the scepticism towards 
legislatures has in fact increased over the last decade. Trust in parliamentary institutions has 
been steadily declining as they have never been more active in developing mechanisms to 
engage with the public. As a result, concerns on parliament’s ability, its key actors, how 
much power the institution has and its level of ability to influence that power have all been 
criticised (Bandeira, 2012, p.266). However, on the Senate’s part, the Public Relations 
Bureau has been conducting projects in public relations, disseminating information of senate 
affairs to the public and strengthening their understanding about what the senate does and the
As this research is focused on Thailand, the citizens in this case would refer to Thai citizens.
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benefits it has. It is good to give basic knowledge to the public about parliamentary affairs, 
therefore strengthening their understanding on rights and values of the people in a democratic 
society. Unfortunately, the nature of Thai politics is that the majority of citizens, in particular 
people from the rural areas, are embedded in the habit of vote-buying. To this stage, lessons 
should be learnt from consequences in national elections -  one raised here from the 1996 
election. Problems including excessive use of money in the election campaigns, a widening 
urban-rural gap in voting behaviour, vote buying and violence including the assassination of 
canvassers characterise democratic development in Thailand (Bunbongkam, 1997, p. 154). 
Unless people understand the true value of citizen’s democratic rights, which would likely 
see a sudden improve in the near future, then corruption problems will continue. 
Parliamentary diplomacy is the system of representation with members of parliament being 
diplomatic actors. The relevance to the previous discussion on the value of citizen’s 
democratic rights and problems of corruption has been raised as a point for reflection on the 
importance of a stable democratic society. International diplomatic duties of parliamentarians 
are also considered as an opportunity for them to represent goodwill and democracy. The 
lessening of vote-buying, corruption, and electoral fraud depends on promoting good 
governance in a democratic society. Therefore, the relevance of parliamentary diplomacy for 
the elimination of corruption would require a united front in terms of stabilising and 
promoting democracy at the international level through the parliamentary diplomatic 
activities. Also, it will also reflect the parliamentarians’ values on democracy.
h. Conclusion: prospects o f  the Thai Senate as a future diplomatic institution 
At present, putting my arguments together along with the data collected from the semi­
structured interviews and official documents, it is possible to make a preliminary conclusion 
that the Thai Senate at its present stage does not have a definite outlook of developing into a
prominent diplomatic institution. Several external and internal factors are related to this
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conclusion. Part of the fact is that they do not have a concise policy model on foreign affairs, 
despite having a statement on how foreign affairs should be conducted and what outcomes 
are expected. Moreover, the senators are only temporary political representatives and perform 
their duties according to regulations stated in the Constitution. From this reason, most of 
them would only perform according to the requirements of their duties or special positions 
they hold. But then again, if the Constitution keeps on being revised and re-revised in the 
future, the chances of the senators’ duty framework would not likely be static.
In this chapter, a theoretical discussion on several themes that have risen according to the 
triangulated information from semi-structured interviews and document analysis have been 
stressed. The discussions combined with the obtained evidence were able to provide an
outlook of the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor. Not only facts about the actual functioning
of the Senate was provided, but also opinions and suggestions from the practitioners 
themselves were asserted. These points would be valuable guidelines for future improvement 
on the policy implementation and decision-making of parliamentarians in a democratic 
society. Existing measures of democracy often disregard direct role of citizens on policy 
issues - also referred to as direct popular decision making - an important democratic practice 
as more attention is put on the electoral connection between representatives and voters 
(Altman, 2012, p.2).
The data collected from the semi-structured interviews in Thailand has provided useful
information and proof to my main hypothesis, that parliamentary diplomacy has a
straightforward definition as its title. Nonetheless, the prospects of the Thai Senate in
becoming a potential parliamentary diplomatic actor can be possible if actors involved in the
parliamentary diplomatic process realise their potential and the values of developing
parliamentary diplomacy in the long term. The diplomatic actors, the senators and senate
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staff, have to work in tandem to develop parliamentary diplomacy. The senate staff support 
the senators, but also the senators duties (reflected through the senate or parliament as a 
legislative institution) supports the work of the administrative sector, that is the government.
All in all at present, the international diplomatic missions of the Thai Senate, or referring to 
the Thai parliament as a whole, are strictly aimed to be within the frame of supporting and 
strengthening democracy. The scope of this would include being within the institution, the 
society, and within the international community. There has been, however, public scrutiny 
that because they know very little about the Senate’s affairs, this is not an example of 
exercising true democracy. Other factors would be corruption, power politics, as well as 
favouritism in the government among political representatives. Consequently, the role of the 
Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor -  relating this back to the initial research focus on 
parliamentary diplomacy -  is that their decision-making authority is limited by the 
Constitution. However, the Senate as part of a bicameral parliament of Thailand can still be 
considered as an example of an active political actor in foreign affairs. Moreover, prospects 
on developing the Senate’s internal structure would be an advantageous method in improving 
the competency of its actors including senators and secretariat staff, thus improving collective 
performance of the Thai parliament.
In the following chapter, specific case studies including territorial disputes and the ASEAN 
regional corporation will be further discussed. The roles of the Thai Senate in parliamentary 
diplomatic duties will also be analysed from each conflict respectively, for the disputes may 
be able to point out the purposes and procedures of the international diplomatic duties of the 
Senate from a different angle -  in other words from the conventional parliamentary 
diplomatic activities that.have been discussed throughout this chapter.
179
Chapter 5: Case studies
Chapter 5
Case Studies on the Thai Senate’s Parliamentary Diplomatic Duties: 
Territorial Disputes and the ASEAN 2015 Community Development Plan
“While the diverse organisational forms and capacities of governments 
in Asia do not prevent economic integration or moves to bring regional 
countries together in shows of unity, they do make cooperation on many 
‘governance’ issues problematic. Actors and institutions at the domestic 
level influence the goals and strategies that governments, pursue in 
international negotiations”
(Hamilton-Hart, 2003, p.223).
The case studies on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and on the ASEAN 2015 
development plan are distinctive cases which are raised in this chapter to support my 
discussion on parliamentary diplomacy. The purposes of addressing these two cases are 
different; the border conflict case reflects an international situation where the President of the 
Senate represents the negotiating delegation -  but does not have any decision-making 
authority. On the case of the ASEAN 2015 regional integration, this is raised as a case where 
Thai senators are a separate group of political representatives from the Thai government and 
are expected to take part in the development plan. These two cases show that parliamentary 
diplomacy, interpreted from the activities of the Senate, can be initially explained as a 
rationality -  the Senate has been given more opportunities to represent the government on the 
border conflict case, and on the case of ASEAN 2015 is an easier and more convenient 
opportunity for senators to represent their constituency in an international level. Yet again.
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these cases emphasise more on the senators’ representation than formal decision-making in 
international diplomatic missions.
In the previous chapter, the discussion had been based on the analysis of the Thai Senate’s 
duties as a diplomatic actor. However, there are two separate cases that have risen during data 
triangulation; the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and the development of the ASEAN 2015 
community development plan respectively. These case studies are presented here to give 
examples of international situations where the actors from the Thai Senate have been present 
and are currently playing an important role respectively. On the border conflict situation, the 
role of the former President of the Senate^  ^ as part of the negotiating team with Foreign 
Ministry diplomats and other government members in conflict resolution and 
representativeness of legislation will be discussed. Although they may not hold the major role 
in decision-making, yet they were part of the negotiating team so this would count as being 
present and having experience in a foreign diplomatic setting. On the ASEAN 2015 
development plan, further, the discussion on this case is elaborated in order to present the 
senators’ perspectives on the importance of regional stability and coordination. Discussions 
on purposes of the senator’s participation and performance on these cases of international 
diplomatic missions will also be included. Moreover, internal and external impacts on the 
senators’ duties in these respective cases will be explained so as to indicate the level of 
effectiveness when they represent the country as parliamentary diplomatic actors.
The information obtained from the interviews did in fact fit into ASEAN initial objectives as 
a regional institution in promoting a sense of community and creating awareness of 
consolidating unity in diversity (ASEAN 2015 handbook). Another way to think about these 
two issues would concern conflict resolution in the region in order to strengthen international
The President o f  the Senate from April 2008-February 2010.
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relations among neighbouring countries, promote democracy in the region, and enhancing 
governmental correspondence for simultaneous collaboration. The development of resources, 
processes, and skills necessary to sustain and develop cultures of peace in non-violent 
conflict resolution provides the fundamental basis for a global 'p^ace praxis' (Woodhouse, 
2000, p.8). Amongst Southeast Asian political elites, there is a sense of community based on 
shared interest in regime survival to avoid the costs of outright conflict and on a rudimentary 
underlying regional culture (Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 2003, p.l). These 
examples are related to my theoretical discussions on the factors that influence parliaments to 
emerge and develop their institutional competency in foreign affairs, enhancing abilities on 
decision-making and policy implementation. Power of domestic and international level 
variables varies in consistent ways across the different stages of a territorial dispute and 
differences in the political accountability of democratic leaders can be used to explain 
opposing patterns of accommodative as well as conflictual behaviour by democratic states 
(Huth and Allee, 2002, p.755).
The cognition and motivation of power holders’ behaviour disproportionately influences and
has bigger impact on negotiations than those of their powerless counterparts, as a result
military and diplomatic policies are adopted by democratic leaders through multiple stages of
international disputes (De Dreu, 2005, p. 150). New circumstances require a redefining of
existing skills or the development of new ones. Institutionalising new training curricula to
provide managerial, technical and leadership competency for government administrators has
become imperative now more than ever before in almost every profession. Unless other
structural problems are also addressed then building new competencies will not necessarily
fix all the existing institutional problems (Awortwi, 2010, p.724). A reflective analysis from
the Thai-Cambodian border conflict issue and the ASEAN 2015 community development
plan will then demonstrate the level of competitiveness of the parliamentary actors’
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competency and responsibilities when it comes to dealing with a formal international 
situation where collaboration and decisions are required for improving the situation.
a.Territorial disputes along the borders o f  Thailand
Disputes between neighbouring countries either along the borderline or between governments 
constitute inevitable causal factors that mainly occur from political proximity issues and the 
exercising of administrative power. Borders have been conceptualised as lines of separation 
that divide social, economic, and political spaces. A previous discussion on territorial 
proximity has been mentioned earlier on in chapter 2. While geographers see this territorial 
space as being driven by a bordering process entailing both management functions and 
demarcation, political scientists have concentrated on the power relations involved in that 
management and demarcation including border reconfiguration (Simmons, 2005, p.827). In 
addition, a few common understandings on the concept of territorial cohesion are aimed at 
ensuring development in all regions—geographically be they rural, urban, sparely populated, 
peripheral, mountainous, coastal, in accordance with their own territorial capital. Then on the 
economic side, territorial cohesion seeks to find the most appropriate balance between 
territorial measures to ensure social cohesion, increase economic competitiveness, and strive 
for sustainable development (Van Well, 2012, p .l550).
In this part, three border conflict cases will be raised as examples to present the roles of
former senators who have taken part and had impact in the negotiating process of persuading
the other foreign part to improve its situation. The bilateral disputes that will be discussed
about are presented respectively as follows; the Myanmar case on democracy, the Thai-
Cambodian border conflict, and the problem on the three Southernmost provinces. Each of
these border conflict cases would reflect different levels of authority and positions of the Thai
senators in certain situations. Moreover, the position of the senators and their professional
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impact in each scenario will provide a further explanation on the institutional dimension on 
the senator’s position as parliamentary diplomatic actors.
i. Myanmar: military junta and democracy
Myanmar -  formally known as Burma -  is a neighbouring country to Thailand to the West. 
The main problems in Myanmar that have triggered tension in an international level include 
drug trafficking, refugees, and democracy. There has been series of diplomatic engagements 
to handle borderland security and domestic situations in Myanmar during the last few 
decades. The case on the Myanmese-Thai relations where a Thai senator has been active as 
regards conflict resolution has been raised as an issue in order to support this argument on 
territorial dispute. During the period of 2000-2006, Mr. Kraisak Choonhavan^° was senator 
and Chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and was active in the promotion of 
democracy in Myanmar^b There has always been an, underlying problem on democracy in 
Myanmar, therefore Mr. Kraisak played an important role in promoting democracy with the 
Myanmese military government.
A series of events were organised as follows; the Thai government lent the Myanmese 
government 7,000 million baht for the laying of gas pipes, 40 million baht for drug 
trafficking elimination, and a large amount of loans for a planned road construction through 
Thailand-Myanmar-India. Due to the instability of the domestic situation in Myanmar, 
Mr. Kraisak even suggested that Myanmar should withdraw its ASEAN membership if there 
are no improvements regarding democracy. The continuity of Myanmar’s membership in 
ASEAN would not make any difference, at the same time ASEAN’s negotiating ability has
Mr.Kraisak Choonhavan, senior academic and politician, is the son o f  former Thai Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan (in office from 1988 to 1991 -  disposed by military coup d’etat).
At present, Mr. Kraisak is President o f  the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), which is 
composed o f like-minded ASEAN members o f  parliaments who work together towards instituting democracy 
and restoring freedom in Myanmar.
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gone completely downhill (information retrieved 20/2/2013). There are innumerable defense, 
security, and intelligence agencies on policy implementation and coordination with roles and 
responsibilities concerning borderland matters on Myanmar, especially organisations 
concerned with the political relationship with Rangoon. The management of local cross- 
border and provincial commerce, refugee issues, immigration and counter-narcotics (Ball, 
2003, p. 18).
During the period of the National Legislative Assembly -  the period following the military 
coup to oust former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which was also the period after 
Mr. Kraisak Choonhavan was Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee -  there was a 
courtesy call from Ms. Susan Sutton, Political Councellor front the American Embassy in 
Thailand to Mr. Pichai Vasnasong, Chairperson of the National Legislative Assembly 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Both parties exchanged views on the situation in Myanmar 
and the U.S prospects towards the situation (10 October 2007). This reflects an urge to solve 
the problems on democracy in Myanmar, and that the issue has clearly been an ongoing 
problem from the previous incumbency. There is a complicating factor in interactions 
between justice and sanctions. In the Myanmar case, the United States was reported in 
August 2010 to be consulting key stakeholders and partners about an international 
commission on alleged junta war crimes^T However, the expanding reach of universal 
jurisdiction and the global anti-impunity movement may undermine the utility of 
international sanctions (David and Holliday, 2012, p. 122).
The Irrawaddy Magazine, N ew s on Myanmar (2010) in David and Holliday, 2012.
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a.Border conflict issue: Thailand -  Cambodia
THAILAND
LAOS
Source: http://www.vaitor.com/?p=2272 (retrieved 19/1/2013).
Originally published at Siam Voices / Asian Correspondent on April 11, 2011
Thailand and Cambodia have had a long relationship history, being neighbouring countries 
and sharing territorial borderlines. A recent ongoing conflict was disputed about the Preah 
Vihear Temple^T Cambodia had been wracked by a civil war and a series of brutally 
repressive governments that had cost the country millions of lives for over twenty years. 
Negotiations for conflicts in Cambodia were held under the auspices of ASEAN, which 
succeeded in bringing the interested parties together for discussions, overcoming several 
obstacles (Hampson, 1996, p. 171-178). In this part, the border conflict between Thailand and 
Cambodia will be highlighted as an international situation where the former President of the 
Senate from 2008-2011 has played an important part in the negotiating process. International 
negotiation emphasises competition, autonomy, and rationality over cooperation, 
relationality, and independence. The negotiation context, as such, can exert an indirect effect 
on negotiation outcomes as the expression of creativity of individual negotiators are 
influenced (De Pauw, Venter, Neethling, 2011, p.43-44). As the border conflict incident is
The Preah Vihear temple is a UNESCO Heritage site which is situated near the Thai-Cambodian border. The 
dispute has erupted from an issue about the entrance from the Thai side. See Q&A: Thailand-Cambodia Temple
Dispute, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/woiid-asia-pacific-12378001. 14/9/2011 (retrieved 24/10/2012).
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still a lengthy ongoing debate between the two governments, the following discussion will be 
examining the role of the Senate as a legislation representative in conflict resolution.
The former President of the Senate played a crucial role as part of the negotiating team during 
the height of tension along the border in December 2010 when 2 Thai citizens were arrested 
and sentenced up to 8 years imprisonment in Panom Phenh. The accusations against them 
concerned illegal border crossing and spying for the govemment*'^. The sentence, however, 
immediately followed the successful conclusion of the seventh meeting of the Joint 
Commission for Bilateral Cooperation between Thailand and Cambodia (JC) at which both 
countries had agreed to extend cooperation in all areas and to hold a meeting of the Joint 
Commission on Demarcation for the Land Boundary (JBC) in Thailand in the near future®^
“Border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia that caused dozens of 
casualties and displaced thousands have challenged the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to finally turn its rhetoric on peace and security 
into action. Between the listing and the fighting in February there were many 
occasions for the two sides to talk. The prime ministers met either in each 
other’s capital or on the sidelines of regional forums. Foreign ministers had the 
. same opportunities, as well as an annual set piece Thailand-Cambodia Joint 
Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JC) session. All included relevant 
interior ministry, police, customs, intelligence and foreign ministry officials.
Each Thai administration from 2008 to 2011 has an inward focus because of the
See BBC News: Cambodia profile timeline 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13006828. 6/9/2012 (retrieved 26/9/2012).
See “Border Clashes between Thailand and Cambodia”, European Parliament Resolution o f 17 February on 
the border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia, Official Journal o f  the European Union, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:188E:0057:0059:EN:PDF (retrieved 
26/09/2012).
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country’s political volatility. Changes in leaders and ministers, as well as the 
turnover of key working-level officials, also made bilateral policymaking 
difficult. Problematic interpretations of the constitution added to diplomatic 
inertia”.
. (International Crisis Group Asia Report no.215,2011, pp.7-9)
The former President of the Senate^  ^ and a senator who was President of the Committee on 
Constitutional Organisation Affairs and Public Accounts have stressed that there are several 
channels for the Thai parliament - referring to both Houses - to build and strengthen 
international relations with foreign counterparts; for instance the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU), ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPA), and other bilateral friendship groups 
referring to parliamentary friendship groups. Considering the border conflict issue, this 
senator has mentioned that the committee had a brief meeting with the French President of 
the Constitutional Court during an official visit to France. Critical discussions during that 
meeting concerned the role of parliament as maintaining a critical balance in the separation of 
powers® .^ Comments from the French President of the Constitutional Court were that the 
separation of powers in Thailand seems to be problematic, based on information from the 
conflicts and political transitions that had occurred during the past few years. Moreover, on 
another occasion, during a Thai-Cambodian Parliamentary friendship group meeting in 
Phnom Penh prior to the breakout of the border conflict, the President of the Senate of 
Cambodia had suggested that trade prospects between the two countries would have been in 
better terms^\
The main person interviewed for this research; referred to Mr. Pfasobsook Boondech, President o f the Senate 
during April 2008 to February 2011 incumbency.
The separation o f power consists o f the administration, the legislative, and the judiciary. These three sectors 
maintain the balance o f  government.
After the breakout o f  the border conflict, Cambodia has shifted its trade and cultural relations towards 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan (interviewed March 2011, Bangkok).
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As a result, the border conflict as viewed from the Cambodian President of the Senate was a 
major obstacle for international cooperation especially for neighbouring countries. A 
comment from the Legal Advisor, Secretariat of the Senate (interviewed 3 May 2011, 
Bangkok) was that during a recent joint sitting with the Foreign Affairs Minister, one senator 
advised on establishing a special sub-committee on the Thai-Cambodia conflict to monitor 
the situation*^. Not only Thailand has problems on political unrests, but if Cambodia were 
included into the argument then this would give a clearer picture of harsh civil situations. 
Problems on civil administration^®, police and judicial support, economic revival and 
development, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring and training, and even a 
degree of leadership are underlying problems in countries with civil conflict (Malone, 2003, 
p.71). In the case of Cambodia, the necessary rule of law cannot be provided as legal 
institutions were virtually destroyed when they became under attack and under­
institutionalised before the outbreak of conflict (Barria and Roper, 2005, p.6).
The attendance of the former President of the Senate during the negotiating process, 
moreover, can be critically seen from two perspectives. Firstly, the attendance is officially 
part of the Thai delegation to represent the legislative sector. Secondly, the professional 
background of the former President of the Senate may also be another factor that emphasises 
on the reason he was selected as part of the negotiating team. Being a former judge in the 
Constitutional Court may also have had beneficial reasons for the Thai government 
negotiating team. A personal assumption is that the former President of the Senate must have 
attempted to negotiate and discuss with Cambodian governmental representatives to pardon 
or, if possible by law, release the two Thai citizens who were sentenced. However, the
The use o f the term ‘recent sitting’ was based on the studied incumbency o f  2008-2011 at the time o f  the 
interview, May 2011.
On this study, countries with civil unrest that were specified on were Namibia, Cambodia, and Former 
Yugoslavia. See Barria, L.A. and Roper, S.D. (2005), “Providing justice and reconciliation: The criminal 
tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia” in Human Rights Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5-26.
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strength of his negotiating conversation may not have been taken into account as much as that 
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry team. As a result, it may be likely that the President of the 
Senate may have to request a pardon or for some consideration to lessen the penalty in a more 
private manner, depending on the level of relationship between the two parliaments. Coming 
back to the issue on the two Thai prisoners in Cambodia, this matter of requesting for 
pardoning of the Thai political prisoners has been carried on continuously to the current 
government®  ^(See Appendix 4).
Following on from the territorial matter of the border conflict. Prime Minister Hun Sen of 
Cambodia has criticised former Thai Prime Minister and opposition cabinet leader Abhisit 
Vejjajiva on linking the border conflict issue with internal political conflicts. The Cambodian 
Prime Minister stated that the former Premier Abhisit has made claims relating to ousted 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on maritime territorial rights. The Cambodian Premier 
claimed that the Thai government has become more indifferent towards the border conflict 
over Preah Vihear temple, in exchange of benefits on natural resources including fuel and 
gas. Therefore, former Prime Minister Abhisit should provide legal evidence on these claims 
(Thairath online, 7/6/2011).
Another news source on the Thai-Cambodian relations has announced that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Thailand has announced to end diplomatic relations with Cambodia, in 
response to Cambodian Premier Hun Sen appointing sentenced former Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra as his personal advisor and as economic advisor to the Cambodian 
government. The statement on cutting diplomatic ties with Cambodia were stated accordingly
®' Since the military coup in 2006 to oust former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there has been 2 prime 
ministers up to present; Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva (2006-2010) and Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra (2010 to present). Ms. 
Yingluck is the first female Premier and youngest sister o f former Prime Minister Thaksin. From this reason, 
there has been a lot o f political conspiracy about family connections running the country.
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as follows; the Thai government has informed the Cambodian government on various 
occasions that international relations should be. the priority than personal relations. Therefore, 
any actions on the Cambodian part regarding Mr. Thaksin cannot be categorised from the 
Thai-Cambodian bilateral relations as Mr. Thaksin is sentenced as a national criminal. In 
addition, the appointment of Mr. Thaksin as an economic advisor and as a personal advisor is 
considered as politically offence to the Thai government. This is inevitably considered as an 
insult and denial to the Thai legal system. The Thai government, consequently, has decided to 
withdraw its ambassador from Phnom Penh and reconsider diplomatic relations with 
Cambodia supported by public opinion and general high levels of disappointment. Further 
decisions regarding Thai-Cambodian diplomatic relations will aim for the well-being of their 
peoples and to lessen the tension between Cambodia and other ASEAN member countries 
(Naew-Na News, 6/11/2009).
Possibility fo r  pardon? the Imprisonment o f  Veer a and Ratri in Cambodia 
The case of two Thai citizens, Mr. Veera Somkwamkid and Ms. Ratri Pipattanapaiboon, 
currently imprisoned in Cambodia on espionage has caused a long-term strain to the relations 
between Thailand and Cambodia. They were arrested in December 2010 and sentenced to 8 
years imprisonment. This attached letter is a current update on the situation; a request for 
pardon from the Thai Prime Minister, Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra during the 2C‘ ASEAN 
Summit in Phnom Phenh. Considerations for pardon, as stated in the letter, has been forward 
to the Cambodian Ministry of Justice. Therefore, decisions should be made and informed to 
the Thai government in due course.
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Border conflicts aggravating strains on bilateral relationships
Border conflicts inevitably aggravate tension and strain between governmental relations. In 
the Thai-Cambodian case, the imprisonment of two Thai citizens on suspicion of espionage, 
although it may seem as a separate issue and not directly relevant to the border conflict 
dispute, it is considered a strain which adds up to the tension already existing between the 
two governments. As mentioned previously in the text, this matter has been carried out 
continuously from the previous government. This case has been raised to highlight the role of 
the former President of the Senate as part of the negotiating team by stressing the former 
president’s professional background as senior judge from the Constitutional court. Although 
his authority during the negotiating process was not utilised accordingly to his professional 
background, the request for the pardoning of the 2 Thai prisoners was a continuing case 
where the former president was present.
The possibility of granting a pardon or releasing the Thai prisoners would be based upon a 
re-consideration of the case regarding the intentions of the two Thai citizens and the 
circumstances of both governments at the time of sentencing the prisoners. If the pardoning 
of these 2 citizens were to be approved as officially requested in the letter, then the strain 
between the Thai and Cambodian government may lessen. At the time of writing® ,^ one of the 
prisoners -  Ratri Pipattanapaiboon -  has been released from prison on pardon. Nonetheless, 
the decision to pardon or release these two Thai citizens should be made according to the 
rightful situation -  based on evidence, not favouratism or taking sides. From the researcher’s 
opinion, the border conflict and the imprisonment of Ratri and Veera are separate cases - the 
latter happened to trigger the heat of tension already existing along the border line. As a 
result, both representatives from the governments of Thailand and Cambodia would have to
®" Details on the pardoning o f  Ms. Ratri, updated 22 February 2013.
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continue negotiating on the situation so that no more serious military clashes would occur in 
the future.
As of the latest situation on the request for pardon for the two Thai prisoners, Ms.Ratri 
Pipattanapaiboon has been released from prison on the occasion of the royal cremation of the 
late King Narodom Sihanouk (source Thairath Online, 1/1/2013). This is considered as 
another step reflecting the effectiveness of bilateral relations between the two countries. In a 
way the pardon of this prisoner can be perceived as results of persuasion that may have 
happened from existing relations between former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. This relationship has continued to the current cabinet 
lead by Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, current Prime Minister and younger sister of former 
Premier Thaksin Shinawatra. The impact of personal relations between state leaders, level of 
coordination, political proximity, power competition and relations between political leaders 
all contribute to the effectiveness of the negotiating process. Negotiation theory has evolved 
in a cultural context that can be based on knowledge and information, cognitive and 
behavioural competencies. Competition and rationality over interdependence, cooperation 
and emotionality, and autonomy have always been emphasised during negotiating processes 
(Koc-Menard, 2009, p.335). The governmental relations between the former Thai Prime 
Ministers and the Cambodian Prime Minister has highlighted situations where personal 
relations between politicians have influenced power proximity.
Another piece of news came recently when Ms. Ratri Pipattanapaiboon attended a meeting
with Airforce General Wirawit Kongsak, senator from the Human Rights Committee. Ms.
Ratri gave a statement on human rights while being imprisoned and criticised the previous
government (led by PM Abhisit) on the basis that the government did not pay much attention
to the welfare and well-being of prisoners. Mr. Veera Somkwamkid, the other Thai prisoner
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still held under custody in Cambodia, has been prohibited from reading books and 
COmmUfricating with Thai people. TTie reason is because the Cambodian authority sees him as 
a threat to their government. Ms. Ratri has claimed that the Thai authorities did not carry out 
their investigation as thoroughly as they should. Moreover, she claimed that the treatment of 
Mr.Veera in prison is against human rights. Therefore, she has reported this matter to the 
Senate Committee on Human Rights to address the authorities to help negotiate with the 
Cambodian government in transferring Mr.Veera to receive penalties and be sentenced under 
Thai law (Thairath online, www.thairath.co.th/content/pol/325275. retrieved 9/2/2013). This 
issue on Ms.Ratri’s statement to the Human Rights committee has reflected different relations 
between previous Thai governments and Cambodia. An assumption was that relations 
between former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Cambodian Premier were beneficial 
towards each other -  most likely in terms of business, therefore when he was ousted by the 
military coup then it may have strained relations with the Cambodian government. This 
would then inevitably affect the Thai-Cambodian bilateral relations with the following 
democrat-led government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejj aj iva.
Suggestions to help improve the situation were that the Thai Senate should aim to strengthen
the capacity of the committee and the friendship groups; representation and authority in
decision-making. This would also have to depend on policies and initiatives of the President
of parliament -  which is the President of the House of Representatives -  and the President of
the Senate on foreign affairs. And this would help benefit the public and private sectors.
Evidence from the Secretary of the Thai-Cambodian friendship group (interviewed 2 May
2011) stated that a delegation from the Thai Senate visited the Cambodian Senate shortly
prior to the outbreak of the conflict. The summary of the discussion was that trust is very
important during times of conflict. Parliamentarians, as representatives of the people, need to
trust each other during official parliamentary visits. Geniality and a strong work ethic are also
194
Chapter 5 : Case studies
important facts that senators should always bear in mind. From this senator’s opinion, 
international diplomatic duties are not only the Foreign Ministry’s responsibility but all Thai 
citizens in every sector of the society, where it be agriculture, education, business, academia.
From the territorial dispute cases raised for discussion in this part, we can see that members 
of the Thai government all need to take part in solving the problem by lessening the tension 
to maintain a steady bilateral relation -  if not always a pleasant and harmonious one. 
Considering the role of the Senate in these territorial disputes, members of the Senate in 
different incumbencies have been key figures in handling the situation. On the Myanmese 
and Southernmost conflicts, the attempt to promote and strengthen democracy in the area has 
always gradually been encouraged. In this context, the discussion on territorial disputes has 
remained a current issue. The case of the Myanmese-Thai conflict, is particularly noteworthy 
here, as evidence has been provided based on available information dated as further back as 
2000. Although there are historical facts that underlie these territorial disputes, they have 
however been omitted from the discussions as the arguments here are more to do with current 
factors. The shifts of worldly state affairs have enhanced international cooperation in every 
level. In managing the struggle between governments on the one hand and markets on the 
other hand, governments will need to find new ways to cooperate in order to build more 
innovative regional and global institutions (Ikenberry, 1998, p.2). From the evidence, 
moreover, Mr. Kraisak Choonhavan has given early reference on the Thai-Cambodian 
conflict situation that there have been three Prime Ministers on the Thai government part, 
while there has been only one Prime Minister on the Cambodian part. The understanding and 
decision-making ability, therefore, is seen to be more beneficial towards the Cambodian 
government. It can then be concluded that the strategic plan in dealing with border conflicts 
and territorial disputes depends on the understanding of the country’s leaders of the situations
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and concerning the continuity of the resolution plans as well as the political values of the 
government leaders (interviewed 5/5/2012).
Hi. The insurgenciess in the 3 Southernmost provinces: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat 
The conflict in the three Southernmost provinces acts as a different dimension on the role and 
activeness of the Senate as a diplomatic actor. The reason for adding this statement to 
distinguish the Southernmost conflict from the two previous territorial disputes is that the 
Southernmost conflicts are considered as more to do with internal diplomacy rather than 
external diplomacy between , parliaments. This case has been added to the discussion on 
territorial disputes to strengthen the arguments on the Senate as a diplomatic actor, by 
presenting a contradictory case where the senators need to be alert in lessening domestic 
violence. Although the situation in the Southernmost provinces has not yet been resolved, 
political representatives are all aware about the ongoing conflicts. The level of coordination 
and control over the situation, nonetheless, differs within each sector.
The senators who represent the three Southernmost provinces also represent the large Muslim 
population from that area. Their impact in solving the insurgency has not been particularly 
effective with regard to the conflict resolution on the Thai-Myanmese issue or to the Thai- 
Cambodian conflict. In the previous two conflicts, members of the Senate were more active 
in attempts to reduce the tension in the situation, if not resolving it totally. A non-standing 
committee on monitoring the Southernmost conflicts has been established to follow up on the 
situation and the well-being of the citizens who live in the troubled area®\ From examples of 
the schedules of this non-standing committee, visits to the Southernmost provinces and other
A schedule on the official visit, the non-standing committee on monitoring the Southernmost conflict can be 
seen as followed (original document in Thai). Non-standing committees function on specific cases in the 
country where extra monitoring and scrutiny is deemed necessary. Also, the chairperson o f this non-standing 
committee is a military general. This fact inevitably reflects the authority o f  the military over domestic 
insurgencies, although it may not be as directly portrayed in the Senate as in other political bodies. 
http://www.senate.so.th/w3c/senate/Dictures/comm/545/file_1363942445.odf (retrieved 1/4/2013).
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provinces nearby in the area reflect a typical attendance to formal briefings with local 
executives. When relating the nature of these provincial visits to international diplomatic 
missions abroad, they bear similarities in terms of places and people they visit.
The conflict along the Thai-Malaysian border is distinctively different from the territorial 
dispute along the West -  with Myanmar, and along the East -  with Cambodia. The most 
distinctive conflict here is the Thai-Cambodian conflict, as the matter is concerned with a 
UNESCO world heritage site and legal reconsideration has been stressed forward to the 
World Court, the Hague. The Myanmese conflict is similar to the Southernmost conflict in 
terms of militant unrests having an ongoing impact on the state of democracy in the country -  
referring to Myanmar and Thailand respectively. The difference is that in the Myanmese case 
a former senator and chairperson of the foreign affairs committee (Mr.Kraisak) has put 
himself forward to endeavour to persuade the then military - dictator government to stabilise 
the country’s democratic situation.. It also alerted attention from the United Nations and 
international peace.
The Southernmost provinces case, on the other hand, do not attract as much global attention
yet is still a concern within the region, as it is an internal dispute which does not exceed
beyond the Thai-Malaysian border. Nonetheless, the conflict has become so more critical that
former ASEAN Secretary-Gênerai Dr. Surin Pitsuwan urged responsible authorities to
consider special administrative regions as a potential solution to reduce insurgencies in these
three southernmost provinces (Thairath Online, 22/3/2013). A special administrative region
for the conflict in the Southernmost conflict would act as a separate unit in coordination with
the central government to tackle with unpredicted violence among the ethnic minorities in the
provinces. Although the southernmost provinces are along the Thai-Malaysian border line,
the insurgency does not extend beyond the border. According to the former ASEAN
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Secretary-General, the Thai government is determined to take control over the insurgencies in 
the Southernmost provinces in order to avoid international intervention or, in a worse 
scenario, regional sanctions.
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan®' ,^ former ASEAN Secretary-General has stated recently that he agrees 
with the government’s plan of negotiating with the Southernmost militants. However, the 
government needs to clarify the persons involved in the discussion, the topic to be discussed, 
and the structure of the organisation. He also stressed that another matter to consider 
critically is the capability of the Thai government representatives in taking control of the 
situation, as it would be more ideal than leaving the situation to deteriorate to the point that 
international intei*vention is necessary. As for “Mahanakom Pattani”®^ or the special 
administrative region governed under the Constitution in order to tackle the insurgency and 
preserve the security of citizens in the Southernmost provinces (Thairath online, 22/3/2012). 
Additional information from the King Prajathipok Institute of Democracy on “Mahanakom 
Pattani” will be presented here briefly to elaborate the initiative so as to set up this special 
administrative region. According to the report, longitudinal findings from interviews and 
public speeches have been gathered from 2009-2011 among various groups of 
representatives; academics, local citizens, former underground members, ethnic Buddhist- 
Muslim representatives.
“The governing system must be under the democratic rules stated in the 
Constitution and must assure political sovereignty and equality to all sectors in the
®'* Dr. Surin Pitsuwan served as 12*'’ ASEAN Secretary-General from 2008-2013. He was member o f parliament 
for Nakom Sri Thammarat in 1986, and is Muslim from a family o f Malay descent.
(translated as “Pattani Mahanakom: Special Administrative Region under the Constitution, a peaceful method in 
conflict resolution”).
www.deepsouthwatch.org (retrieved 2/2/2013).
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community. The governing body should comprise of ethnic Buddhist and Thai- 
Melayu Muslim citizens from the Southernmost provinces to encourage equal 
opportunities. Most importantly, the governing system in the Southernmost 
provinces should promote public participation and policy monitoring according to 
Section 281 in the Constitution on local governance by citizens. Local candidates 
for the special administrative region governing committee should be scrutinised in 
order to build trust among the people in the area and the official language should 
be both Thai and Melayu. Education systems should be a combination of formal 
education to comply with the Education Ministry policy and religious education.
More specifically, religious law should be enacted in particular laws on family, 
inheritance, and social ethics in provinces where the majority of population are 
Muslim”(King Prajathopik Institute for Democracy project handbook, 
www.deepsouthwatch.org).
A specific discussion on Pattani Mahanakom has not been mentioned during interviews with
senators who represent the three Southernmost provinces. Nonetheless, the initiative on
Mahanakom Pattani has drawn attention from public and private sectors, including the
parliament. Members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been active in
following up and monitoring the situation. Notwithstanding this, the Southernmost conflict is
considered a historically sensitive issue. The plans for establishing this special administrative
region should be developed carefully, as the former ASEAN Secretary-General has stressed
that the security of the local people and the compromise between ethnic minorities should be
considered the priority in putting forward any formal decisions. This fact on the citizens’
security and welfare, moreover, can be applied to other territorial disputes and domestic
conflicts. In this respect, not only senators who represent the Southem provinces should be
active in the conflict resolution plan, but senators in every position should coordinate
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according to their professional knowledge. Therefore, senators would have the opportunity to 
be active in internal diplomacy while negotiating and coordinating with other government 
representatives in structuring efficient governing policies. Being part of the central 
government, the senators’ duty in legislative scrutiny can also contribute to governing policies 
of the special administrative region in the future once it is officially approved for function.
Despite the different nature of each conflict mentioned above, they all share one main 
similarity -  the restoration of peace, the maintenance of cooperation, and democracy in the 
region. At present, the urge to resolve the disputes would also comply with the ASEAN 2015 
integration plan on the strengthening of regional unity among diversity. According to the 
Inter-Parliamentary handbook on parliaments and security control, not all conflicts pose a 
threat to peace and security in democratic societies. It is often that tensions escalate beyond 
control and turn into violent conflict in the absence of well-functioning democratic 
institutions. Freedom of expression in a democracy allows people to relay their views to their 
elected representatives. In turn, these representatives have the task of discussing and 
weighing the issues at stake through a public debate, thus enabling democracies to seek 
viable compromises and defuse conflict having the support of society at large (IPU handbook, 
2009, p. 15^.
The context of these territorial dispute cases are presented to demonstrate the attempt of the 
Thai and foreign governments in conflict resolution, whether it be territorial conflicts 
(Cambodia), civil unrest in a neighbouring country (Myanmar), and internal disputes among 
ethnic minorities in Thailand. The similarities of these territorial disputes is that the Thai 
government representatives -  including the senators -  all intend to promote and secure a
Parliaments can also contribute to peace and security in creating legal parameters for security issues.
Members o f  parliament play an important role in reviewing law drafts on security, as they are able to suggest 
amendments so as to ensure that the new legal provisions are adequately proposed (IPU handbook, 2009, p. 18).
200
Chapter. 5: Case studies
democratic-based governing system albeit the difference in their participation and authority 
of the conflicts. Most importantly, the restoration of democracy in unsettled areas would need 
to focus on the peace and security of the people who live there. Thé degree to which 
parliaments and parliamentarians hold governments to account for foreign affairs is a 
question of increasing practical and normative importance, as electoral incentives and 
informational deficiencies limit legislators’ orientation towards foreign policy (Martin, 2013, 
p. 114-115)^ " .^ Although the involvement of senators in the previous and present incumbencies 
do not reflect an outstanding impact of parliamentary diplomacy on the country’s foreign 
affairs, their presence and involvement in territorial disputes and civil unrest can show an 
extent of awareness in regards to conflict resolution. Not only the actions of parliamentarians 
are important, but public awareness and opinion should also be taken into account in cases of 
conflict resolution. Mutual recognition and acknowledgement of needs and interests is critical 
to the resolution of cross-cultural conflicts, and involves four steps as follows:
“Educating parties on the need for the shared values of freedom, 
equality, justice and peace, and how and why they are critical to cross- 
cultural interaction; recognition of the other as human, and of their needs, 
interests and identity; support which involves empowering parties to voice 
issues of concern; and resolution of the conflict through a process which 
promotes values”
(0jelabi,2010,p.53)
Political and economic globalisation and regional integration all act to ensure that national borders no longer 
limit the country’s politics. See Kahler & Lake, 2003 in Martin, 2013.
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According to Mr. Kraisak Choonhavan -  former Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs 
committee - on the Cambodian conflict, citizens of neighbouring countries in ASEAN should 
be able to express their opinions openly as all people are entitled to freedom of speech. 
Moreover, citizen’s opinions would more or less count towards governmental procedtires on 
conflict resolution. In a way, this method of surveying citizen’s opinions on cross-territorial 
or internal conflicts would be more accurate than doing poll surveys. It is argued that the 
context of freedom of speech lacks substantive meaning, despite it having impact on press 
freedom and control. Logistical factors, moreover, are more applicable to the publicising of 
people’s opinions in all countries irrespective of ideology, form of government, or level of 
development (Ibelema, Powell, and Self, 2000). From a critical point of view, in situations of 
conflict and turmoil, citizen’s opinions should be taken into account as an important reason 
for the government’s decision on conflict resolution. Not only will it contribute towards the 
good exercising of democracy in the society, but also to good relations between neighbouring 
countries and -  in the case of ASEAN -  a stable regional consensus.
In the following section, the case discussion will move on to the regional cooperation plan; 
ASEAN 2015. Apart from the territorial dispute discussion, this case has also been raised 
during the interviews as another main prospect for the Thai senators -  being representatives 
of the Thai government to ASEAN - to contribute their professionalism and knowledge. The 
cases on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and the following case on the ASEAN 2015 
community development plan are clear examples that reflect a combination of the Senate’s 
legislative and diplomatic proficiency in solving territorial disputes and enhancing 
governmental capability in regional cooperation respectively.
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h. Regional Cooperation: ASEAN 2015 community development plan
Earlier on in chapter 2, one of the factors that has been raised as an influence on the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy was economic globalisation. Considering that the 
, Thai Parliament is a member institution of the regional establishment ASEAN, members of 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate play significant roles in representing 
parliament internationally. This case topic will then be discussed in accordance to the factor 
for parliamentary diplomacy improvement, as the ASEAN 2015 plan was another focal point 
that has been stressed frequently during the interviews with senators. This case on regional 
cooperation in 2015 does not show what the senators have done, but shows an ongoing 
opportunity where senators -  as members of the Thai government -  can adjust themselves in 
the area of duties and direct powers about laws concerning with the trade and investment, 
particularly in the speeding up of the procurement of law amendments to enter the ASEAN 
2015 community. Parliamentarians must undergo a paradigm shift in learning in order to help 
solve the problems which may arise from the investment of large businesses from Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand (Dong, 2009, p.5). A Roadmap for an ASEAN 
Community has been drafted covering the period from 2009 -  2015, the proposed year for 
completed targets. As a result, senators from the previous and present incumbencies have all 
been enthusiastic on strengthening the institution’s competencies to fulfill this regional 
development plan^\
Roadmap to ASEAN 2015: Economic integration and drug trafficking elimination 
The roadmap of ASEAN 2009-2015 has outlined a plan to improve all sectors of the ASEAN 
member countries by 2015 including politics and government, economics, social and cultural 
awareness. Two major goals that will be raised here are plans of enhancing regional
For an introductory VDO on the Thai Senate’s aim to collaborate in the ASEAN 2015 community plan, 
see link http://www.senate.go.th/w3c/senate/ (presented in Thai, retrieved 8/11/2012).
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economic integration and the elimination of drug trafficking from one of the recent ASEAN 
members; the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) is one of the three ASEAN Community Councils. It's goal is to seek regional 
economic integration by 2015. The areas of cooperation include:
• human resources development and capacity building
• recognition of professional qualifications 
consultation on economic and financial polices 
trade financing
infrastructure and communications connectivity
• electronic transactions through e-ASEAN
• industrial integration to promote regional sourcing
• enhancing private sector involvement for the building of AEC 2015, ASEAN will 
be transformed into a region with free movement of services, goods, free flow of 
capital, skilled labour, and investment.
(Charumanee, 2012)
On the part of drug trafficking elimination, the cultivation of additive plants especially opium 
has been a long problematic issue in Southeast Asia, enabled by the regional terrains and 
climate. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) has been following up on 
plans and progress of dug trafficking elimination in the Lao PDR, one of the major areas of 
cultivation and drug trafficking, and has published news on the elimination plan progress as 
follows;
“The Lao National Commission for Drug Control and Supervision 
(LCDC) has held discussions with the Asean Ambassadors Group in Laos, 
aiming to make the Asean region a drug free zone by 2015. LCDC Chairman
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Mr. Soubanh Srithirath said leaders met in Phnom. Penh in May 2012 and 
adopted a Declaration which in the strongest terms emphasises the need to make 
the Asean region a drug free zone by 2015. However, increased trafficking of 
chemical precursors and increased production and abuse of methamphetamines 
has heightened the struggle between regional drug syndicates and police forces, 
which has resulted in very serious threats from organised transnational crime”.
(Latsaphao, 2012)
As mentioned in the previous section, the Thai Senate -  as part of the bicameral Thai 
parliament -  also hold membership in international parliamentary establishments. Regional 
trading areas like ASEAN have eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs 
and have transformed the division of responsibilities between state and subnational 
governments, encouraging changes at the level of the state and international system, and in 
political and economic developments within regions (Keating, 1999, p.l). At the regional 
level, members of the Thai parliament represent the government as an ASEAN member state. 
Apart from membership in the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Thai parliament also holds 
membership in the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Association (AIPA), ASEAN Inter­
parliamentary Union (AIPU). Most of the senators stressed this point partly because, one can 
suspect, the senators themselves are representatives of the citizens from the different sectors. 
Holding senatorship also represents the national parliament. A book review on African 
parliaments^^ supports the understanding between democratization and roles of parliament. 
The parliaments of the countries chosen for the study exist within diverse political systems 
and very different constitutional frameworks and diverse political systems, and therefore with 
different rules applying to the relationships between executive and legislature (Avezedo-
The study was focused on 6 African parliaments: Kenya, Uganda, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
See Legislative Power in Emerging African Dem ocracies edited by Joel D. Barkan. Boulder, CO and London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.
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Harman, 2011, p.550). One of the hypotheses explored in studies on legislation is that 
individual legislators will be the key for reforms in parliaments.
Therefore, during the senators’ term they represent the Thai parliament in ASEAN -  the 
Association for Southeast Asian Nations. As a result, most senators would have objectives in 
contributing their knowledge and experience, as well as initiating plans and projects for 
institutional improvement. This argument fits into the micro-macro improvement model; 
beginning from a smaller institution then expanding to a collective sphere. A re-articulation 
of the regional space, the coordination of action, and mobilisation across jurisdictional and 
institutional borders has been driven by global economic pressures (Andersen and Pierre, 
2010, p.219). The improvement of functionality at the institutional level can contribute 
towards efficiency in regional cooperation and development*”®. Between states, international 
politics shows how recognition of states has been exploited by great and small powers alike 
as a form of diplomatic tool, while international law looks at how recognition of a prior state 
confers legal status and personality (Ong, 2012, p.514).
The key factors with the potential to enable the realisation of ASEAN’s regionalist project as 
well as to determine how such outcomes affect the nature of state behaviour (e.g. common 
values, cooperation and institutionalisation), strengthen its position in the region. Following 
on from the border conflict discussion, to maintain pleasant foreign relations with 
neighbouring countries. In this case, countries that share borders should not leave the strain of 
disputes and conflicts to become more serious or out of hand. The resolution of any 
governmental dispute in the early stages by adopting the diplomatic processes of negotiation 
and using their skills to assist the main representatives from the government. The original
The five non-communist states o f Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed the 
original core o f  the ASEAN.
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creation of ASEAN was determined by the desire of its original member states to minimise 
the risk of militarized conflicts and handle existing and potential inter-state disputes through 
peaceful measures (Amer, 1998, p.34). In addition, the argument that these two case studies 
can have effects not only on the foreign relations but also on regional development. 
Therefore, any underlying conflicts and disputes should be resolved as soon as possible. The 
respective national governments are expected to promote domestic stability on a 
comprehensive basis to build national resilience so that the resultant secure states can 
withstand external and internal stresses and thus contribute to the attainment of regional 
resilience in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2009, p. 160).
When considering régionalisation, topics including economic integration and cooperation 
would usually emerge in the discussion. However, other important factors would also 
constitute towards the Senate’s diplomatic functionality and its collective performance as a 
government representative in regional collaboration. Norms that constitute a collective 
identity are constructed through identity change at the domestic level and local interaction in 
the existing international system or as promoted by outside actors (Rother, 2012, p.51). These 
factors include the exchange of knowledge and skills in multicultural-related projects. When 
we think about Thailand as one of the founders of ASEAN, it is evident that the country has 
been continuously ameliorating social and economic competencies to be a solid regional 
power. Integration in general concerns how different issues of regional integration are 
constructed, represented and negotiated by different actors in different sorts of discourses 
(Slocum and Langenhove, 2004, p.229). ASEAN’s overall record in promoting collaboration 
among its members may have played an important role in confidence building among 
member economies and thus in facilitating improved interstate relations (Ravenhill, 2008, 
p.471). Regional cooperation of competition policies binds more countries and regions under
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common rules, compared to bilateral cooperation where membership is limited and weakened 
once an international cartel competition becomes restrictive (Qi, 2009, p. 85).
Several interviewed data are drawn to support this statement on improving the Senate’s 
competency. A recent opinion from a senator from the Committee on Education (interviewed 
10 July 2012) was that the Thai Senate is currently developing itself to become part of the 
ASEAN 2015 community. One of the most important facts is to improve the competency of 
the Secretariat staff by, for instance, offering financial support for training or higher 
education in the ASEAN member countries. This would also help for individuals who have 
higher proactive capability as they are more likely to seek out opportunities to improve their 
situations, to take initiative to effect their environment, and to create conditions to improve 
their social context than those who have lower proactive capability (Shi, Chen, and Zhou, 
2011, p.360). As a result, the staff would then be able to provide specific information on an 
ASEAN member country to the senators, and the issues would depend on the committee the 
senator holds membership in, or on the purpose of particular exchange visits.
A suggested initiative from another senator who is secretary of the Foreign Affairs committee
(interviewed 28 March 2011, Bangkok) is to create an exchange group of students - focused
on youths and children - from ASEAN member countries to learn about each other’s cultures
and education system. All the member countries should be in a “win-win” situation, either
bilateral or multilateral. Moreover, despite the Senate’s domestic duty on legislative scrutiny
they are not restricted from improving international relations and developing themselves into
diplomatic actors. In fact, the House of Representatives is responsible for the majority of the
legislative affairs so the Senate should be able to focus more on international diplomatic
affairs that would be beneficial for the country and its position in ASEAN. Acknowledging
the importance of younger learners, from this senator’s point of view, is a constructive
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method to build foundational understanding in politics. Local youth projects have been 
ascribed a number of advantages by officials, politicians, and project leaders as they allow for 
testing new and non-traditional methods. The exchange programmes will aim to promote 
communication skills, entrepreneurship, and social integration of young people thus better 
adapting to young people’s needs (Hansson and Lundhal, 2004, p. 162).
Furthermore, among the opinions given to support the point on building the Senate’s 
competency, a senator from the committee on transportation (interviewed March 2011, 
Bangkok) has emphasised the importance of maintaining a stable position in the region. The 
Senate may not be directly involved in foreign affairs or diplomacy. At present, nonetheless, 
the Senate as a representative institution of the Thai government is strengthening its 
authoritative position in the region. The reason is to comply with the ASEAN 2015 
community plan in stabilising regional trade, investment, and exportation. The problem, 
nevertheless, about inefficient communication among ministries still occurs and -  from the 
senator’s opinion -  is an obstacle to effective decision-making or agreements. Hopefully, 
parliamentarians in general have open and flexible minds. Thus, after they finish their term in 
office they should use the opportunity to continue participating in charitable work through 
organisations, local establishments, and supporting the community. Finally, the government 
and the media should have a standpoint on maintaining and publicising international relations 
with neighbouring countries. Regardless of title and tenure, public relations practitioners have 
always been engaged in traditional public relations activities, including a variety of writing 
and media relations activities*”' (Waters, Tindall, and Morton, 2012, p.242). Consequently, 
national political institutions are substantial elements of a transnational public. A national 
deliberative public and a new space of transnational public communication not only inspires
'”* For politics and public relations, see Spicer, C. (1995), Organizational public relations: A po litical 
perj'pecrzve. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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current debates but also needs to conceptually situate public legitimacy in the contextual 
■framework of national and transnational communication as embedded (Volkmer, 2010, p.54).
This would lead to another comment on the topic of legislation among Southeast Asian 
countries. Socially, Southeast Asia is home to rich political, economic and social institutions 
that give rise to distinctive dynamics of political contention. A distinctive feature of 
Southeast Asian contentious politics concerns ideologically motivated and well-organised 
insurgencies (Vu, 2006, p.394). In terms of legislation, in an interview with the Chairperson 
of the Committee on Finance and Banking (interviewed 28 March 2011), the point of 
exchanging thorough knowledge about legislation of ASEAN member countries was 
discussed. Legislation, according to the interview data, is considered a fundamental base for 
every democratic government in policy implementation. As a result, Thai parliamentarians 
should have a ‘vision’ to strengthen legislation by learning from other further developed 
countries e.g. Malaysia, Singapore, while providing sufficient democratic legislative issues 
for emerging ASEAN members e.g. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar. Since its formation, ASEAN 
respected and accepted its members’ diversity of systems and political ideologies as well as 
declaring non-interference in domestic affairs of member states as the sine qua non of 
regional cooperation*”^ (Dosch, 2008, p.528). Yet, a fact to bear in mind on state behaviour 
and foreign relations in the region is that ASEAN has maintained a non-interference strategy 
based on the interests of the region’s dominant social forces in maintaining particular social 
and political orders*”^ (Jones, 2010, p.480).
*”^  Nevertheless, the explicit promotion o f  democracy, political values and norms were deliberately excluded 
from the organization’s agenda in the early periods o f  ASEAN establishment.
*”^  The issues on non-interference has been criticised for retarding ASEAN from taking meaningful action over 
transnational security threats, problematic members like Myanmar, and economic crises. See Jones, L. (2010), 
“ASEAN's unchanged melody? The theory and practice o f ‘non-interference’ in Southeast Asia” in The Pacific 
Review, Vol.23, No.4, pp. 479-502.
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The concept of establishing an E-govemment was also mentioned in terms of a method to 
strengthen regional cooperation, by connecting parliamentary and government affairs with 
the people*”'*. A member of the Thai Senate has stressed this point that in the age of 
globalisation where information flows are continuous, we should take advantage of 
technology in establishing a central. data service system between all ministries and public 
institutions. In this way, not only will government agents be able to coordinate and transfer 
official information but also to provide wider access for the public. Highlights of most 
literature on e-Govemment focus on its potential to support democracy, efficiency, and social 
and economic development, thus transforming public administrations in developing 
countries’ into modem and knowledge-based institutions (Cochigglia and Yemaschi, 2006, 
p.4). Stabilising transparency and accountability among political agencies and among public 
institutions and the people are considered, from this senator’s opinion, as a benefit towards 
democracy promotion in the society. In addition, the flow and accessibility of information 
through the E-govemment system would constitute a foundation for Thailand’s future 
advancement in the region. However, a point to consider is that the consequence of a 
governmental agency recreating a completely new administrative process is that new e- 
govemment applications tend to fall into the pattem of well-liked and existing familiar paper 
processes (Bock, 2005, p.91). When establishing e-govemments, therefore, public opinion 
and anticipation should be taken into account critically as this is considered the foundation 
for an efficient democratic-orientated regional coordination in every aspect including 
political, economical, and social improvements.
*”'* Discussion with the Chairperson on Finance and Banking, continued from issue on exchange o f  legislation 
knowledge.
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In sum, the shared idea to these proposals is that candidates from Thailand, whichever sector, 
level, age range, are expected to gain experience and improvise their knowledge from the 
exchange visits with other neighbouring countries. The imposition of fixed borders around 
resources, territories, and people, and the establishment of administrative systems to regulate 
everything within those borders, underwrote the global legitimation of the hegemonic model 
of sovereignty‘s  (De Costa, 2007, p. 13). The senators and senate staff are expected to use that 
knowledge along with personal competency to improve their skills and performance. 
Discussions with a Senate staff from the Committee on Energy stressed the generic duty 
framework of legislative staff and the importance of committee exchange visits (interviewed 
2 May 2011). Foreign visits according to the objectives of each committee are important not 
only that they provide opportunities for members of the Thai parliament*”^  to leam from other 
parliaments in terms of technical advancements, policies, or obstacles. As a result, in the 
individual level senate staff would be able to familiarise themselves with knowledge from 
other parliaments and provide supporting information on issues relevant to the committee’s 
objectives for senators. In a collective level, further, senators would be able to improvise 
advanced knowledge from foreign exchange visits abroad into forms of legislation which 
would be passed forward for administrative approval.
In addition, an implication on a transformation of the conventional system was asserted 
through the interview discussions. While formal cooperation involves written agreements 
where obligations of the contractual partners are clearly stipulated among or between local 
government units, informal agreements may only consist of a handshake among officials 
expressing their understanding of the terms of the agreement (d’Apolito, 2012, pT05). The
*”^  International relations has stemmed from the distinct set o f  human traditions and diverse experiences o f  
encountering and engaging among communities. See De Costa, 2007.
Including senators, members o f  the House o f Representatives, and parliamentary staff who work for both 
secretariats.
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majority of opinions stressed on the evolution of practicing politics and international affairs, 
that actors should be included from all establishrnents*^T In international relations, there are 
cases where non-state actors pursue their own interests in groups of individually, altering the 
political, economical and social conditions by stimulating the government and the structure of 
diplomacy in their country (Mahler, 2000, p. 198). In the case of the Thai Senate, a senior 
senate staff from the Bureau of Foreign Languages, Secretariat of the Senate (interviewed 28 
March 2011, Bangkok) has given information that reflected the impact of international 
conference speeches and exchange visit speeches in having a discursive impact on 
communication and messages conveyed to other foreign counterparts on specifically 
discussed topics. Senators usually follow the details provided by word in the speech, which is 
usually about a current situation in the host country at the time of the speech. In some 
instances, they would add personal remarks as a form of good measure. However, the 
argument here is that although speeches are written by senate staff or are composed at hand 
by the senator, the note sent out to the audience would possibly have impact on 
communication, decisions, and actions concerning the respective situation that may take 
place after the conference.
Conclusion
The case studies on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict and the ASEAN 2015 community 
development plan have been raised to emphasise the role of the Thai Senate as a diplomatic 
actor. In both cases, the role of the President of the Senate in the border conflict case and the 
representation of the President and senators from particular committees in the ASEAN 2015 
development case reflected the somewhat structured limitation of their authority. This also 
applies to other parliamentary diplomatic missions, where the senators from different
Not only limited to Foreign Ministry envoys.
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committees would represent the government, engage in discussions and give opinions, but 
they would not be making any decision regarding the event. The Senate’s power is only 
limited to legislative representation and scrutiny, whereas formal negotiations and decisions 
will have to be made by the administration. Governments within their borders are the 
dominant manifestations of polities today. Polities are institutions for exercising collective 
authority, structures for making rules and collective decisions regarding power, selection, 
citizenship, removal of individuals, and processes to resolve conflicts ^ d  sanctions for 
undesired behaviours (Kirlin, 2003, p. 1379). As a result, the representation of the Thai Senate 
in both cases can be critically viewed as convenient opportunities for the Senate. These cases, 
therefore, are distinctive cases which highlight the ongoing effort of national governments to 
stabilise power relations, and reinforce and strengthen community structures. In the case of 
Thailand, in particular, the fact of being the sole country in the region to maintain its 
sovereignty has encouraged the government to maintain a solid position in handling conflicts 
with neighbouring countries, as well as seeking resolutions to solve internal conflicts in the 
Southernmost provinces. Variations and levels of communal conflicts over long historical 
periods can be analysed by bringing together a path dependent theory of continuity and 
change and a multi-dimentional, systemic model of the constitution of communal conflict 
(Ruane, 2006, p.509-510). In this sense, governmental actors including senators would be 
able be able to build a more efficient strategy in tackling territorial disputes and civil 
insurgencies in the long run.
The issue on regional cooperation and improving the institutional capacity to comply with the
ASEAN 2015 community development plan can be related to a previous discussion on
political engineering. A reminder on the issues discussed was that political engineering is
defined as methods and mechanisms to improve the functioning and structure of the
institution by considering the policies and actors within the institution. Specifically, the
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constructing of institutional policies to suit with, the actors’ knowledge and skills, the 
government’s political objectives, and the citizen’s interests. However, according to the 
ASEAN regulations it takes up to 800 days to enact law. The idea has been emphasised on 
the importance of the reenactment of law in each ASEAN member government to be ready, 
prepared, and competent for the integration goals set for 2015. The main goal for the ASEAN 
integration is the awareness for member countries to develop their country’s political, 
economical, and social competency in order to improve their power and status in the region 
(ASEAN 2015 blueprint)*”'.
In the discussion on the border conflict, the authority of the Senate in decision-making during 
international negotiations is limited by the institutional framework. Nonetheless, the 
representation of the President of the Senate along with the conventional diplomat from the 
Foreign Ministry in an international setting as part of the negotiating team compliments one 
another as a balance in the separation of powers. Over recent times of increasing scrutiny of 
the institutions of governance and mounting support for fundamental constitutional change, it 
is necessary to maintain the balance of the separation of powers on its basis of being an 
essential aspect of modem constitutionalism (Patapan, 1999, p.391). Geographical proximity 
is an important factor in the influencing and control of power dimensions. The negotiation 
process would have to be carried out according to diplomatic procedures to maintain 
harmonious relations without tainting existing diplomatic relationships. As the argument 
goes, to understand when diplomacy is successful or when it breaks down is to understand 
how disputants get to the table in the attempts at negotiation. This may be because such 
diplomatic initiatives paradoxically occur in contexts in which they are least likely to be
Also see “The Readiness Preparation for Entering the ASEAN Community in 2015 o f the House o f  
Representatives and the Senate”
http://www.thai-senate.com/senate inter/upload-download/article/show file.php?id-49 
(retrieved 5/2/2013).
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successful (Greig, 2006, p.356). Yet again, the most important lesson on border conflicts for 
governments to bear in mind is the ability to maintain pleasant and effective diplomatic 
relations through the political representative’s professionalism despite the seriousness of the 
conflict. This, in a way, would assist with negotiation procedures by smoothing rigid surfaces 
on both parties and not aggravate the already tense situation.
Moving to the discussion on the ASEAN 2015 community development plan, suggestions 
from supporting evidence reflected the senators’ perspectives on plans to expand training 
opportunities in order to enhance parliamentary actors’ competency. Moreover, opinions on 
building a strong foundation by offering education exchange programmes for youths was 
another prospective initiative enabling the Thai parliament to play a more active role as a 
representative institution of inter-regional cooperation in the region. Economic co-operation 
has always been the dominant agenda for regional concordance, with political and security 
concerns receiving only limited attention because of the premium accorded to sovereignty 
(Khadiagala, 2009, p.433). Evidence from interviews with senators and senate staff have 
pointed out other relevant issues that can possibly be initiated through parliamentary 
diplomacy in order to enhance regional cooperation, thus gradually fulfilling the plans for 
ASEAN to become a proficient regional establishment by 2015.
The opinions from the interviewed senators have suggested development initiatives that
would be beneficial for a long-term regional development plan. Also, many types of
initiatives would help improve individual and collective skills as well as knowledge of the
parliamentary actors. Maintaining good diplomatic relations will help keep the balance of
power flowing among regional and global legislative peers. The future resolution of the
Southernmost conflicts will be a positive start for the Thai government to re-establish a solid
position in the region, beginning from using internal diplomacy among parliamentarians and
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military personnel in order to solve civil insurgencies. Once the civil unrest in the South has 
settled, then it would be less of concern for government representatives to strengthen 
diplomatic ties with foreign counterparts.
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Conclusion:
Prospects for Parliamentary Diplomacy
“Parliaments have thus become almost ubiquitous as institutions of modem 
governance. The basic pre-condition for the establishment and survival of 
governments depends on the ability of the political parties to control their 
representatives, to aggregate positions and policies, to present a coherent 
ideological image, to operate effectively in the legislative arena and to function 
as a stable basis for the political process”.
(Kazan, 2006, p .l)
Parliamentary diplomacy is a subject for an endless debate. While the series of discussions 
placed in this research has presented details of defining and conceptualising parliamentary 
diplomacy by drawing various theoretical arguments and supported by evidence from 
primary and secondary data sources, the arguments on the exact purposes and position as well 
as the contribution of diplomacy conducted in the parliamentary level would still remain as 
another issue in the studies of international relations. There is nothing odd about this, as 
specific research on parliamentary diplomacy is still in its prime despite the definition and the 
practice itself as having existed for several decades already. According to Dean Rusk’s 
definition, parliamentary diplomacy refers to the new processes which involves nations with 
widely differing goals in activity formally organised as a continuing system of regulated 
debate (Rosenbaum, 1967, p.218). My definition of parliamentary diplomacy would be that it 
is a method of building relations within the parliamentary level with parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff being diplomatic actors. The process of building relations would be 
through a variety of methods; bilateral sessions including courtesy calls from international 
representatives in Thailand, the attendance at formal functions hosted by foreign embassies.
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Moreover, multilateral routes on building foreign relations among parliamentarians would 
include connections and membership within parliamentary friendship groups and 
parliamentary associations respectively, as well as the participation of Thai parliamentarians 
in international conferences. Parliamentary associations have potential benefits for members 
of parliament in the possibility of developing a more outward orientation from their own 
parochial affairs, and at the same time constituting an additional element by providing 
equipment available to the conduct of public affairs to individuals and nations (Levy, 1974, 
p.352).
However, despite the level of activeness in foreign diplomatic duties, members of parliament 
have limited authority in decision-making. As a result, they can be part of the negotiating 
procedure but then the final decision would fall on the administrative sector -  that is 
conventional diplomats from the Foreign Office. The limitations of diplomacy is emphasised 
when the prestige and standing of the diplomat shows through vigour and force in the 
conduct of foreign policy, thus his standing becomes a casualty of forces of national politics 
(Thompson, 1974, p.303). To summarise in brief, parliamentary diplomacy is another 
alternative path of creating international relations among parliamentary peers, to exchange 
professional knowledge through committee membership, specific discussions in international 
arenas, and worldly issues that may be important to their respective countries. The question, 
nonetheless, still remains whether it is necessary at all to have parliamentarians as diplomatic 
actors.
To answer such question, for the meantime, the Thai Senate is not a proper example as a 
prominent parliamentary diplomatic actor. Fundamentally, this is due to their authority 
limitations. This argument is concluded from a personal observation and from the data
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collected during fieldwork. Yet, there is a possibility that in the future the Senate would be 
able to develop -  individually and institutionally -  to become an alternative diplomatic actor 
with a more notable record as the world becomes more and more globalised. This, 
nevertheless, would also depend on the constitutional amendments and the reorganisation of 
internal institutional structure. Inevitably, politics, chance, and bounded rationality are 
cognitive and social phenomena that influence the decision process in organisations*”” 
(Macintosh and MacLean, 1999, p.299). The organised groups either benefit at the expense 
of unorganised groups or that the lesser susceptibility to collective-action problems would 
result in any policy bias in favour of small groups or large individuals (Gehlbach, 2006,
p.802).
In the following parts, the discussions will be presented according to the prospects of 
parliamentary diplomacy by summarising and analysing the findings from my collected data. 
These details and explanations have been tested on my initial hvnotheses to be tested prior to 
collecting data. My hypotheses were presented as follows; The Thai Senate is a distinguished 
institution in domestic legislative scrutiny, but is yet to develop in becoming a prominent 
diplomatic actor. However, prospects of the Thai Senate in becoming a prominent diplomatic 
actor lies upon the actors’ values and perceptions on the importance of international 
diplomatic duties. Another hypothesis is that senate staff have a better understanding of the 
process and procedures of parliamentary diplomacy than the senators; the staff are the 
“steering wheel”. Senators are contemporary political actors, while senate staff are permanent 
civil servants. Therefore, their understandings and experiences on foreign diplomatic duties 
are different. The final hypothesis was that the diplomatic actors in this study, senators and
*”” This research on organisational change comprising strategic change, organisational learning, and business 
processes. See Macintosh, and MacLean, 1999.
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senate staff, perform their duties according to their existing knowledge, professional 
background, norms and regulations within the institution.
The presented summary will also relate to my theoretical conclusion on the definition of 
parliamentary diplomacy, the functioning relations between the institution and the actors 
reflected from a sociological institutionalist approach, lessons leamt from the Thai Senate, 
contribution of actors towards its member institution, and the future -  directions and 
development of parliamentary diplomacy.
My personal opinion, as a counterargument to the initial hypothesis, is that at present the Thai 
Senate is not a good example of a parliamentary diplomatic actor. However, there are chances 
that the Senate, or to put it more generally the Thai parliament, can develop to become a 
prospective parliamentary diplomatic actor in the future. This would depend on a number of 
factors; to name a few, the institutional structure, the stability of the Thai constitution, and the 
level of professionalism of the President of the Senate. An example from members of the 
German Bundestag showed that the conception of parliament where socially distinguished 
and privately wealthy notables would represent the "interests" of the German state at their 
leisure. But then again, the reality of a developing cadre of professional parliamentarians 
does not depend on the widespread party organisational experience nor the candidates’ levels 
of commitment or ambition to a career in politics (Fishel, 1972, p.65). Moreover, the Thai 
political culture holds a typical bureaucratic model where the separation of official from 
private life, the use of formal, rationally constructed rules and regulations, the spread of a 
new rational action and ethos of legality; and the institutionalisation of all this in a modem 
administration (Evers, 1987, p.667). These are some reasons for the concluding point on the 
Thai Senate currently not being a proper example of a parliamentary diplomatic actor, let
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alone a strong political representative. This point, consequently, can be related back to the 
discussion in chapter 3 on the Thai Senate about parliamentarians taking politics as a 
vocation (Tickamyer, 1981). Again, the purpose of this research is not to engage into an in- 
depth discussion on Max Weber’s account on understanding the premises of human culture 
and its conference into creating reality of world (Strong, 1985, p.396). However, the 
sociological argument on the constitution of human nature has been applied to the 
understanding of the senators’ perception and values while conducting international 
diplomatic duties.
The professional reaction among the senators in office, in particular, can also be considered 
as a form of political socialisation where actors from different professional backgrounds 
exercise their skills, knowledge and values in a political arena while they have the 
opportunity, even if it be temporary. The knowledge that thoughts, behaviour, and political 
ideology are formed as a result of factors other than direct agent influence is far from 
restricted to the resocialisation of individuals (Gustafsson, 1987, p.229). My argument 
continues from this point, based on the evidence collected for this research that political 
socialisation among parliamentarians can also establish and develop collective institutional 
power. There are two major perspectives that dominate socialisation theory; the normative 
locates power within societal structures, and the interpretative which locates power within the 
individual (Gbrich, 1990, p.517). The issues on political socialisation, both normative and 
interpretative, can be related to my hypothesis on the theoretical implication of sociological 
institutionalism that the actors raised in this study, including the senators and senate staff 
perform their duties according to their personal and professional backgrounds, existing 
knowledge, norms and institutional regulations.
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The triangulation of data from the semi-structured interviews and official documents have 
revealed evidence to support my hypotheses. At the same time, the triangulation of the 
information among the 3 interview groups, in particular the interview data from professional 
representatives who are not affiliated with parliamentary affairs have provided a variety of 
opinions to analyse the initial research questions and hypotheses on the prospect of the Thai 
Senate as a diplomatic actor. The outcomes of these diplomatic missions as seen from the 
case study in this research on the Thai Senate does not reflect a prospective outlook of the 
development of parliamentary diplomacy. In other words, the Thai Senate is a less competent 
example of a political institution which would represent parliamentary diplomacy considering 
from the supporting data collected during fieldwork and from my initial observation from an 
insider’s perspective.
However, if we consider actors from other Upper Houses then there may be more clear 
examples or they may have a better proven result on parliamentary diplomacy. A speculation 
would be that in different countries, different social and political cultures would influence the 
functioning of the institution and its actors respectively. Action templates were used as a term 
to explain the great slippage between the actual use of means and value preferences by 
individuals and collectivities in different cultures (Hudson, 1999, p.768). The international 
diplomatic activities of the Thai Senate, on the contrary and from the collected data, only 
reflected a bridge of relation-building between parliamentary counterparts.
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a. Theoretical contribution: parliamentary diplomacy
Towards the end of this research, the definition of parliamentary diplomacy can be presented 
as a representation of parliamentarians as diplomatic actors in the conduct of building and 
maintaining foreign affairs. This definition, however, has been drawn from scholarly
literature on diplomacy and other relevant factors that encourage parliament in becoming
active in foreign diplomatic duties. At the national and international levels, governments have 
adopted privatisation, deregulation, and currency liberalisation measures to create more 
appropriate conditions and foster corporate internationalisation for public and private
corporations in becoming a stable component of the global system (Vattani, 2000, p.280-
281). Focusing on the Thai parliament, in addition, the extent of diplomatic duties of the Thai 
Senate are limited by the Constitution. However, any planned foreign affairs mission that 
would be relevant to national security needs to be approved by parliament (under Act 190, 
current Constitution version 2007). Paiiiamentary questions asked during sessions may reveal 
interests in national, international policy or local constituency-orientated issues. They can 
also reflect the behaviour and the function of legislatures by identification of a question’s 
topic and thus formation of an opinion regarding the agenda and policy interests of the 
questioner (Martin, 2011, p.260). From this point, although the decision-making authority is 
limited but then again it shows that the Senate has the rights to approve any international 
diplomatic mission being carried out.
On parliamentary diplomacy, the arrangements of the Constitution do have an impact on 
shaping the perspectives and attitudes of the legislators on foreign affairs. Considering the 
aforementioned fact that the straightforward definition of parliamentary diplomacy has not 
yet been stated, and that the definition of parliamentary diplomacy has been drawn together 
from existing scholarly literature, constitutional arrangements limit but do not restrict
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parliamentary diplomacy. Consequently, the constitutional limitations on the Thai Senate’s 
diplomatic duties can thus reconstruct a contributing scholarship for future research on 
parliamentary diplomacy.
From the evidence presented from the Thai Senate, legislative actors have authority 
limitations yet they hold the position in scrutinising and approving foreign affair missions 
prior to them being carried out at a national level. Stressing this point on parliamentary 
diplomacy scholarship, the constitutional arrangements of a national parliament can limit and, 
at the same time, empower the practice of the government’s foreign affairs. This statement 
can be applied to all national parliaments universally, and can reflect the impact of the 
Constitution on parliament’s authority in diplomacy. From the researcher’s perspective 
combined with evidence for this theoretical contribution, amendments of the. Constitution 
would then alter the authority for diplomatic procedures in the parliamentary level -  not to 
mention adjust parliament’s legitimacy in general. Parliament is a sovereign body, able to 
enact, repeal or amend any law, including any self-imposed limitations. An entrenched 
constitution, accordingly, is not an inherent guarantee of an effective limitation upon 
excessive executive, legislative, or judicial independence or the necessity of a better 
government (Cox, 2013, p.52-53).
Moreover, the military has got a major role in the shaping of the political culture in Thailand. 
As discussed in chapter 2 in the formal level, the military represents the majority of the 
governmental institutions including the Senate. However, in a more specific level -  looking 
at the example of the Senate, senators who are military generals do not hold the most 
distinctive roles in parliamentary diplomacy. Although that may be over-represented in the 
Senate, this is not to say that they are not active at all in international diplomatic activities.
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Their membership in committees enable senators with military background to be active in 
diplomatic missions as other senators who are from different backgrounds. Yet, the 
background of the senators are not considered as the variable which would determine their 
activeness in parliamentary diplomatic duties. The language barrier, moreover, is a more 
important factor that would determine the activeness and participation of senators in foreign 
missions.
h. Contribution o f  actors towards its member institution
This study has reflected a contribution of political actors towards its member institution. 
Although the parliamentary actors in this study -  senators and secretariat staff -  do not 
currently represent a prominent example of a parliamentary diplomatic institution, their 
performance has to some extent contributed towards the structure and functioning of the 
institution. The reason for stressing this point is because findings from the interviews 
suggested that the performance and perceptions of actors reflect the level of competency not 
only among individual actors, but also the institutional policy and strategy on international 
affairs. The main debate was triggered during an interview with a senior member of staff 
from the Bureau of Strategy and Policy on the lack of clarity and inefficiency of the Senate’s 
institutional objectives and policies. In a study on the contribution of political candidates of 
similar party affiliation and ideology in large corporations, factors that stimulate elite’s 
behaviour include common political behaviour, social relations between firms, and economic 
interdependence might contribute primarily to members of committees that serve the interests 
of their particular industries (Mizruchi, 1990, p.21). A lesson learnt from the case study of the 
Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor is that the institution’s lack of competency on foreign 
diplomatic duties, not to mention on the domestic duties they are expected to achieve, would 
encourage other parliamentary institutions and its actors to be conscious about the importance
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of the clarity and structure of the institution as well as -  “put the right man for the right job”. 
All senators and secretariat actors can perform their duties according to each committee and 
the rules within each committee. The President of the Senate, or the chairperson of each 
particular committee, has the authority to choose the participants from different committees, 
not in terms of personal favour but rather in terms of specialism.
Another focal point worth mentioning here on how the works of parliamentary actors in 
diplomatic duties contribute towards their institution was reflected from an exchange of 
opinions among parliamentary scholars and practitioners during the 125^ Inter-Parliamentary 
Union Conference (IPU), October 2011. A conference paper presented here was to initiate a 
project to exchange parliamentarians and parliamentary staff to Thai embassies across the 
world, starting from within the ASEAN region (Chaitep, 2011, p. 12). This was suggested as a 
method to improve the skills and competency of parliamentary staff in facilitating senators’ 
diplomatic duties and collectively enhancing the performance of parliament. Recently, the 
proposed plan has been referred to by the Thai Prime Minister,. Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, on 
an official visit to Australia to mark the 60^ Anniversary of Thailand-Australia diplomatic 
relations. During her visit, the Premier initiated an improvement of trade and export, and also 
an exchange of Thai and Australian parliamentarians^ Details on formal agreements or 
official postings of member of parliaments abroad were not available, yet this piece of news 
has provided an example of this current government’s scheme to enhance bilateral relations 
with other parliaments.
See National News Bureau o f  Thailand Public Relations Department / ‘Prime Minister Yingluck pleased with 
visit to Australia”, 2 June 2012.
http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255506020003 (retrieved 18 June 2012).
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Again, it may also be worth thinking about the actors’ orientation towards politics when 
discussing opportunities to exchange members of parliament or members of Secretariat staff 
for training in parliaments abroad. Considering political roles from an occupational 
perspective, the increasing need for advanced knowledge, training, and skills for political 
decision-making is considered as part of the complexity of the systems with which the 
politician deals increases. But the process is incomplete, as the politician is a representative 
of an older social order where political class determines political functions (Conway, 1963; 
Hall, 1975; Lenski 1966). Past work has not directly confronted the issue of whether 
vocationalism influences decision-making although there has been interest in factors relating 
to political experience and office (Tickamyer, 1981, p.26).
It has been mentioned in the previous parts of this research that Secretariat staff assist the 
duties of senators, and at the same time senators’ duties aim to contribute towards the 
government’s decision on international negotiations and discussions. The professional 
relationship between the senators and the staff from the Secretariat of the Senate is also an 
obvious example of a semi-democratic bureaucratic system on the Thai society. An 
explanation on the weak point of democracy in Thailand, which also explains a lot about the 
characteristics of politicians, is stated as follows;
“Concerning contestation, the weak point in Thai democracy is the lack of 
electoral competition for political posts wielding power at the intermediate level.
The only political officials with significant power subjected to regular elections 
are members of Parliament. Elected municipal and provincial councils have little 
real authority, while the more powerful positions of district officer and provincial 
governor continue to be appointed by the Minister of Interior. Furthermore,
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extensive vote-buying at election time calls into question the integrity of the 
electoral process”.
(LoGerfo, 1996, p.906)
From this, it is concluded that members of political institutions do have a level of 
contribution towards the institution by following the norms and regulations. Again, it would 
be beneficial if the actors not only follow the regulations, but also adjust themselves 
accordingly to the political culture and specific committee objectives. This would be a way to 
help improve both the domestic and international duties of actors at all levels. When 
considering the relations between the senators, the senate staff, and the Senate as an 
institution examining from their duties within the parliament can also reflect a check and 
balance of the organisational structure. The outcomes of their performance can lead to re­
consideration of the level of efficiency of the institutional policy on international affairs. The 
role of bureaucrats and the impact of organisational behaviour on the making and the 
implementation of decisions are part of bureaucratic politics (Smith, 1989, p. 109). As 
senators and senate staff work together in tandem, they are able to check each other’s 
performance.
At the moment, the sole observation is that in different constituencies each President of the 
Senate would have different policies on domestic and foreign affairs. An individual adopts an 
estimation of that function which is both relatively unwarranted and absolutely, through the 
repetitions of various actions and continued performance of a certain function required by 
such performance (Langerock, 1915, p.31). According to the Director of International 
Organisations Bureau, Secretariat of the House of Representatives, international diplomatic 
relations in the parliament level are crucial in developing the institutional structure. This
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includes the institution itself and the actors involved (interviewed 28 April 2011). Senators, 
being members of each committee, would go on foreign trips to learn and exchange 
knowledge about specific issues in order to improvise and draft legislative documents. The 
argument for this point is that it is beneficial, to observe and learn about the working 
procedures of other national parliaments’ international duties. However, this does not mean 
that we have to copy every detail. The Thai Senate needs to develop its own solid policy on 
international diplomatic affairs, for the benefits of the institutional proficiency in the future. 
At the meantime, what has been observed from the institutional regulations are only 
frameworks and guidelines for the actors to follow. It is crucial that these guidelines are 
developed into more concrete institutional policies; where a proper project is carried out, 
followed up, and evaluated for future improvements. Most importantly, these regulations on 
the conduct of domestic and international affairs should waver to the least despite any future 
constitutional amendments or political instabilities that would effect the functioning of 
parliament and the incumbencies.
A solid policy model would be beneficial for the improvement of individual and collective 
performance. However, according to the director of the personnel training group from the 
Bureau of Human Resources Development (interviewed May 2011), permanent civil servants 
from the Secretariat are expected to provide the policy for senators during their term in office. 
Some might say this is the way of working in tandem, but there are some other people - 
including the researcher - who would say that this is a hindrance to the self-improvement of 
senators understanding and skills as diplomatic actors. By doing so, they would fit into the 
bureaucratic model of a typical patron-client relationship, used to being served and provided 
for and this would be totally contrast to the reality that they are expected to contribute their 
knowledge and experiences to their political duties. But then again it is the regulations that
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senators follow their duties according to the acts stated in the Constitution. The identity of the 
institution is determined on the hierarchical and bureaucracy. However, there is no act or 
restriction in keeping them abound from implementing any duties regarding diplomatic 
affairs that would be of benefit to the parliament. The diplomatic actors - senators and senate 
staff - need to have interest in the nature of the job and how they can contribute their 
knowledge and professional background to their duties.
c. The Senate and the public
The relations and accountability of parliament and the public is also a strong point to consider 
in improving the Senate’s functionality. My suggestion as regards this would be that any 
approved project to enhance public knowledge and participation should always follow a 
concise procedure of planning, structuring, proceeding, following-up and the evaluation of 
results. Results from the evaluation would then be able to predict the possibility and success 
of public knowledge and engagement on the Senate’s affairs in the future, as well as reflect 
the level of public trust and the accountability of parliament. Public opinion and scrutiny acts 
like a chain reaction of check and balance in the society. The public has the right to scrutinise 
parliament in general about everything, afterwards issues are carried forward to the 
administrative sector where appropriate methods and discussions are taken out. A quote on 
the functioning of parliament is referred to as follows;
“The whole structure of the constitution, the way in which parliament works, is 
that it is a party machine and that means that the majority party and the 
government have a common interest and they are interdependent. The 
government majority back benchers have an interest in making sure the 
government does its job, but that it also manages to put into effect the policies
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of a government and equally, the government depends on its majority in order 
to get things through”.
(Griffith, 1992, p.6)
Then again, it is questioned whether the issue of the public have wider knowledge about the 
affairs of the Senate does matter on the institutional performance and the actor’s decisions in 
conducting domestic and international duties. A reflection of the problem of elite functioning 
in Thai politics is that as long as the freedom of speech is limited within the society, then the 
basic level of parliament scrutiny will not be that effective. Therefore, instead of trying to 
change the political culture, citizens should try to adopt their role accordingly to the non- 
changeable political culture.
d. Methods fo r  improvement
The methods for an improvement in the performance and outcome of the international 
diplomatic duties of the Senate would have to go back and reconsider the whole political 
culture that underlies the structure of the parliamentary institution. It will always be 
inevitable that political elites have more authority to control and mandate politics than the 
citizens. Therefore, democracy in Thailand is a result of a patron-client leadership model 
which has been running throughout each transitional era (Prasertkul, 2005, p.9). As the 
argument has relied solely on the role of parliamentarians and secretariat staff as diplomatic 
actors -  and basing an example on the Thai Senate -  it has become more certain that 
parliamentary actors do not suffice in promoting a better stance of parliamentary diplomacy. 
From the conducting of fieldwork and data analysis, several issues have stimulated methods 
for future improvement on the actor’s competency. These issues include the application of 
improvement methods on an individual and institutional level eg. plans, projects, strategies,
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specific training etc. Further, intensive training should be provided for new members of the 
Senate as well as new members of the Secretariat, apart from basic knowledge and 
competency training. The intensive training schemes would have to be well-plaimed and 
well-structured to gain the most of participation, and an evaluation of the outcomes should 
always be conducted to measure the impact of the training on the individual. However, the 
possibility of launching intensive training schemes will have to depend on the possibility of 
the government budgets. The exercising of representative democracy from the outlook of the 
current diplomatic activities of the Thai Senate is still difficult to predict the future of 
parliamentary diplomacy. At the moment, instead of a proper actor on parliamentary 
diplomacy, it may be better to refer to parliamentary actors according to the nature of their 
conduct on international diplomatic affairs as ‘new state representatives’.
Additional information in order to build diplomatic competency, the Secretariat of the Senate 
should establish a parliamentary diplomatic affairs research unit apart from the currently 
existing foreign affairs department. This would be an opportunity for secretariat staff who 
have experience or specialism in parliamentary diplomatic affairs to develop empirical 
research and gain information from other parliaments in developed nations in order to 
improve the functions, strategies, and policies on the Thai Senate’s foreign duties. The 
research scholarship and publications can then be circulated within the institution and 
publicised to other relevant sectors in government and throughout the public (conversation 
between researcher and senator, 4 December 2012). Having gone through a long process of 
institutionalisation, parliaments renew themselves institutionally under such pressures as the 
conipetition with executive power, international political environment, and the impact of new 
cohorts of members (Longley and Davidson, 1998, p.2). Moreover, a parliamentary research 
unit would also provide better opportunities for parliamentary affairs be published towards
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the public, therefore enhancing their knowledge about the duties of the Senate and gaining a 
better understanding of what the Senate actually does considering it being a closed 
community. The media has constantly played a crucial role as being an indispensable channel 
of information communication in the changing society, as a result positive interactions 
between legislators and the media will encourage legislators to design a legal system that best 
serves the needs of society and contributing to a rational change in the legal system (Wu,
2 0 1 0 ,  p .2 1 ) .
e.Limitations o f  research
During the period of conducting and writing up this thesis, there had been a number of 
limitations to the research. These limitations, however, did not majorly interfere with the 
overall research process. On the positive side, they were able to help test the initial 
hypotheses and provide an even structured research framework to work on. The limitations of 
this research that occurred during the research process are stated accordingly in the following 
paragraph.
Limited access to information: the researcher has access to governmental documents in 
certain departments of the Secretariat of the Senate. Moreover, information older than 10 
years is destroyed so information which may have been valuable to this research prior to the 
time frame of 10 years is not available. The information storage is also considered another 
obstacle in retrieving raw data to support the research arguments. There is not a proper 
information storage system, thus only limited statistical data on international diplomatic 
duties of the Senate were collected. The interviews with senators were also quite limited, as 
the researcher was not able to access some of the senators or foreign office diplomats for 
interviews, although some correspondence had been arranged and constantly followed up.
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This limitation on interviews leads forward to constraints about specific discussions on the 
Thai political system or certain public figures: people have diverse political views in 
Thailand as in many other countries across the world. Therefore, this research has been 
written up in a neutral but critical manner, so not to be overly-biased due to the advantage of 
the researcher as an insider. The final obstacle while conducting the research was the distance 
of case studies: extensive travelling was required to collect first hand semi-structured 
interview data and official documents, as the sources of information were all based in 
Bangkok, Thailand. As a result, precise planning had to be arranged prior to each travel. 
However, additional interview data was able to be acquired from 2 diplomatic missions to 
London, UK, in July and November 2012 respectively. These follow-up interviews helped 
provided data that was useful to add up with the existing research material.
The analysis of the acquired data and the concluding points to answer the research questions 
and hypotheses were presented on the basis of this political fact. Another issue concerning 
limitations for the research was the unavailability of data from Foreign Ministry officials. 
Speculated reasons would be due to time constraints and professional engagements. Had 
there been more information from Foreign Ministry representatives, then the data analysis to 
distinguish conventional diplomacy and parliamentary diplomacy would have been clearer. 
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to define parliamentary diplomacy and conventional diplomacy 
from all the other evidence that has been gathered to this concluding point by the actors, the 
levels of which the activities are conducted, and the authority in decision-making.
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/  Suggestions fo r future research
This research has reflected a great deal of advice and suggestions for future studies on 
parliamentary diplomacy. The first suggestion is that national parliaments should contemplate 
on the significance of diplomacy and creating foreign relations with international 
counterparts. The reason is because parliaments, as well as other government representatives, 
are now considered as main contact for foreign counterparts. An ideal parliamentary 
diplomatic actor, where it be an institution or individual representative, should have a clear 
and concise strategy of each diplomatic mission. On the Thai Senate case, foreign trips that 
involve senators travelling abroad should state precise objectives of the mission, expected 
outcomes, and a formal evaluation of certain diplomatic missions to measure the level of 
success. This is a whole summary of the evidence gathered to support this research project. 
Again, the extent of positive outlooks on such international diplomatic mission would fall on 
the understanding and values of the senators, while they hold their office terms and have the 
opportunity to engage themselves and represent their committee in international diplomatic 
activities. As representatives of the people, the individual and collective skills of legislators 
are expected to be a combination of representation, conflict management skills, and partisan 
incentives altogether (Skogstad, 1985, p.740). However, some recent work contends that 
there is less collective action of some kinds than most people think: depending on less 
involvement by political action committee, less lobbying, fewer and smaller campaign 
contributions (Burstein and Sausner, 2005, p. 404).
For methodological matters on the criteria and selection of interviewees in case study 
research where interviews are required to gather information to support the research, it is 
advisable to select the prospective interviewees in the earlier stages of the research. When 
referring to the early stages, from my experience, it is advisable to construct a clear
236
Conclusion
theoretical framework and methodology. A concise research structure will then enable the 
researcher to make a better choice of prospective interviewees and also handle obstacles prior 
to the interview process before hand. These obstacles include cancellations of interview 
appointments and access limitation to prospective interviewees. Further, during interviews 
the interviewees may express bias and aggressiveness according to their orientation towards 
the interview^" (Yanos and Hopper, 2008, p.230).
As devised in the previous chapters of this thesis, parliamentary diplomacy has enabled 
government representatives from different continents across the world to build relations with 
foreign counterparts, therefore expanding the networks of international relations 
conventionally limited to foreign ministries. My initial arguments were that parliamentary 
institutions and actors have emerged and developed their role in international diplomatic 
duties. If considered in a general context, parliamentary diplomacy will continue to develop 
in the future as the world is rapidly interconnecting. Political agencies are emerging and 
diplomatic actors will not solely be limited to envoys from the Foreign Office. The direction 
and success of diplomatic practice through parliament, however, would depend on the 
intentions and perseverance of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff who are responsible 
for carrying out the foreign diplomatic duties. This research, nonetheless, having attempted to 
theorise and define parliamentary diplomacy by raising the Thai Senate as a case study of a 
parliamentary institution and the role its actors play in conducting international affairs, for the 
meantime it can be vague or even difficult to pinpoint a certain outlook O f parliamentary 
diplomacy through this particular example. Thus, several questions arise on the competency 
of the institution and actors who form part of the institution. Part of the reason stemmed from
Pierre Bourdieu’s methodological essay, 'Understanding’ referred to this interview trap as ‘false, collusive 
objectification’: false, because it is unfaithful to the particularities o f  the life under scrutiny; collusive, because 
the interviewer unwittingly goes along with the artifice; and objectifying because a readymade account has been 
substituted for the lived, unfinished angularities o f  a reflective subject. See Bourdieu, P. (1999) in Yanos and 
Hopper (2008).
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the researcher’s personal scrutiny combined with relevant findings from fieldwork data. 
Findings jfiom evidence, as have already been mentioned in the previous chapter, was that the 
studied group of senators were senior elite politicians who are from various backgrounds and 
are expected to take up their positions in parliament in order to contribute their professional 
knowledge and experience to legislative scrutiny and specific committee obligations. From an 
ethnographic observation combined with the collected data, it is evident that some senators 
do take their duties very seriously whilst others only consider this temporary political career 
as a stepping stone or a catapult to build their reputation. Applying this fact to my main 
theoretical debate, my view towards this would be that the functioning nature of the senators 
include creating networks among their peers in the House and beyond. International 
diplomatic missions of the Senate, consequently, should aim for a concrete outcome and each 
mission should always be followed up for results -  not just seeing it as an advantage to travel 
abroad. Moreover, while this discussion has been based on the sociological institutionalist 
approach to study the organisational behaviour of the Thai Senate, it may have also fitted into 
the description of the rational choice institutionalist approach. Rationality in institutions 
would influence dynamics of decision-making by maximizing the utilities of the actors, 
limiting individual rationality and affecting the courses of society (Hira and Hira, 2000, 
p.269). Further, the arrangements within the institutions may be entirely new or built on less 
formal arrangements, and that certain behaviour may be permitted or prohibited (Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal, 2001, p.763).
However, the sociological institutionalism approach; “logic of appropriateness” was used for 
this research instead as it has helped examine and understand the relationship between the 
institution and its actors, as well as the background motivation for the actors’ performance on 
their domestic and international duties. Moreover, it is an attempt to understand the
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functioning structure, the communication pattern, and the behaviour of its actors. It is clear 
that the actors follow the institutional regulations on performing both their domestic and 
international duties using a combination of professional skills and training experience. In 
other words, the institutional norms and regulations direct the performance of the actors. 
When recurring problems need to be solved, moreover, actors in the institution would adopt 
of set of habitualised actions and develop these actions empirically to a degree that they are 
evoked with minimal decision-making effort (Zilber, 2002, p.234). Problems about their 
performance, however, are reflected, from their senator peers, secretariat staff who assist the 
senators’ duties, and members of the public who act as a double scrutiny of parliament. 
Another obstacle is the communication skills of the actors, but these skills can be improved 
from the experience of other policy-makers abroad, businesses, civil society actors and the 
media as public communication is not the afterthought but at the heart of the new paradigm of 
diplomacy (Leonard and Avakeson, 2002, p.4). The said problems would relate to the entire 
functioning of the Senate; the ambiguity of the incumbents’ performance and the 
accountability of the institution itself. Evidence has shown that there is a lack of a concise 
model on foreign affairs, despite having a statement on how foreign affairs should be 
conducted and what outcomes are expected. A senior official from the Bureau of Policy and 
Strategy (interviewed 3 May 2011) has stated that records from the policy bureau does not 
show any main policy or code of conduct on foreign affairs, due to the fact that the 
Secretariat of the Senate administers and supports the senators’ duties rather than outlining 
policies for them to follow.
A summary of the hypotheses testing is described as follows; parliamentary diplomacy of the 
Thai Senate is limited by the Constitution, as the authority of making decisions lies with the 
conventional diplomats from the Foreign Office. Further, institutional actors including
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senators and Senate staff should work together in tandem. The major obstacle for the 
performance of senators and senate staff is that there is no concise institutional policy 
framework. A lack of transparency and accountability between senators and the staff is also 
another main problem which constrains the advancement of the domestic and diplomatic 
duties. The solution for these obstacles would rely more on ways to improve the structure, by 
developing proper institutional functions. Skills and knowledge improvement of staff: more 
competency to facilitate and assist senators in international diplomatic missions. Although it 
is impossible to transform the political culture and change the regime system, these methods 
would more or less help to improve the functionality of the Senate.
g.Lessons learnt from  the Thai Senate
In the earlier chapters, I have attempted to elaborate a rather limited definition of 
parliamentary diplomacy by drawing together various theoretical and scholarly explanations 
on conventional diplomatic practices. Further, an example of an institutional actor -  the Thai 
Senate - was given to demonstrate and clarify the role and competency of a political 
institution apart from the conventional diplomatic institution -  the Foreign Office. A 
reflection from the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor can offer a broadened perspective on 
parliaments’ engagement in foreign affairs. One of my previous hypotheses was that the Thai 
Senate can be considered as an emerging diplomatic actor, but has yet to become a prominent 
actor in developing parliamentary diplomacy, let alone international relations. Having tested 
these hypotheses by gathering relevant information from semi-structured interviews, results 
have shown that actors from the Thai Senate -  including the senators and civil servants from 
the Secretariat of the Senate -  perform their duties according to the institutional regulations. 
However, the perceptions on international diplomatic duties of each group of actors are 
slightly different as followed;
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The political posts of senators are temporary. Therefore, they think that they should make the 
most of their time and opportunity while in office. The main responsibilities, apart from 
legislative scrutiny, is that they need to take part in conducting international diplomatic duties 
with foreign counterparts. However, some senators think that the diplomatic duties are not 
permanent. They would only participate in such duties when they have the opportunity during 
their term in office.
Senate staff, in addition, are permanent civil servants. Their main responsibilities are to 
facilitate the duties of the senators, depending on the department they are assigned to. It is 
likely that during the life-long tenure of their civil service, the staff are likely to be 
transferred to other departments in order to rotate the functioning of the Secretariat. 
Nonetheless, my argument would remain firm that permanent civil servants are likely to have 
more experience in the procedures of international diplomatic duties. This would also 
compliment to the professional knowledge of the senators, despite them having less 
diplomatic experience.
Considering the terms of the Senate’s functioning it may be more feasible to adopt the 
rational choice institutionalist approach to such particular study on the role of parliaments 
and parliamentarians. However, the decision to adopt a sociological institutionalist approach 
for this study was because of my initial justification that the official performance of the 
parliamentary actors reflect their interactions and behavior in a personal setting. Moreover, 
when they are together as members of a parliamentary community, a level of socialisation 
within the parliament setting occur. In addition, the sociological approach has had a most 
descriptive focus with the seldom well-articulated assumption that people’s group 
memberships, social, and spatial memberships are largely determined by their political
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actions. This would also shape the geographic and demographic correlates of citizens’ 
electoral behaviour (Dennis, 1991, p.57).
. The shifting and transferring of knowledge and duties are more so flowing among senators 
and the secretariat staff. A distinctive point when the distribution of responsibilities are 
wavered when the senators bring their personal assistance to facilitate their duties. This, in a 
way, has two-folded effects on the senators’ and secretariat staff’s performance. The positive 
side is that most of the senators’ personal aides have already had experience working with 
that particular senator in his/her previous profession prior to the commencement in office. 
Therefore, they are able to coordinate with the senator’s demands and requirements more 
swiftly. On the other hand, while the familiarity with the senator enables the senators and 
their assistants to work together efficiently, the gap between the senators and the secretariat 
staffii2 jg likely to widen, not to mention the gap between the senators themselves. The gap 
between parliamentarians and staff vary according to department and committee. This makes 
it more likely that senators in some committees tend to perform their duties separately with 
their own personnel, despite the fact that they are expected to perform their duties 
collectively with other peers. Causes of the gap between parliamentarians and staff, to list a 
few, would include different levels of knowledge, skills and ability, seniority issues, social 
background, the latter reason making the Senate staff either feel intimidated or overly 
patronised
One senator from the Committee on Monetary, Finance, Banking and Financial Institutions 
(interviewed 23 March 2011) mentioned during the interviews that some senators tend to
' Referring to the secretariat staff from the Committee Bureaus who have direct contact with the senators from 
each standing committee.
In chapter 3, underlying factors on the class distinction that has created an invisible gap in the Thai society 
include upper-middle class, agricultural background, economic status, education.
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discuss and make decisions ‘discretely’ in their group, referring to the actual senator and his 
or her personal assistants. As a result, it would have an effect on the senators’ collective 
performance and decision-making. During the limited time in office the senators would have 
their personal aides to assist and facilitate their duties. As a result, the distribution of 
knowledge would not be efficient among the diplomatic actors. In other words, senators -  
who are supposed to be the main diplomatic actors -  would not have any knowledge 
regarding the specific mission they are expected to complete. This is a typical reflection of 
bureaucracy in the Thai society and inevitably viewed as a hindrance on the improvement of 
interpersonal skills, institutional function, parliamentary diplomacy, and last but not least, 
democracy.
Therefore, it is important for senators and senate staff to have a solid understanding and 
knowledge on the procedures of their main responsibilities and general knowledge on 
international diplomatic duties, especially in the case of those who are more frequently active 
in international missions. This is to say that they should have thorough knowledge which 
could be transferable later on once they finish their senatorship, not just knowledge on the 
surface. This, moreover, would apply to the secretariat staff whose grounded responsibilities 
are to assist and support the duties of senators. As their positions are likely to be rotated 
during the course of their civil service, these professional skills would therefore be of use in 
their prospective positions.
In brief, each national parliament has their own institutional rules and regulations for the 
members to follow, whether be regulations on domestic or international duties. However, if 
we consider international diplomatic duties of parliaments, to some this may not be as 
important as their domestic duties of legislative drafting and passing on bills. Moreover, the
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authority of parliament is also limited by their country’s constitution, thus it may be more 
appropriate to view them as policy advisors rather than policy makers. On the external 
factors, a case from France has showed that very few studies on mass political behaviour and 
the impact of worldwide market activity reflect the politician’s perception of policy maker 
competency, policy efficacy, and what voters demand from their representatives (Hellwig, 
2007, p. 146). Bringing the discussion back to the Thai Senate, the current Constitution, 
A.D.2007, has set a framework for the senators’ duties -  as stated in chapter 3.
Nonetheless, my argument would remain that parliamentarians from unicameral parliaments 
or bicameral parliaments can develop their skills to become alternative diplomatic actors in 
their own rights -  even if their authorities are legally limited and if the formal negotiation 
process and final decisions would have to be made by the Ambassador or head of state. The 
major concern for the case of the Thai Senate would be that as long as bureaucracy and 
patronage is deeply rooted in the system, not to mention the societal background and 
institutional norms, then it would be extremely difficult for the actors to accept the values of 
a transparent and efficient political career. Thus, a positive outlook of parliamentary 
diplomacy would be out of the question. But then again it is the regulations that senators 
follow their duties according to the acts stated in the Constitution. The identity of the 
institution is determined on the hierarchical and bureaucratic. However, there is no act or 
restrictions to keep them abound from implementing any duties regarding diplomatic affairs 
that would be of benefit to the parliament. The diplomatic actors -  senators and senate staff -  
need to have interest in the nature of the job and how they can contribute their knowledge and 
professional background to their duties.
' The impact o f  globalisation has raised the intensity o f  competition in political and economic establishments, 
and this can draw political actors to become more business, profit-orientated rather than considering views from 
the people who voted for them. See Hellwig, 2007, pp. 146-158.
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Senate staff, having pointed out that they are the main mechanisms to a successful diplomatic 
parliamentary mission, would still be repressed and limited by the position in the secretariat 
(interviews with Secretariat staff from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of 
Foreign Languages, March 2011). Parliaments, as the cradle of democracy, should present 
right values and policy directions. Joint efforts of secretaries general, parliamentary 
cooperation and upgraded professionalism of parliamentary secretariats are among the key 
elements in advancing global parliamentary democracy in an era of new civilisation, an 
enormous amount of knowledge and experience accumulated in different spheres of culture 
and civilisation converges on the back of developing science and technology and growing 
economies (Dong, 2009). In other words, no matter how much knowledge they have than the 
senators, they would have to act and perform their duties according to the conventions within 
the institution. However, conventions are likely to evolve, modify themselves, and sometimes 
disappear according to internal and external dynamics of routinisation. As a result, 
nonjustified norms, interrelation between objects, discourses, and the symbolic meanings that 
shape the behaviours of actors’ symbolic meetings can be taken for granted (Gomez and 
Jones, 2000,p.700-701). Senate staff are permanent civil servants whose main duties are to 
support both the domestic and international diplomatic duties of the senators. Most 
importantly, it was shown from the research that the staff are more familiar with the 
procedures of international diplomatic duties. Their duties on assisting the senators are 
considered as recurring; they need to prepare the process over and over again. As long as 
patronage and favouratism exists within the institution, nonetheless, the opportunity for the 
actors who could have constituted and improved parliamentary diplomacy would be 
inhibited.
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h. Conclusion
The directions and development of parliamentary diplomacy are as yet unpredictable. The 
Thai Senate is only another example of a domestic political institution, the main functioning 
being legislative scrutiny and the international responsibility is to build and maintain foreign 
relations with international counterparts. From the supporting evidence gathered up to now, 
parliamentary diplomacy is only another path of creating and maintaining international 
relations among fellow parliamentarians, but does not have impact in making decisions, 
negotiations, or implement any agreements. Senators would only initiate a discussion, build a 
relationship, and that is how it will remain unless the constitutional framework on the Senate 
should be revised otherwise. National parliaments were originally established as legislative 
institutions, therefore they have limited powers on implementing and carrying on any 
discussions or, if any, agreements further into a pragmatic project. As a result, the decision­
making process is the responsibility of the administrative sector; the government. However, 
as I have attempted to show the Thai Senate is currently not an obvious example of a political 
institution that can deliver prospects of a parliamentary diplomatic representative, the future 
of diplomacy would remain affected by the fact that the main diplomatic institution is the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(
As for the Thai Senate, the conclusion of this research is not a definite rejection of a chance 
for improvement. The selected period for research -  the Senate incumbency from 2008 -  
2011 -  reflected an example of yet another period when parliament needs to stabilise its 
position and authority after events of political transition. At the same time, this reflects the 
constant instability and uncertainty of Thai politics "k On the positive part, the case study of
Political instability, in my opinion, cannot be compared as it varies from country to country according to a 
number o f  factors including the political culture, regime type, politicians who hold authority, and diverse 
political views and actions o f the citizens.
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this incumbency has provided evidence to show leadership and professionalism of the former 
President of the Senate. The international diplomatic duties lead by the former President was, 
in a way, to convey trust to foreign counterparts and reassure that the domestic situation was 
being under control. This remark leads to a fact that it is impossible to transform the political 
culture and change the regime of the country, particularly in the case of Thailand where 
patriotism and a sense of national identity is considered strong. On the Senate, I would say 
there are possibilities that the institution may be able to improve itself structure-wise to 
become a more successful domestic and diplomatic actor. This, however, would depend on a 
variety of factors which would need to be reconsidered, and put into action gradually over 
time. Returning to one of my hypotheses, the prospects o f  the Thai Senate in becoming a 
prominent diplomatic actor lies upon the actors ’ values and perceptions on the importance o f  
international diplomatic duties', this statement has been gradually emphasised throughout the 
research. During the temporary period of their term in office, senators should make the most 
of their duties and professionalism. The engagement in work that is preliminary intellectual 
and serves civic or individual need, requires specialised skills and training, mainly 
autonomous and self-regulating, committed to furtherance of basic ethical norms, are 
characteristics of a professional (Meyers, Wyatt, Borden, & Wasserman, 2012, p. 190). Also, 
their values, perceptions, attitude towards both domestic and international diplomatic duties 
would add up to a better performance and prospective mission outcomes.
Yet again, this is not to suggest that the senators are only a group of senior professionals who 
take their positions for granted but the research has been an attempt to clarify the nature of 
the Senate as an institution and the nature of its members, the senators. The historical 
background of Thai politics has definitely shaped the rituals of conduct within the political 
institution and it is difficult to determine whether there would be any transformations to the
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system in the near or later future. However, what would be suggested at this point is that 
senators, as individuals, have the ability to contemplate and make decisions, based on their 
background professions and knowledge about their duties as senators. Political views are also 
another important element that each person has rights to believe in, but they should not use 
this as a constraint or a domineering factor during their performance in office.
On a particular foreign trip, for instance with the President of the Senate or with a standing 
committee, a Secretariat staff usually would be assigned as delegation secretary. Staff from 
the Bureau of Foreign Affairs would be assigned if the President were head of the delegation, 
but staff from individual committees would be responsible for following the delegation if the 
head of the delegation were Chairperson of a committee. The duties include updating contacts 
and appointments to whom the delegation would be meeting and the places they will be 
visiting. Therefore, Senate staff who act as delegation secretary should definitely understand 
their duties thoroughly and keep themselves alert at all times. When problems arise, they 
would also need to handle the situation professionally. My argument to this point is that the 
international diplomatic duties of the Thai Senate can be defined by the quality of the two 
actors which have been raised in this research; the senators and the senate staff. From the 
start, they need to have a positive relationship in working together and realise the importance 
of keeping oneself up-to-dated with worldly information and as diplomacy is a regulated 
process of communication between at least two subjects, conducted by their representative 
agents over a particular object (Constantinou, 1996, p.25).
Skills and knowledge improvement of staff to be more competent in order to facilitate and 
assist senators in international diplomatic missions are also crucial. Even though the Senate 
staff do understand the process and procedures of parliamentary diplomacy, they cannot
248
Conclusion
exceed the framework of their duties. At the same time, senators would not be able to exceed 
their duty framework as stated by the Constitution either. What has been leamt is that the 
institutional rules and constitutional limitations provide a grounded duty framework for the 
actors, therefore they strictly follow what they are expected to do. However, in certain 
situations thinking ‘outside of the box’, by being more assertive or utilising first-hand 
problem solving skills. In other words, apart from the formal regulations they are obliged to 
follow, the actors should assimilate themselves with the institutional norms. The statement is 
implying that it would be ideal if the actors are able to combine their duties according to the 
Constitution and to the institutional requirements, or by following the collective rules of the 
group as it is often likely that individual once they ‘socialise’ together they tend to form a 
collective norm among the members. Even if the argument was stressed that the Senate staff 
have better understanding about the international diplomatic duties of the Senate than the 
senators who are supposed to be the primary actors themselves, both groups of actors -  being 
part of the institution and working together in tandem -  should constitute their duties to the 
long-term improvement of the Senate’s overall functioning. In fact, senators are 
contemporary political actors while senate staff are permanent civil servants. Therefore, their 
understandings and experiences on foreign diplomatic duties are different. This fact then 
leads to the presentation of the diplomatic actors in this study, referring to the senators and 
senate staff, performing their duties according to their existing knowledge, professional 
background, norms and regulations within the institution.
The globalised world has encouraged increasing numbers of diplomatic actors. Although the 
conventional diplomatic establishment would remain within the nation’s Foreign Office, my 
prediction would be that other alternative international diplomatic actors would continue to 
create and maintain bilateral or multilateral relations among their foreign counterparts. This,
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significantly, will have a contributing impact on the conventional path of diplomacy and 
international relations building. Directions and development for present -  the Thai Senate, as 
well as the Thai parliament as a whole -  should have a solid and clear institutional structure, 
properly outlined for members to follow. Also, during their term in office the senators should 
see themselves with dual responsibilities; on legislative scrutiny and on the international 
diplomatic duties. Even if these roles are temporary, they should perceive it not only as an 
opportunity to represent the government but also to utilise their professional knowledge and 
skills to what may be of beneficial to the country.
The conclusion of parliamentary diplomacy can be summarised as follows accordingly. 
Parliamentary diplomacy is predicted to keep on developing, as it is still in its early stages. It 
may well be that the conceptualisation of parliamentary diplomacy would be to build and 
maintain relations among actors in the parliamentary level, through the exchange of 
knowledge and values -  this may include official cooperation -  on legislative affairs or 
specific issues that will enable benefits towards each party involved. Further, parliamentary 
diplomacy is a path to stimulate, brainstorm ideas and thoughts on how to improve a 
particular situation. But most of the meetings and activities involved are more likely to talk 
about a situation rather than aim at conflict resolution (except for the case of the Thai- 
Cambodian border conflict).
Moreover, the direction of parliamentary diplomacy would depend firstly on the perceptions 
of the actors during their term in office, whether they take their responsibilities seriously. It is 
an inevitable fact that professional individuals enter parliament to utilise their skills and 
knowledge. However, they should always bear in mind that during their senatorship in 
parliament they should focus on their professional contribution to parliamentary affairs e.g.
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specific committee affairs, their provincial representation, and other responsibilities related to 
their background profession. Most importantly, senators should be aware that as 
representatives of the citizens Jfrom every province they should contribute fully to their 
appointed duties than rationalising benefits and fame from a temporary political career in 
parliament. Suggested further research would be on issues including a concise outline of 
institutional policy within the framework of the Senate and studies on bicameral parliaments, 
the position of the institutional actors in parliamentary diplomatic activities, and the 
contribution of parliamentary institutions to diplomacy and democracy-building.
This research was not only conducted in order to theorise parliamentary diplomacy and study 
the role of the Thai Senate as a diplomatic actor, but also to add a contribution towards the 
studies of legislatures in developing countries in Southeast Asia. The Thai Senate has been 
raised as a case study on parliamentary functionings in terms of the institutional mechanism, 
and an intensive example on legislative institutions being diplomatic actors. The conclusion 
would often come up as parliaments in this region were sometimes powerful but in practically 
no case were they the decisive institution for policy output, as other important factors shape 
politics in these countries (Ziegenhain, 2008, p.5).
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APPENDICES
A .l Semi-structured interview outline
Interview points: Perspectives on the Thai Senate’s International Diplomatie duties
Introduction
Purpose of interview: to collect primary qualitative information for PhD level 
research on parliamentary diplomacy 
Time: approximately 3 0 -4 5  minutes 
Ethical issues
o Permission to record the interview for transcription and analysis 
o Privacy of obtained information
Duties
Personal background
o Professional experience 
o Specialised area 
- Nature of duties / responsibilities in the Thai Senate 
o Domestic duties 
o International duties .
Senate committee
o Membership in committee(s) 
o Position in committee(s)
o Reason/factors for becoming members in particular committee(s) 
o Duties in committee(s)
Diplomatic actor: individual 
o Role / duties
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o Perspectives on parliamentary diplomacy 
o Future prospects ; plans after senatorship 
Diplomatie actor: institutional 
o Role / duties
o Perspectives on parliamentary diplomacy 
o Future prospects 
Any further helpful suggestions on parliameiitary diplomacy?
Example of main questions
detailed questions were further elaborated during the course o f  each interview
Please give your opinion on the international diplomatic duties of the Senate 
Do you think diplomatic duties are important? From your point of view and your 
responsibility?
Do you consider yourself as a diplomatic actor?
Please give your opinion on prospects of the international diplomatic duties of the 
Senate and whether the Senate can be seen as a diplomatic actor in the future? 
Any further comments or suggestions on the Thai Senate being a parliamentary 
diplomatic actor?
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A.2 List of international diplomatic duties
The numbers and figures presented in the following tables were collected from summary 
reports from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs. Data and numbers were recorded according to the 
countries where the President of the Senate and senators from different committees have 
officially visited. However, ‘N/A’ refers to the fact that data was not applicable for collection 
due to incomplete data records, and ‘0’ refers to the no activities.
Foreign Visits
YEAR NUMBER OF VISITS
2006 N/A
2007 7
2008 0
2009 N/A
2010 19
2011 6
2012 2
Courtesy calls
YEAR NUMBER OF VISITS
2006 13
2007 28
2008 30
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Japan, Romania, India, Finland, 
Cuba, Cambodia, France, Morocco, 
Russia, America, Czech, Chile, 
New Zealand, Lao PDR, 
Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Peru, 
Italy, Australia, Madagascar, 
Vietnam, Germany.
2009 18
Netherlands, China, UK, Saudi 
Arabia, Cuba, Greece, Germany, 
Lao PDR, Austria, Belgium, 
Romania, Chile, Israel, Canada, 
Myanmar, Bhutan, Iran, South 
Korea, Argentina, New Zealand, 
Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Singapore, Australia.
2010 28
2011 34
2012 31
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YEAR NUMBER OF VISITS
2006 1
2007 13
2008 1
2009 13
Spain, Morocco, USA,
Mexico,Singapore, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, Austria, China, 
Bhutan, Belgium, Netherlands, 
France, Italy, South Africa, Malta, 
Italy, Argentina, Brazil
2010 19
2011 3
2012 15
Reception hosting
YEAR NUMBER OF VISITS
2006 2
2007 25
2008 NFA
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2009 16
UK, China, Germany, Lao PDR, 
Egypt, Poland, Romania, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Japan.
2010 19
Bhutan, Russia, India, Philippines, 
South Korea, Switzerland, Bahrain, 
China, Namibia, Japan, Germany, 
Peru, Argentina, Malaysia, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Vietnam, Cyprus, Spain.
2011 6
China, Romania, Nigeria, Spain, 
UK, Japan, Iran, Vietnam, Peru, 
Singapore, Israel, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Italy, South Korea, 
Switzerland, Russia.
2012 6
Source: Based on individual reports from the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, Secretariat of the 
Senate, Bangkok.
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Primary sources 
List of interviews 
Senators
Name Position Date of interview
H.E. Mr. Prasobsook 
Boondech
President of the Senate 
(2008-2011)
17/3/2011
Mr. Nikom Vairajpanich First Vice-President of the 
Senate
17/3/2011
Mr. Buncha Pongarynkool Senator, Committee on 
Agriculture
25/3/2011
Mr. Jittipoj Viriyaroj Senator, Committee on 
Constitutional Institution 
Affairs and Auditing 
Budgets
24/3/2011
Ms. Paradee 
Jongsuthanamanee
Senator, Committee on 
Transportation
28/3/2011
Ms. Pikulkeaw Krairiksh Chairperson, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs
17/3/2011
Mr. Siriwat Krai sin Chairperson, Committee on 
Education
30/3/2011
Mr. Surachai 
Chaitrakulthong
Chairperson, Committee on 
. Economics, Trade, and 
Industry
23/3/2011
255
References and Bibliography
Mr. Suradet Jiratthichareon Chairperson, Committee on 
Energy
2/5/2011
Mr. Tuanabdullah 
Daudmareyo
Senator, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs
25/3/2011
Mr. Vittaya Inala Chairperson, Committee on 
Monetary, Finance, 
Banking, and Financial 
Institutions
23AV2011
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Name Position Date of Interview
Ms.La-or Pnthonyai Director, Bureau of Foreign 
Affairs
28/4/2011
Mr. Somsak Manimpichu Deputy Secretary-General 3/5/2011
Mr.Montri Rnpsnwan Legal Advisor 25/3/2011
Ms. Saijai Ketsuwan Legal officer, Committee on 
Economics, trade, and 
Industry
23/3/2011
Anonymous (female) Group director. Bureau of 
Strategies and Policy
24/3/2011
Mr.Rawat Wannurak Officer, Bureau of Foreign 
Languages
21/3/2011
Anonymous (female) Officer, Bureau of Foreign 
Languages
21/3/2011
Ms. Somying Thadathibeth Protocol group director. 
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
27/4/2011
Ms. Nattaya Suksagnuen Officer, Bureau of Official 
Information
21/3/2011
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Secretariat o f the House o f Representatives
Name Position Date of Interview
Anonymous (female) Group director, Bureau of 
International Organisations
29/3/2011
Ms. Kanteera Leelanond Officer, Bureau of 
International Organisations
29/3/2011
External representatives
Name Position Date of Interview
Anonymous (male) Retired senior official. Rice 
Department, Ministry of 
Agriculture
23/3/2011
Dr.Thawinwadee Bureekul Department Director, 
Prapokklao Institute
26/4/2011
Anonymous (female) Biology teacher, Yupparaj 
Wittayalai School,
Chiang Mai
19/4/2011
Ms. Napamon Roongwitoo Journalist, Bangkok Post 28/4/2011
Mr. Surachet Yothadee Freelance lawyer 19/4/2011
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